

Speech 356 (86D-E, 87B). Can the premises here be modified so as to arrive at non-contradictory conclusions?

494 (97A). "Rightly" translates *orthôs* and "right" translates *kaios*. All the other instances of "right" or "rightly" in this section of the dialogue refer to *orthôs*, the adverb for "correct", "right", "straight". Consider our cognate "orthodox", which in Greek would mean "right" or "correct opinion". See the notes for Speeches 406 (89C) and 502 (97B).

498 (97A). See, on Larissa, the note for Speech 1 (70B).

502 (97B). Socrates does not seem to distinguish here (or in Speech 504 [97B]) "right" (*orthê*) "opinion" (*doxa*) from "true" (*alêthês*) "opinion" (*doxa*). Is this because Socrates is ignoring here the distinction between theory and practice? Or is it that the distinction between all opinion, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other hand (Speeches 330-334 [85C-D] and 512-518 [97D-98B]), renders the distinction between theory and practice meaningless among opinions? (*Alêthês* means, literally, "unhidden".) See, also, the note for Speech 518 (98B). See, for the development elsewhere of the distinction between theory and practice, Plato, *Republic* 472E-473A. See, as well, the notes for Speeches 434 (92C) and 520-522 (98B-C).

See, on *orthôs*, the notes for Speeches 406 (89C), 444 (93D), 494 (97A), and 562 (99E).

512 (97D). See, on Daedalus, Plato, *Euthyphro* 11B sq (where Daedalus is identified as an ancestor of Socrates). See, also, the note for Speech 514 (97D).

514 (97D). "[A]mong the marvels attributed to this legendary craftsman [Daedalus] was the making of statues which moved—perhaps a mythical representation of the development of sculpture to suggest the human body in motion rather than [in] repose." Mollin and Williamson, *An Introduction to Ancient Greek*, p. 401. See the note for Speech 426 (91D).

516 (97E-98A). Socrates, both before and after this speech, seems to use "right opinion" and "true opinion" interchangeably. Here (and in Speech 526 [98C-D]), he uses both terms in the same speech. See the note for Speech 406 (89C).

516 (98A). "Causes" translates *aitias*. This word and its adjectival form are also common legal terms for "charge", "accusation", "guilt", "credit". The basic notion seems to be that it is what is responsible for something, so that it can sometimes mean a reason for something. Consider Speech 2 (70B) ("the one responsible...is Gorgias"). Consider, also, our word *aetiology*.

To "bind" right opinions "means to find reasons for them in one's own thinking." Klein, *A Commentary on the Meno*, p. 248.

518 (98B). Is Socrates, in making "images and conjectures", like Daedalus? Consider Speech 356 (86D-88C).

Speeches 516 (97E-98A) and 518 (98B) not only distinguish opinion from knowledge but also indicate how one moves through and from opinions to knowledge by binding them "with causes by reasoning." Despite the essential defect of opinions, not all opinions are equal. True opinions are better than false opinions. Are we not supplied with a standard for distinguishing among true opinions? The more a true opinion is supported by evidence of causes through reasoning, the better it is.

See the note for Speech 502 (97D). See, also, the note for Speech 434 (92C).

520-522 (98B-C). Consider similar discussions by Aristotle. Knowledge and art, he says, arise for human beings out of experience. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 980b28-981a13. Art is defined as a steady capacity to make in accordance with a true and rational account. See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140a9-11. "As concerns acting, experience does not seem to differ from art at all, but those people with experience are even more successful than those who have a rational account but are without experience (and this is because experience is awareness of particulars, but art is awareness of universals, and all actions and belongings are concerned with the particular...)." *Metaphysics* 981a13-17. Aristotle agrees with Socrates that opinion is property of that which is variable and that particulars are indeed variable.

526 (98D). "Nor are they acquired" is in most manuscripts. "Some commentators think better sense is made if *oullêl* [the Greek for "nor"] is considered a scribe's miscopying of *oullal* [the Greek for "they are"]" Mollin and Williamson, *An Introduction to Ancient Greek*, p. 403. Thus, the latter part of this speech could be translated, "and neither of these two is natural to human beings—neither knowledge nor true opinion, but is acquired—or does it seem to you that neither of them is by nature?" Consider the opening speech of this dialogue. Consider, also, the note for Speech 113 (77B). Consider, as well, the note for Speech 2 (71B).

548 (99A). Our translation follows the reading of the manuscripts (*epigignetai*, "consequent to"). In defending the conjecture followed here by most modern editors, Thompson argues, "But Virtue has never been described as an *epigignêna* ('consequence') of Knowledge." *The Meno of Plato*, p. 253. But has not this possibility been indicated in the very speech by Socrates that precedes this one, and in other places? Virtue (that is, virtuous action and character) seems to be said in these passages to be consequent upon direction from true opinion or knowledge. See the note for Speech 338 (85D).

552 (99B). Anytus, then, would still seem to be present at this discussion or at least visible to Socrates and Meno. The word "here" could be thought of as accompanied by some gesture. See, also, Speeches 561 (99E) and 564 (100B). Klein speaks of Anytus as being present, "phantom-like." *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*, p. 253. It might be wondered as well whether Anytus had joined this gathering before he is referred to in Speech 412 (96A).

The lines drawn by Socrates for the Slave-boy, even if routinely erased as they proceed, can all be considered to linger "phantom-like" (and, as such,

are all incorporated in Figure 64 of Appendix B of this volume). See the notes for Speeches 204 (82B) and 206 (82C).

554 (99B). "Good judgment based on opinion" translates *eudoxia*, which also means "good reputation".

558 (99D). "Divinely inspired" translates *enthousiazemai*: *thous* is a contracted form of *theos*, "god"; *enthous* is, then, "having a god within". The English words "enthused", "enthusiasm", and "enthusiastic" are derived from this root. See the note for Speech 434 (92C).

560 (99D). Laconians is another name for the Spartans (or Lacedaemonians). Laconia is the region which contains Sparta.

561 (99E). See Speech 552 (99B). See, also, Bluck, *Plato's Meno*, pp. 432-33.

562 (99E). "Rightly" here is not *orthôs*, which is more in the sense of "correctly", but rather *kaliôs*, which is more in the sense of "nobly". See the notes for Speeches 113 (77B) and 404 (89C).

562 (100A). Homer's lines are from his *Odyssey*, X, 494-495, where it is said that this power was bestowed on Tiresias by the goddess Persephone. See, on Persephone, the notes for Speeches 110 (76E) and 194 (81B-C). Tiresias, who figures prominently in the stories of Oedipus and Antigone, is associated with Thebes. See, on Thebes, the note for Speech 412 (90A).

"Shadows" are critical in the Cave of Plato's *Republic*, Book VII.

564 (100B-C). Jacob Klein, as he prepares to conclude his study of the *Meno* by reviewing Socrates' account of "the result of the entire dialogue" (in Speeches 562-564 [99E-100C]), observes, "Let us not forget: he is talking to Meno." *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*, p. 255.

See the notes for Speeches 274 (83E-84A) and 282 (84B-C).

APPENDIX A OATHS IN THE MENO

I. The oaths are collected here for each of the characters who utter them:

Socrates 1. "by the gods" (Speech 10 [71D])

2. "by Zeus" (Speech 404 [89C])

Meno

1. "by Zeus" (Speech 197 [82A])

2. "by Zeus" (Speech 463 [95B])

3. "By Zeus" (Speech 477 [96B])

4. "By Zeus" (Speech 517 [98A])

Slave-boy

1. "by Zeus" (Speech 245 [83B])

2. "by Zeus" (Speech 275 [84A])

Anytus

1. "by Zeus" (Speech 421 [90E])

2. "by Heracles" (Speech 425 [91C])

3. "by Zeus" (Speech 429 [92B])

4. "by Zeus" (Speech 451 [93E])

II. The oaths are collected here in the order in which they were uttered:

1. Socrates: "by the gods" (Speech 10 [71D])

2. Meno: "by Zeus" (Speech 197 [82A])

3. Slave-boy: "by Zeus" (Speech 245 [83B])

4. Slave-boy: "by Zeus" (Speech 275 [84A])

5. Socrates: "by Zeus" (Speech 404 [89C])

6. Anytus: "by Zeus" (Speech 421 [90E])

7. Anytus: "by Heracles" (Speech 425 [91C])

8. Anytus: "by Zeus" (Speech 429 [92B])

9. Anytus: "by Zeus" (Speech 451 [93E])

10. Meno: "by Zeus" (Speech 463 [95B])

11. Meno: "By Zeus" (Speech 477 [96B])

12. Meno: "By Zeus" (Speech 517 [98A])

APPENDIX B GEOMETRICAL DIAGRAMS

These figures track the steps in the geometrical developments from Speech 204 (82B) through Speech 322 (85B) of the *Memo*. The steps suggested here are sometimes no more than a pointing to or a counting of what is already there, with the bolder line(s) in each instance identifying what is immediately being drawn, referred to, or counted. All sixty-four figures are drawn to the same scale. See the notes for Speeches 204 (82B) and 206 (82C). See, also, the notes for Speeches 224 (82D) and 552 (99B).

Fourteen of the figures are repeated in this fashion:

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|
| I. 3, 6 | VIII. 29, 35, 39 |
| II. 8, 10 | IX. 34, 37 |
| III. 17, 22, 24, 26 | X. 48, 52 |
| IV. 18, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30 | XI. 49, 53 |
| V. 19, 40, 46 | XII. 50, 55, 59 |
| VI. 20, 45 | XIII. 51, 62 |
| VII. 28, 31 | XIV. 58, 63 |



FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2



FIGURE 3



FIGURE 4



FIGURE 5



FIGURE 6



FIGURE 7



FIGURE 8



FIGURE 9



FIGURE 10




FIGURE 11




FIGURE 12




FIGURE 13




FIGURE 14




FIGURE 15




FIGURE 16




FIGURE 17




FIGURE 18




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


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


FIGURE 21




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


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


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


FIGURE 25




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


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


FIGURE 28




FIGURE 29




FIGURE 30




FIGURE 31




FIGURE 32




FIGURE 33




FIGURE 34




FIGURE 35




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


FIGURE 47




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


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


FIGURE 50




FIGURE 51




FIGURE 52




FIGURE 56




FIGURE 57




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


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


FIGURE 60




FIGURE 61




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


FIGURE 54




FIGURE 55




FIGURE 62




FIGURE 63




FIGURE 64