5 E

FIFTH EDITION

Social Psychology

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
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
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination

PARENTS OFTEN DREAD THE DAY WHEN THEY have to have "the conversation" with their child. For many parents, the conversation entails an awkward discussion about sex, birth control, sexually transmitted diseases, perhaps even the existence of sexual predators. For elderly parents talking to an adult child, the conversation might be about "do not resuscitate" orders and directives about what to do with their bodies when they die.

But for African-American parents, the conversation is so much more wrenching and urgent. They have to tell their children how to act when they are stopped by the police (Gandbhir & Foster, 2015). And they have good reason to teach them about *when*, not *if*, because African-Americans, particularly African-American males, are stopped by police far more often than people of other races. One study of the New Jersey State Police found that African-Americans accounted for 42 percent of the drivers stopped by police even though they accounted for only 15 percent of verified violations (Brown & Jantzi, 2010).

The conversation for African-American parents focuses on the unpleasant truth that their children cannot expect to be treated the same as white children. Police officers will treat them with greater suspicion, sometimes with greater hostility, and, disturbingly often, with greater force—even deadly force. The many deaths of black men at the hands of the police—Tamir Rice, Trayvon Martin, Philando Castile, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Jr., Freddie Gray, and many others—that have given rise to the Black Lives Matter movement make this particular conversation an unfortunate necessity for conscientious black parents.

The need for such conversations and for community workshops designed to teach black youth how to live safely in twenty-first-century America (Ross, 2017)

Why has violence and mistreatment toward African-Americans persisted in the United States?

How much are people's identities derived from the groups to which they belong?

How does the success of the Obamas or Oprah challenge negative perceptions of people of color?

speak to the issues we discuss in this chapter—stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination and what can be done to deal with these facets of the human condition. Why is it that some individuals, all part of the same human family, are treated so differently than others because of their skin color, gender, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, or even their age or occupation?

"The conversation," along with the troubles it reflects, takes place against a background of indisputable progress. Slavery still exists in some pockets of the world but is no longer a sanctioned, state-sponsored enterprise. The world is now more multicultural than ever, with members of different races, ethnicities, and religions living and working alongside one another more peacefully and productively than ever before. In 2008, and again in 2012, the United States elected its first African-American president, a triumph that nearly all pioneers of the Civil Rights Movement said they never thought they'd see in their lifetime. As Martin Luther King, Jr., famously noted in 1965, "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."

Despite such progress, however, the origins of the Black Lives Matter movement make it abundantly clear that the human tendencies to stereotype, harbor prejudice, and engage in discrimination are still with us. So, too, do the actions of white supremacist Dylan Roof, who, on June 17, 2015, stormed into Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in South Carolina and, hoping to start a race war, killed nine African-American worshippers. Beyond the United States, Sunni and Shia Muslims are at each other's throats in numerous hotspots in the Middle East, and the prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians seem as remote as ever. Recent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Darfur, Rwanda, Somalia, and Ukraine show that intergroup enmity continues to be a distressingly common component of the human condition. And although the legalization of same-sex marriage in many European countries and the United States is a sign of genuine improvement in civil rights, gays and lesbians continue to face discrimination—daily and worldwide. Women in nearly all countries continue to earn less than men doing comparable work, elderly people are often dismissed as incompetent, and people who are not good-looking have challenges that their more attractive peers never face. Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are still all around us. As Martin Luther King also noted, "Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable." ■

Theoretical Perspectives

The pervasiveness of stereotypes and the persistence of ethnic, religious, and racial animosity challenge us to understand the underlying causes of intergroup tension. Where do stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination come from? Why do they persist? What can be done to eliminate or reduce their impact?

Any serious attempt to address these questions must begin with the recognition that there will likely never be a single, comprehensive theory of the causes of stereotyping, prejudice, or discrimination. Their causes are many and varied, and any satisfactory account of these intertwined phenomena must incorporate numerous elements. This chapter focuses on three general perspectives that shed light on these issues. The *economic perspective* identifies the roots of intergroup hostility in competing interests that can set groups apart from one another. The *motivational*

perspective emphasizes the psychological needs that lead to intergroup conflict. The *cognitive perspective* traces the origin of stereotyping to the same cognitive processes that enable people to categorize, say, items of furniture into distinct classes of chairs, couches, and tables. This perspective takes into account the frequent conflict between people's consciously held beliefs and values and their quick, reflexive, sometimes subconscious reactions to members of other groups.

Note that these three perspectives are exactly that—*perspectives*, not sharply defined categories. They're also not competing accounts, but complementary elements of a more complete analysis. These three elements often influence one another. Take, for example, victims of genocide. Jews, expatriate Chinese, and Armenians have all been the victims of genocide. The reasons in each case were partly economic, as these groups were richer than many others in their countries. The economic element may have driven the cognitive element, which caused people to perceive these minority groups as fundamentally different from themselves. The cognitive element in turn may have fed into the motivational element of anger over the wealth obtained by prominent members of these minority groups. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these processes necessarily happen in a precise order; for example, seeing these minority groups as different from the mainstream might have made it easier for people to notice and resent their wealth and to focus their attention on the members of these groups who were wealthy. Certainly, the three elements tend to be tightly intertwined. Nevertheless, the distinctions between the economic, motivational, and cognitive perspectives is useful for the purpose of organizing and thinking clearly about the varied causes of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination—and about ways that intergroup conflict might be reduced. In this chapter, we'll examine each of these perspectives in turn. But first let's take a closer look at the nature of intergroup bias.

Characterizing Intergroup Bias

Do you believe that Asians are conscientious, Italians are temperamental, Muslims are fanatical, or that Californians are "laid back"? Such beliefs are examples of **stereotypes**—beliefs that certain attributes are characteristic of members of particular groups. Stereotyping is a way of categorizing people (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). A stereotype can be positive or negative, largely true or entirely false. It involves thinking about a person not as an individual, but as a member of a group, and projecting your beliefs about the group onto that person.

Certain stereotypes have some truth to them and others don't. Consider the old joke that heaven is a place where you have an American house, a German car, French food, British police, an Italian lover, and everything is run by the Swiss. Hell, on the other hand, is a place where you have a Japanese house, a French car, British food, German police, a Swiss lover, and everything is run by the Italians. The Swiss bureaucracy is indeed more widely praised than the Italian's, and automobile magazines rave more about what's rolling off the assembly lines at BMW and Audi than at Peugeot and Renault. Some stereotypes are accurate. But is there really any reason to be especially wary of German police? There certainly was during the 1930s and 1940s, but has German law enforcement been unusually harsh or corrupt since then? Maybe, maybe not. Are Italian lovers preferable to Swiss? You make the call.

"I speak French to my ambassadors, English to my accountant, Italian to my mistress, Latin to my God and German to my horse."
—FREDERICK THE GREAT OF PRUSSIA

stereotype A belief that certain attributes are characteristic of members of a particular group.

SEEDS OF INTERGROUP BIAS
(A) The stereotype of African-Americans being more likely than other groups to break the law, combined with anti-black sentiment, can lead to discriminatory behavior, such as police officers pulling over African-American drivers in wildly disproportionate numbers. (B) The stereotype linking Islam with extremism can lead to negative reactions toward Muslims and Islamic institutions. (C) The Trump administration created the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) office to publicize the plight of victims of crimes committed by undocumented immigrants, thereby highlighting immigrant crime but not the same crimes committed by U.S. citizens.

Stereotypes about Swiss administrators, German police, or Italian lovers are not what concern most social psychologists, however (Judd & Park, 1993). They've focused instead on those stereotypes that are most likely to lead to pernicious forms of prejudice and discrimination.

Prejudice refers to an attitudinal and affective response toward a group and its individual members. Negative attitudes generally get the most attention, but it's also possible to be positively prejudiced toward a group. Prejudice involves *prejudging* others because they belong to a specific category. **Discrimination** refers to favorable or unfavorable *behavior* directed toward members of a group. It involves unfair treatment of others, based not on their individual character or abilities, but strictly on their group membership.

Roughly speaking, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination refer to the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, respectively, that drive negative relationships between groups. The three often go together. People are more inclined to injure those they hold in low regard. But these components of intergroup bias don't *have* to occur together. For example, it's possible (and common) to be prejudiced but not engage in discrimination, if only to avoid social or legal repercussions. On the flip side, a person can also discriminate without prejudice. Jewish parents sometimes say they don't want their children to marry outside the faith, not because they have a low opinion of other groups, but because they're concerned about assimilation with non-Jews and its implications for the future of Judaism. Thus, ingroup favoritism can arise even when there isn't any hostility toward different outgroups. Sometimes, of course, statements such as "I have nothing against them, but . . ." are merely cover-ups of underlying bigotry. At other times, they are doubtless sincere and don't reflect any bad intent—but they can cause insult and injury nonetheless (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006; Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006).

Contemporary Prejudice

Throughout much of the world, norms about how different groups are viewed and treated have changed. In Western countries in particular, it's illegal to engage in many forms of discrimination that were common half a century ago, and it's not socially acceptable to express the sorts of prejudices and stereotypes that were common (and brazenly open) until relatively recently. These changes have caused some people to be conflicted between what they truly think and feel and what they think they *should* think and feel (or what they believe is prudent to say or do publicly). For many people, the changes have also created a conflict between competing beliefs and values (such as a belief in equal treatment for all but also a desire to make up for past injustice toward racial minorities with affirmative action). Similarly, people might experience a conflict between abstract beliefs and gut-level reactions (such as a belief that one should feel the same toward all people but also some hard-to-shake resistance to that belief). In addition, as research has shown, some people's responses to members of other groups are nonconscious and automatic and may differ considerably from their more thoughtful and explicit beliefs and attitudes. These kinds of conflicts have inspired social psychologists to develop new theories to explain this modern, more constrained, more conflicted sort of prejudice (Dovidio, 2001).

This shift in theoretical approaches is particularly noteworthy with respect to race relations in the United States. Some have argued that old-fashioned racism has largely disappeared in the United States but has been supplanted by a subtler, more modern counterpart (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2005; Sears & Kinder, 1985; see also Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993 on homophobia; and Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995 on sexism). In one example of this theoretical shift, **modern racism** is defined as a rejection of explicitly racist beliefs—for example, that black people are morally inferior to white people—while nevertheless feeling animosity toward African-Americans or being highly suspicious of them and uncomfortable dealing with them.

Sam Gaertner and Jack Dovidio (1986; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) have led the way in exploring the conflicts and inconsistencies that often accompany modern racism. They note that many people hold strong egalitarian values that lead them to reject prejudice and discrimination, yet they also harbor unacknowledged negative feelings and attitudes toward minority groups that stem from ingroup favoritism and a desire to defend the status quo (Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Whether these individuals will express prejudice or discriminate depends on the situation. If they can't identify a justification or "disguise" for discriminatory action, their responses will conform to their egalitarian values. But if they sense, even nonconsciously, that a suitable rationalization is available, the modern racist's prejudices will emerge.

In an early test of this idea, white participants were in a position to aid a white or black person in need of medical assistance (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; see also Dovidio, Smith, Donella, & Gaertner, 1997; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005). If the participants thought they were the only one who could help, they came to the aid of the black person somewhat more often (94 percent of the time) than the white person (81 percent). But when they thought other people were present and their own inaction could be justified on nonracial grounds ("I thought somebody else with more expertise would intervene"), they helped the black person much less often than the white person (38 percent versus 75 percent). In situations such as this, the prejudice or discrimination is "masked," and the individual remains comfortably unaware

of any racist impulses. Thus, modern racism shows itself in subtle ways. The modern racist would never join the Ku Klux Klan but might consistently give black passersby a wider berth. Such a person might never utter a racist word, but might insist that "discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States" (this statement is an item on the Modern Racism Scale; McConahay, 1986).

In another study, white participants evaluated black and white applicants to college (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002). Participants all had scores on the Attitudes toward Blacks Scale that indicated that they were either high or low in explicit prejudice toward blacks. All participants rated white and black applicants the same when the applicants either excelled on all relevant dimensions (such as SAT scores and grade point average) or were below average on all dimensions. But when the applicants excelled on certain dimensions (for example, high SAT scores) and were below average on others (for example, low GPA), the ratings of prejudiced and unprejudiced participants diverged: the prejudiced participants rated the black applicants less favorably than did the unprejudiced participants. Here, prejudiced participants could defend their responses as nondiscriminatory by claiming that the dimensions on which the black applicants fell short were more important than those on which they excelled.

Theories of contemporary prejudice, such as the theory of modern racism, are important because while they track the undeniable progress that's been made in how members of historically marginalized or stigmatized groups are treated, they also uncover subtle forms of prejudice and discrimination that still persist and need to be combated. None of this, however, should blind us to the fact that old-fashioned, virulent intergroup hatred and discrimination are still disturbingly common. There's nothing "modern" about ISIS and other Islamic extremist groups killing "apostates" and claiming that they're serving Allah when they do so. Nor is there anything modern about the fact that in some U.S. states, on the night that Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, there were more Internet searches for "[n-word] president" than "first black president" (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2017).

"Benevolent" Racism and Sexism

Statements like "Some of my best friends are_____" (fill in the blank) or "I'm not sexist; I love women!" illustrate a common conviction that stereotypes must be negative to be harmful. In fact, however, many of our "isms"—racism, sexism, ageism, heterosexism—can be ambivalent, containing both negative and positive features (Czopp, Kay, & Cheryan, 2015; Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Ho & Jackson, 2001). Someone might believe, for example, that Asians are less warm and more rigid than whites—and at the same time believe they are more intellectually gifted. Similarly, someone might believe that women are less intelligent than men—and at the same time believe that women are kinder and have better social skills.

In their work on ambivalent sexism, Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (2001a, 2001b) interviewed 15,000 men and women in 19 nations and found that "benevolent" sexism (a chivalrous ideology marked by protectiveness and affection toward women who embrace conventional roles) often coexists with hostile sexism (dislike of nontraditional women and those viewed as usurping men's power). Glick and Fiske argue that even these seemingly positive stereotypes aren't benign.

Ambivalent and benevolent sexist or racist attitudes may be particularly resistant to change. The favorable features of such beliefs enable the stereotype holder to deny any prejudice. (Think of the trucker who romanticizes women so much he decorates his mud flaps with their likeness.)

By rewarding women and minorities for conforming to the status quo—for acting in ways that are in keeping with the stereotypes about them—benevolent sexism and racism inhibit progress toward equality. In other words, those who hold ambivalent attitudes tend to act positively toward members of outgroups only if those members fulfill their idealized image of what such people should be like—say, the happy housewife or the dutiful staffer bringing coffee. Members of the outgroup who deviate from the stereotype tend to be treated with hostility (Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008). Furthermore, benevolent sexism can be just as damaging as hostile sexism. In one study, for example, women treated in a paternalistic manner (a kind of benevolent sexism) did not perform as well on a series of intellectual tests because of the self-doubts aroused by the treatment they received (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007).

Measuring Attitudes about Groups

The most straightforward way to assess how people feel about various groups is, of course, to ask them. Researchers have done so in two ways. First, they've provided survey respondents with a list of trait adjectives and asked them to indicate which ones they believe characterize members of different groups—the elderly, the wealthy, Latinos, and so on (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Katz & Braly, 1933). Second, researchers have developed various self-report questionnaires that ask respondents about their attitudes and beliefs about members of different groups, including the Attitudes toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993), the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), the Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni, Saltstone, & Hughes, 1990), and the Sexual Prejudice Scale (Chonody, 2013).

But surveys of people's attitudes toward certain groups can't always be trusted because respondents may not think it's acceptable to express what they really feel or because what people report verbally is only a part of their stance toward members of other groups, and there may be other beliefs or feelings beneath the surface. Given that so many forms of prejudice are ambivalent, uncertain, or hidden—even from the self—they're not easily tapped through self-report (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Social psychologists have therefore developed more subtle self-report measures (Fiske & North, 2015) and created a number of indirect, non-self-report measures of prejudice and stereotyping. We discuss two types here: the implicit association test and different types of priming procedures. (For overviews of a wider set of implicit measurement procedures, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007.)

THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST (IAT) Anthony Greenwald and Mazarin Banaji (1995) pioneered a technique called the **implicit association test (IAT)** for revealing subtle, nonconscious prejudices, even among those who sincerely believe they are bias-free. Here's how the technique works. A series of words or pictures are presented on a computer screen, and the respondent presses a key with the left hand if the picture or word conforms to one rule and another key with the right hand if it conforms to another rule. Before you read further, either

implicit association test (IAT) A technique for revealing nonconscious attitudes toward different stimuli, particularly groups of people.

BOX 11.1

Not So Fast:
Critical Thinking by Finding the Proper Comparison

Suppose you want to see whether gender stereotypes bias a teacher's judgments of student work. How would you find out? Researchers have generally used a straightforward approach: They've given essays to groups of participants, telling some of them that the essay was written by, say, John, and others that it was written by Jane. They have then had participants assess its quality. Of course, it's important for the researchers to choose the names assigned to the essay carefully. Comparing the ratings of an essay supposedly written by Adolf with those of an essay written by Jennifer wouldn't work, because there's so much baggage associated with the name Adolf. How do researchers ensure that the names are comparable? One way is to choose pairs of male and female names that are as similar as possible—Michael and Michelle, Paul and Paula, Robert and Roberta, and so on. This is precisely what researchers interested in gender bias have done, and what they have found is abundant evidence of sexism. The very same essay tends to be rated more favorably when it's attributed to a male student rather than to a female student (Goldberg, 1968). What could be more straightforward and telling?

It turns out that these studies are not so straightforward and informative after all. In fact, when you try to create pairs of male and female names that are as similar as possible, you can easily end up with a set of male names that people tend to like more than the female names. The higher ratings given to essays purportedly written by Paul or Robert may not be because

they're thought to be written by men, but because they're thought to be written by people with more desirable names. These studies, in other words, may showcase *nameism* rather than sexism (that is, in this example people may tend to like the names Paul or Robert more than the names Paula or Roberta). In fact, when the male and female names are equated in terms of how much participants like them as names, and not by how similar they are in other ways (length, phonemic overlap, and so on), there is no effect of the gender of the purported author on how favorably an essay is evaluated (Kasof, 1993).

Does this mean there's no sexism when it comes to evaluating a person's performance? Of course not. It just means there may be no sexism when it comes to the evaluation of essays. And that shouldn't be surprising. Girls are known to perform better than boys in school, especially when it comes to reading and writing, so their work in this context at least is less likely to suffer from negative stereotyping. But there are other areas in which sexist stereotypes might indeed undermine the evaluation of a woman's performance. Historically, for example, it was thought that women didn't have the same musical talent as men, and their performance during auditions for premier orchestras appeared to validate that assessment. But when orchestra directors had musicians audition behind a screen so the performers couldn't be seen, there was a sharp rise in the percentage of women deemed worthy of positions in the world's most esteemed orchestras (Goldin & Rouse, 2000).

Moreover, although there may not be any sexism on the part of *individuals* evaluating essays written by men and women, there might nevertheless be *societal* sexism when it comes to how names are created. Nearly all pairs of very similar male and female names—Paul and Pauline, Donald and Donna—result from the female name being derived from the male name. Society is apparently more tolerant of derivative female names than derivative male names. That's a different kind of sexism, but it's sexism nonetheless.

What's especially noteworthy about the research in this area is that the very strategy the investigators used to rule out an alternative interpretation of their results opened the door to an alternative interpretation! What could be more sensible—more seemingly scientific—than to choose male and female names that were as alike as possible? Who would have thought that doing so would threaten the validity of the study? Research like this serves as a reminder that knowledge is hard won. It also serves as a reminder that selecting the proper comparison is not always as easy as it seems. Should I pair Jack's essay with one supposedly written by Jane or by Joan? Or, in other studies, should I have participants in the control group complete their questionnaires right after they've finished reading the instructions, as those in the experimental group did, or, since the experimental group had more to read, after the same amount of time has passed? Making the right call can be the difference between an experiment that's informative and one that's misleading.

First, as you read each word in the column below, tap your left index finger if it is either a female name or a "weak" word, and tap your right index finger if it is either a male name or a "strong" word.

Martha
Vigorous
Jason
Small
David
Powerful
Karen
Delicate
Gloria
Feather
Tony
Mighty
Matthew
Wispy
Rachel
Robust
Amy
Fine
George
Flower
Betsy
Stout
Charlene
Iron

Now repeat the procedure, but as you read each word, tap your left index finger if it is either a female name or a "strong" word, and tap your right index finger if it is either a male name or a "weak" word.

Did you find yourself tapping faster as you read the words the first time or the second?

try a noncomputerized version of the task in **Figure 11.1** or see whether you hold any implicit stereotypes or prejudice toward a variety of groups by taking some of the IATs online at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/research/.

Greenwald and Banaji argued that respondents would be faster to press one key for members of a particular group and words stereotypically associated with that group than they would to press the same key for members of that group and words that *contradict* the stereotype associated with that group. It's easy to respond quickly when members of a group and the attributes associated with them are signaled with the same key rather than different keys.

The same general procedure is used to assess implicit prejudice (rather than stereotyping). In this case, participants press one key for both positive words and photos of people in one group, and another key for both negative words and people in another group. Participants then repeat the procedure with the pairings of the two groups and the positive/negative words switched. A nonconscious prejudice toward older people, for example, would be captured by a difference between the average time it takes to respond to old faces/positive words and the average time it takes to respond to old faces/negative words. Someone with negative views toward older adults would take longer to respond to old faces/positive words than they would to old faces/negative words (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005).

Millions of people have taken the IAT online. Among other results, researchers have found that both young and older individuals show a pronounced prejudice

in favor of the young over the old, and about two-thirds of white respondents show a strong or moderate prejudice for white over black (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). About half of all black respondents also show some prejudice in favor of white faces.

Although the test has its critics (Blanton & Jaccard, 2008; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010), there's evidence that IAT responses correlate with other indirect measures of prejudice (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). In one study, participants in a brain-imaging machine viewed pictures of black faces and white faces. The participants' earlier IAT responses to black faces were significantly correlated with heightened neural activity in the amygdala (a brain center associated with fear and emotional learning) in response to the black faces. Their scores on a more traditional, conscious measure of prejudice, the Modern Racism Scale, were not correlated with this difference in neural activity, suggesting that the IAT assessed an important component of attitudes that participants were unable or unwilling to articulate (Phelps et al., 2000).

An important question, however, is whether a person's responses on the IAT are predictive of behavior that's more significant than pressing computer keys (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). In one study addressing this question, participants interacted with a white experimenter, took the IAT, and then interacted with a black experimenter. The participants' IAT scores predicted the discrepancy between how much they spoke to the white versus the black experimenter, how often they smiled at the white versus the black experimenter, and the number of speech errors and hesitations they exhibited when interacting with the white versus the black experimenter (McConnell & Leibold, 2001).

PRIMING AND IMPLICIT PREJUDICE Social psychologists have also used **priming** (mental activation) procedures (see Chapter 4) to measure prejudices that individuals might not know they have or that they may wish to deny. The logic is simple. If I show you the word *butter* and then ask you to tell me, as quickly as you can, whether a subsequent string of letters is a word, you'll recognize that *bread* is a word more quickly than you'll recognize that *car* is a word because of your preexisting association between bread and butter. Similarly, if you associate nuns with virtue and charity, you're likely to respond quickly to positive terms (*good, benevolent, trustworthy*) after seeing a picture of a nun. But if you have negative associations to nuns—say, you see them as strict, rigid, or cold—you're likely to respond more quickly to negative terms (*mean, unhappy, unbending*) after seeing a picture of a nun.

As shown in **Figure 11.2**, an implicit measure of prejudice can thus be derived by comparing a person's average reaction time to real and made-up words preceded by faces of members of a given category (compared with "control" trials, in which positive and negative words are preceded by faces of people not in that category). As discussed later in this chapter, numerous studies using these priming methods have shown that people who are sure they aren't prejudiced against blacks nonetheless respond more quickly to negative words preceded by pictures of black faces and more slowly to positive words preceded by pictures of black faces (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio & Hilden, 2001; Friese,

priming The presentation of information designed to activate a concept (such as a stereotype) and hence make it accessible. A prime is the stimulus presented to activate the concept in question.

Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008; Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010). And one shouldn't assume that people are lying when they deny such prejudices: they may simply not have conscious access to many of their true attitudes and beliefs.

A variant of this sort of priming procedure, the **affect misattribution procedure (AMP)**, doesn't measure how *quickly* people respond to a stimulus after a given prime, but how people *evaluate* that stimulus (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). In the AMP, subjects are shown a picture of a member of a particular target group—a Muslim, a transgender individual, a hedge fund manager—which is immediately followed by a neutral or unfamiliar image: say, a belt buckle or a Chinese pictograph. The key question is whether the feelings associated with the target group (for example, Muslims) transfer to the subjects' evaluations of the subsequent, otherwise neutral image (for example, Chinese pictographs). If a person has negative associations to Muslims, the average rating of Chinese pictographs that follow the presentation of the image of a Muslim should be lower than the average rating of pictographs that follow non-Muslim faces. Responses on the AMP have been shown to be related to political attitudes, other measures of racial bias, and significant personal habits like smoking and drinking (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Payne, et al., 2005; Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008; Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007).

FIGURE 11.2
AN AFFECTIVE PRIMING PARADIGM
People are faster to identify real words (rather than made-up words) after seeing pictures of members of a given group if they associate those real words with that group. In this example, someone with negative associations about black people would be faster to recognize "dangerous" as a real word after seeing a picture of a black person's face.

affect misattribution procedure (AMP) A priming procedure designed to assess people's implicit associations to different stimuli, including their associations to various ethnic, racial, occupational, and lifestyle groups.

◀ LOOKING BACK

In much of today's Western world, prejudice and discrimination are frowned upon. This trend has led to an explicit rejection of prejudiced attitudes that nonetheless can be accompanied by subtle and often nonconscious discriminatory behavior. The schism between what people consciously maintain and how they sometimes feel or act has led to the development of various indirect measures of beliefs and attitudes about different groups. These include the implicit association test and priming procedures, which measure the degree to which different groups trigger positive or negative associations.

The Economic Perspective

Not surprisingly, some of the most intense intergroup tensions arise between groups that vie for the same limited resource. Israelis and Palestinians claim ownership of much of the same small strip of land, and, to put it mildly, they have difficulty getting along. Immigrants to the United States, especially those from Mexico and Central America, face some of the harshest discrimination

from those U.S. citizens who see them as threats to their own jobs. Filipino, Sri Lankan, and African guest workers in rich Gulf countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been known to quarrel with one another and to "stick to their own kind." These observations highlight the core tenets of the economic perspective on prejudice and discrimination: groups develop prejudices about each other and discriminate against one another when they compete for material resources.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

One version of the economic perspective has been called **realistic group conflict theory** because it acknowledges that groups sometimes confront real conflict over economic issues (Esses, Jackson, & Bennettt-AbuAyyash, 2010; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). According to this theory, prejudice and discrimination often arise from competition over limited resources. The theory predicts, correctly, that prejudice and discrimination should increase under conditions of economic difficulty, such as recessions and periods of high unemployment (King, Knight, & Hebl, 2010; Krosch & Amodio, 2014; Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012; Vaughn, Cronan, & Beavers, 2015). When there's less to go around or when people are afraid of losing what they have, competition intensifies.

The theory also predicts that prejudice and discrimination should be strongest among groups that stand to lose the most from another group's economic advance. For example, working-class white Americans exhibited the most anti-black prejudice in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement (Simpson & Yinger, 1985; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). Blue-collar jobs were most at risk once millions of black Americans were allowed to compete more freely for entry-level manufacturing jobs in companies from which they had previously been excluded. Similarly, Donald Trump's efforts during the 2016 presidential campaign to depict immigrants as threats to American jobholders resonated most strongly among white voters in communities experiencing hard times economically (Cohn, 2016; see also Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013).

Realistic group conflict theory has been expanded to address the fact that groups often compete not just for material resources, but over ideology and cultural supremacy as well (Esses et al., 2010; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Groups fight over whose God should be worshipped, what values should be taught, and what should (and shouldn't) be allowed to be shown on television and posted on the Internet. The theory also specifies some of the ways group conflict plays out. First of all, a pronounced **ethnocentrism** develops—that is, the other group is vilified and one's own group is glorified. Anyone who has ever played pickup basketball knows this phenomenon well. An opponent whose antics seem intolerable instantly becomes more likable once that person becomes a teammate. More generally, people in the outgroup are often thought of in stereotyped ways and are treated in a manner normally forbidden by one's moral code. At the same time, loyalty to the ingroup intensifies, and a "circle the wagons" mentality develops. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, many people reported that individuals across different ethnic and racial groups in the United States seemed to pull together more than they had beforehand. In an experimental investigation of this tendency, telling white students that the attacks were directed at all Americans, regardless of race and class, served to reduce prejudice toward African-Americans (Dovidio et al., 2004).

The Robbers Cave Experiment

A group of researchers explored the ethnocentrism that results from intergroup competition in one of social psychology's classic studies. In 1954, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues carried out an ambitious experiment far from the confines of the psychology laboratory (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Twenty-two fifth-grade boys were taken to Robbers Cave State Park in southeastern Oklahoma (so named because the outlaws Belle Starr and Jesse James supposedly hid there). The boys had signed up for a two-and-a-half-week summer camp experience that, unbeknownst to them, was also a study of intergroup relationships. The research team spent over 300 hours screening boys from the Oklahoma City area to find 22 who were not unusual in any way: none had problems in school, all were from intact, middle-class families, and there were no notable ethnic group differences among them. The boys, none of whom knew each other beforehand, were divided into two groups of 11 and taken to separate areas of the park. Neither group even knew of the other's existence—initially.

COMPETITION AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT In the first phase of the experiment, the two groups independently engaged in activities designed to foster group unity (pitching tents, preparing meals) and took part in such common camp activities as playing baseball, swimming, and putting on skits. Cohesion developed within each group, and one group of boys named themselves the Eagles and the other named themselves the Rattlers.

In the second phase, the Eagles and Rattlers were brought together for a tournament. Each member of the winning team would receive a medal and a highly coveted pocketknife (a reward researchers would certainly not hand out to young boys today). Members of the losing team would get nothing. The tournament lasted five days and consisted of such activities as baseball, touch football, tug-of-war, cabin inspections, and a treasure hunt. The competitive nature of the tournament was designed to encourage each group to see the other as an obstacle to obtaining the reward and hence as a foe. And that's exactly what happened.

COMPETITION IN THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT
Two groups of fifth-graders participated in a study that demonstrated intergroup competition and cooperation. (A) During an early phase of the study, the two groups competed against each other, as in this tug-of-war contest. (B) This competition led to numerous acts of aggression—they raided each other's cabins, called one another names, and stole things from one another, as shown here with the Rattlers showing off a pair of pants they stole from a member of the Eagles.
Source: Adapted from Sherif et al., 1961.

COOPERATION IN THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT
To study ways of diminishing intergroup conflict, Sherif and his research team engineered a number of crises that could be overcome only if the two groups worked together. (A) Here the boys pulled a stalled truck, something that could be done only if everyone pitched in. (B) Working together on these superordinate goals led the two groups of boys to set aside their differences and become friends.
Source: Adapted from Sherif et al., 1961.

From the very first competitive encounter, and with increasing frequency throughout the tournament, the two groups hurled insults at each other, calling those in the other group "bums," "cowards," "stinkers," and so on. Although such terms may be tame by today's trash-talking standards, they are clearly not terms of endearment, and they differed markedly from the self-glorifying and congratulatory comments the boys made about members of their own group. Expressions of intergroup hostility, moreover, weren't limited to words. The Eagles captured and burned the Rattlers' flag, which naturally led to a retaliatory theft of the Eagles' flag. Food fights broke out in the dining area, they raided each other's cabins, and they issued challenges to engage in physical fights.

REDUCING INTERGROUP CONFLICT THROUGH SUPERORDINATE GOALS
The third and final part of the experiment is in many ways the most important, because it dealt with how to reduce the conflict between the two groups. On seven occasions over the next two days after the competition was over, the two groups were simply brought together in various noncompetitive settings to see whether their hostility would dissipate. It didn't. Simple contact between the two groups just led to more name-calling, jeering, food fights, and insults.

Given that simple noncompetitive contact failed to reduce hostility between the two groups, the investigators next tried confronting the boys with a number of crises that could be resolved only through the cooperative efforts of both groups. For example, the water supply to the camp was disrupted, and the entire length of pipe from the reservoir to the campgrounds had to be inspected to find the source of the problem—a task made much more manageable if the boys in both groups were assigned to inspect different segments of the line together. In another example, a truck carrying supplies for a campout at a distant area of the park mysteriously "broke down" and the boys were instructed to try to get it running again. The investigators left a large section of rope near the truck, hoping the boys might try to pull the truck to get it started. One of the boys said, "Let's

get our tug-of-war rope and have a tug-of-war against the truck." In doing so, members of both groups intermingled throughout the length of rope and pulled it together.

Relations between the two groups quickly showed the effects of these **superordinate goals**—goals that could only be achieved by both groups working together. Name-calling abruptly dropped off and friendships between members of the two groups developed. When the study was completed, the boys insisted that everyone return to Oklahoma City on the same bus rather than on the separate buses on which they had arrived. And when the bus pulled over at a roadside diner, the Rattlers (who had won $5 in an extra competitive event held after the main tournament) decided to spend their money on malted milks for everyone, Eagles included. (Yes, $5 could buy a lot of malted milks in 1954.) The hostility produced by five days of competition was erased by the joint pursuit of common goals. In short, a happy ending (see **Box 11.2**, see p. 374).

The Robbers Cave experiment offers several important lessons. One is that neither differences in background nor differences in appearance nor a prior history of conflict are necessary for intergroup hostility to develop. All that's required is that two groups enter into competition over rewards that only one can attain. Another lesson is that competition against outsiders often increases group cohesion. This tendency is often exploited by political demagogues who invoke the threat of outside enemies to try to stamp out dissension or deflect attention from problems or conflict within the group itself. The final lesson points to how intergroup conflict can be diminished. To reduce the hostility between certain groups, policy makers should think of ways to get them to work together to fulfill common goals. Simply putting adversaries together "to get to know one another better" is usually not enough (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992; Brewer & Miller, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Wilder, 1986). It's the pursuit of bigger, shared, superordinate goals that keeps everyone's eyes on the prize and away from troublesome subgroup distinctions. We'll return to the subject of how to reduce intergroup

superordinate goal A goal that transcends the interests of any one group and can be achieved more readily by two or more groups working together.

INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY
The integration of different racial and ethnic groups has been remarkably successful in the U.S. military, where soldiers cooperate to accomplish the shared goal of defending the nation.

The "Jigsaw" Classroom

School classrooms can often be competitive places where students try to outdo one another for the top grades. Not the type of environment that is most conducive to building intergroup harmony and acceptance. But what would happen if the classroom were made less competitive? Might a more cooperative learning environment improve academic performance and intergroup relations in integrated settings?

Social psychologist Elliot Aronson developed a cooperative learning procedure to find out. When the public school system in Austin, Texas, was integrated in 1971, the transition was not smooth. A disturbing number of physical confrontations took place between black, Hispanic, and white children, and the atmosphere in the classrooms was not what proponents of integration had hoped it would be. The superintendent of schools invited Aronson to do something to improve matters. Mindful of the lessons of the Robbers Cave experiment, Aronson wanted to institute procedures that would unite students in the common goal of mastering a body of material, rather than competing for the highest grades and the teachers' attention. He and his colleagues came up with something called the "jigsaw" classroom (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978; Aronson & Thibodeau, 1992).

In the jigsaw classroom, students are divided into small groups of about six students. Every effort is made to balance the groups in terms of ethnicity, gender, ability level, leadership, and so on. The material on a given topic is then divided into six parts, and each student is required to master one part (and only one part) and teach it to the others. For a lesson on Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, one student might be responsible for the history of the Soviet Union, another for the history and workings of the KGB, a third for Putin's childhood, a fourth for the current political and economic situation in Russia, and so on. By dividing the material in this way, Aronson ensured that no student could learn the entire lesson without help from peers. Each student's material must, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, fit together with all the others for everyone in the group to learn the whole lesson.

The students' dependence on one another dampens the usual competitive atmosphere and encourages them to work cooperatively toward a common goal. To the extent that the groups are ethnically heterogeneous, members of different ethnic groups gain the experience of working together as individuals rather than as representatives of particular ethnic groups.

The effectiveness of this approach has been assessed in field experiments comparing students in jigsaw classrooms with those in classrooms that teach the same material in the usual fashion. These studies have typically found that students in the jigsaw classrooms like school more and develop more positive attitudes toward different ethnic groups than students in traditional classrooms (Roseth, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008; Slavin, 1995).

Thus, the lessons learned from the Robbers Cave experiment—that intergroup hostility can be diminished by cooperative activity directed at a superordinate goal—have profound practical significance. A simple classroom procedure derived from these lessons—one that can be used in conjunction with traditional, more individualistic classroom exercises—can boost academic performance and facilitate positive racial and ethnic relationships.

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hostility later in this chapter when we discuss efforts—derived from more than just the economic perspective—to reduce stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

← LOOKING BACK

Consistent with the economic perspective, prejudice can arise from conflict between groups over limited resources. The Robbers Cave experiment serves as an instructive model of this sort of conflict, showing how otherwise friendly boys could turn into enemies when placed in groups competing for a limited resource. The hostility between the groups evaporated when they had to cooperate to achieve superordinate goals of value to both groups.

The Motivational Perspective

Hostility between groups, it turns out, can develop even in the absence of competition. In the Robbers Cave experiment, there were signs of increased ingroup solidarity when the two groups first learned of each others' existence—*before* they were engaged in, or even knew about, the organized competition. Midway through phase 1 of the experiment, when the two groups were still being kept apart, they were allowed to get within earshot of each other. The mere fact that another group existed made each set of boys take their own group membership more seriously. Both groups quickly became territorial, referring to the baseball field as "*our* diamond" rather than "the diamond" and a favorite swimming spot as "*our* swimming hole." Soon after learning about each other's existence, both groups wanted to "run them off" and "challenge them."

The fact that these developments took place before any competition had been arranged indicates that intergroup hostility can develop merely because another group exists. The existence of group boundaries among any collection of individuals, then, can be sufficient to initiate group discrimination. The motivational processes that lead to this sort of hostility have been explored in a telling research paradigm.

The Minimal Group Paradigm

People's readiness to adopt an "us versus them" mentality has been extensively documented in experiments using the **minimal group paradigm** pioneered by Henri Tajfel (Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; see also Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008). Tajfel's lifelong interest in intergroup dynamics can be traced to his own experiences as a young man. Because of restrictions on Jewish higher education in Poland, Tajfel emigrated to France to study at the Sorbonne. When World War II broke out, he volunteered to serve in the French Army, which he did for a year before being taken prisoner. He spent the rest of the war in a German prisoner of war camp, fully aware that if his captors had thought of him as Jewish rather than French, he would have shared the same fate as everyone else in his immediate family, none of whom survived the war.

In his research, Tajfel created groups based on arbitrary and seemingly meaningless criteria and then examined how the members of these so-called "minimal groups" behaved toward one another. The participants first performed a rather trivial task and were then divided into two groups, ostensibly on the basis of their responses. In one such task, for example, participants had to estimate the number of dots projected briefly on a screen. Some participants were told they belonged to a group of "overestimators" and others that they belonged to a group of "underestimators." In reality, the participants were randomly assigned to the groups, and they learned only that they were assigned to a particular group; they never learned who else was in their group or who was in the other group. Thus, what it meant to be part of a "group" was boiled down to the bare minimum—the category was arbitrary and members of each group did not know who the others members were.

After learning their group membership, the participants were taken to separate cubicles and asked to assign points, redeemable for money, to pairs of their

minimal group paradigm An experimental paradigm in which researchers create groups based on arbitrary and seemingly meaningless criteria and then examine how the members of these "minimal groups" are inclined to behave toward one another.

| TABLE 11.1 | AWARDING POINTS IN THE MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM | | | | | | | | |

Ingroup	18	17	16	15	14	13	21	11	10	9
Outgroup	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21

fellow participants. They were shown multiple pairings of preassigned point values, where one amount would go to a participant who was in the group they were in (the ingroup) and the other amount to a participant in the outgroup. See **Table 11.1** for an example: if you assign a member of the ingroup 18 points, then the member of the outgroup gets only 3 points, as shown in the first column; if you assign the member of the ingroup 17 points (the second column), then the member of the outgroup gets 5 points; and so on. Participants assigning points didn't know the individual identity of those to whom they were awarding points; all they knew was the other participants' group membership. In this way, the investigators could determine whether participants assigned points equally to members of the ingroup and outgroup; whether they instead maximized the total point payout regardless of group membership; or whether they maximized the points given to the ingroup *over the outgroup,* even if the ingroup could have gotten more points through other choices that would have given the outgroup more points as well.

In Table 11.1, for example, someone who chooses 13 and 13 would appear to be interested in equality; someone who chooses 9 for the ingroup member and 21 for the outgroup member would appear to be interested in handing out the greatest number of points overall; and someone who chooses 18 for the ingroup member and 3 for the outgroup member would appear to be interested in maximizing the *relative* advantage of the ingroup over the outgroup, even though the ingroup could have gotten more in the pairing that gives the ingroup 21 points—but also gives the outgroup a more generous amount of points at 15.

Numerous experiments have shown that a majority of participants are interested more in maximizing the *relative* gain for members of their ingroup over the outgroup than they are in maximizing the absolute gain for their ingroup. A moment's reflection reveals just how extraordinary this is. The participants don't know who the ingroup and outgroup members are; the points awarded are never for themselves; and, of course, the basis for establishing the two groups is utterly meaningless. Yet participants still tend to favor their minimal ingroup. In fact, they're willing to do so at a cost to the ingroup, which earns fewer points when the focus is on "beating" the other group rather than on maximizing their group's absolute gain. The ingroup favoritism that emerges in this context demonstrates how easily we slip into thinking in terms of *us* versus *them* (Brewer & Brown, 1998). And if history has taught us anything, it is that the us/them distinction, once formed, can have enormous—and enormously unfortunate—implications.

"Cruelty and intolerance to those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion."
—SIGMUND FREUD

Social Identity Theory

Studies using the minimal group paradigm have shown the pervasiveness and persistence of ingroup favoritism, but what does it have to do with the motivational perspective on prejudice? Might it not reflect a purely cognitive tendency

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY
People derive their sense of identity not only from their individual accomplishments but also from those of the groups to which they belong. (A) These delegates at the U.S. Republican National Convention identify with the Republican Party. (B) These individuals derive part of their identity from belonging to the community of surfers.

to divide the world into categories of *us* and *them*? Just as all children quickly learn to distinguish the self from all others, might we not also all learn to distinguish "my side" from the "other side"?

Much of the psychology behind ingroup favoritism might very well reflect these kinds of cognitive tendencies. The us/them distinction may be one of the basic cuts people make in organizing the world. Still, the ingroup favoritism observed in the minimal group situation can't be the product of cognition alone. For that we need a motivational theory—a theory to explain why, once the us/them distinction is made, we treat those we consider "us" better than those we consider "them." Some divisions into *us* and *them* have the kind of material or economic implications discussed earlier, which often provide motivation enough for people to treat ingroup members better than outgroup members. But not all motivations are economic, and certainly no meaningful economic implications are present in the ingroup/outgroup division in the minimal group paradigm. To explain that sort of ingroup favoritism, a different motivational perspective is needed.

The most widely recognized theory that attempts to explain the ubiquity of ingroup favoritism is **social identity theory**, which is based on the idea that our self-esteem comes not only from our personal identity and accomplishments, but also from the status and accomplishments of the various groups to which we belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Spears, 2011; Stroebe, Spears, & Lodewijkx, 2007). Being "an American" is an element of the self-concept of most Americans, and with it may come the pride associated with, say, the Bill of Rights, U.S. economic and military clout, and the accomplishments of American scientists, industrialists, athletes, and entertainers. With it, too, may come the shame associated with the country's history of slavery and its treatment of Native Americans. Similarly, being a gang member, a professor, a film buff, or a surfer means that our identity and esteem are intimately tied up with the triumphs and shortcomings of our fellow gang members, academics, film buffs, and surfers.

social identity theory The idea that a person's self-concept and self-esteem derive not only from personal identity and accomplishments, but also from the status and accomplishments of the various groups to which the person belongs.

BOOSTING THE STATUS OF THE INGROUP Because our self-esteem is based in part on the status of the various groups to which we belong, we may be tempted to boost the status and fortunes of these groups and their members. Therein lies a

powerful cause of ingroup favoritism: doing whatever we can to feel better about the ingroup leads us to feel better about ourselves. Evidence supporting this idea comes from studies that have assessed participants' self-esteem after they've had an opportunity to exhibit ingroup favoritism in the minimal group situation, such as the one described earlier where participants awarded pairs of points to "overestimators" or "underestimators." As expected, those who had been allowed to display ingroup favoritism had higher self-esteem than those who hadn't had a chance to boost their own group at the expense of another (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980). Other research has shown that people who take particularly strong pride in their group affiliations (such as feeling particularly proud to be an American) are more prone to ingroup favoritism when placed in a minimal group situation (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). And people who are highly identified with a particular group react to criticism of the group as if it were criticism of the self (McCoy & Major, 2003).

BASKING IN REFLECTED GLORY Social identity theory also receives support from the everyday observation that people go to great lengths to announce their affiliation with a group when that group is doing well. Sports fans, for example, often chant, "We're number 1!" after a team victory. But what does *"We're number 1"* mean? It's a rare fan indeed who does anything other than cheer their team, heckle referees, or taunt opposing players. Yet countless fans want to be connected to the effort when the outcome is a victory. After a loss, not so much.

Robert Cialdini refers to this tendency to identify with a winning team as **basking in reflected glory.** He investigated the tendency by recording how often students wore their school sweatshirts and T-shirts to class after their football team had just won or lost a game. As expected, students wore the school colors significantly more often following victory than after defeat. Cialdini and his colleagues also tabulated students' use of first-person versus third-person references. It's no surprise to learn that, as a general rule, "we" won, whereas "they" lost (Cialdini et al., 1976). As social identity theory predicts, the triumphs and failings of the groups with which we affiliate affect our self-esteem—even when

basking in reflected glory Taking pride in the accomplishments of other people in one's group, such as when sports fans identify with a winning team.

BASKING IN REFLECTED GLORY
Sports fans, like these Ohio State students, passionately identify with their team and feel joyous when the team wins and dejected when it loses. To connect themselves to the team, fans often wear team jerseys to the game and even to class or work the next day if the team wins.

the group is simply a favorite sports team (Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992). We therefore have an incentive to identify with such groups when they do well but to distance ourselves from them when they lose.

DENIGRATING OUTGROUPS TO BOLSTER SELF-ESTEEM To bask in reflected glory is to use ingroup identity to enhance self-esteem. But does denigrating outgroups also boost self-esteem? Does criticizing another group make people feel better about their own group—and hence themselves? Indeed it does.

In one study, researchers threatened the self-esteem of half the participants by telling them they had just performed poorly on an intelligence test; the other half were told they had done well (Fein & Spencer, 1997). The participants then watched a videotaped interview of a job applicant. The video made it clear to half the participants (none of whom was Jewish) that the candidate was Jewish, but not to the other half. Participants later rated the job candidate (see **Figure 11.3**). Participants whose self-esteem had been threatened rated the candidate negatively if they thought she was Jewish; participants whose self-esteem was not threatened did not (Figure 11.3A). In addition, the participants whose self-esteem had been threatened and had "taken it out" on the Jewish candidate experienced an increase in their self-esteem from the time they received feedback on the IQ test to the end of the experiment (Figure 11.3B). It appears that denigrating members of outgroups can indeed bolster self-esteem.

Lisa Sinclair and Ziva Kunda explored a related way that outgroups are strategically used to enhance self-esteem. In this study, non-black participants were either praised or criticized by a white or black male doctor (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). The investigators predicted that the participants would be motivated to cling to the praise they received but to challenge the criticism and that they'd use the race of their evaluator to help them do so. In particular, the investigators predicted that participants who received praise from a black doctor would tend to think of him more as a doctor (a prestigious occupation) than as a black man,

FIGURE 11.3
BOLSTERING SELF-ESTEEM
(A) The average ratings of a job candidate's personality, depending on whether the candidate was Jewish or non-Jewish after the person doing the rating had received positive or negative feedback. The results demonstrate that feeling down on oneself (a rater who had received negative feedback) can make a person more likely to denigrate the outgroup (rate the Jewish candidates more poorly). (B) Raters who had received negative feedback and subsequently denigrated the outgroup received a boost in self-esteem from doing so.
Source: Adapted from Fein & Spencer, 1997.

whereas those who were criticized by a black doctor would tend to think of him more as a black man than as a doctor.

The participants performed a lexical decision task right after getting feedback from the doctor (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). The researchers flashed a series of words and nonwords on a computer screen and had the participants indicate, as fast as they could, whether each string of letters was a word. Some of the words were related to the medical profession (for example, *hospital, prescription*) and some were associated with common stereotypes of blacks at that time (*rap, jazz*). Sinclair and Kunda reasoned that if the participants were thinking of their evaluator primarily as a doctor, they would recognize the medical words faster; if they were thinking of their evaluator primarily as a black man, they would recognize the words related to the black stereotype faster.

As **Figure 11.4** shows, that's exactly what happened. Participants were particularly fast at recognizing words associated with the black stereotype when they'd been criticized by the black doctor and slow to recognize those words when they were praised by the black doctor (Figure 11.4A). The reverse was true for the medical words (Figure 11.4B). Participants were fast at recognizing medical words when they'd been praised by the black doctor and slow to do so when criticized by the black doctor. When the black doctor criticized them, in other words, participants saw him as a black man—and when he praised them, they saw him as a doctor.

ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUALS
Do you see this person mainly as a man? A doctor? A black man? A black doctor? How you see him may depend on how each construal contributes to your self-esteem.

Reaction time (milliseconds) to recognize "medical" and "black" words after receiving feedback from a black doctor

- "Medical" words
- "Black" words

(A) Feedback: Positive / Negative

Participants who had received positive feedback from the black doctor were faster to recognize words related to medicine.

Reaction time (milliseconds) to recognize "medical" and "black" words after receiving feedback from a white doctor

- "Medical" words
- "Black" words

(B) Feedback: Positive / Negative

Participants were equally fast at recognizing words related to medicine and to black stereotypes regardless of whether they received positive or negative feedback from the white doctor.

FIGURE 11.4
SELF-ESTEEM AND RACIAL PREJUDICE
Participants were either praised or criticized by a white or black doctor. Reaction times to "black" words and "medical" words after criticism or praise by white doctors were virtually the same, but participants were quicker to recognize "black" words when they had received negative feedback from the black doctor and quicker to recognize "medical" words when they had received positive feedback from the black doctor.
Source: Adapted from Sinclair & Kunda, 1999.

Social identity theory also maintains that group memberships are part of every individual's identity. If so, then people will often be motivated to denigrate outgroup members not just when they personally are under threat, but when their *groups* are. Studies confirm this prediction. When white Americans or Canadians are made aware of the changing racial demographics of their country, they express more negative attitudes toward minority groups, increased implicit pro-white bias, and less interest in affiliating with members of non-white groups (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). This, of course, was a much discussed element of the 2016 presidential election: the part of the electorate who felt they were losing ground economically and culturally were thought to be most receptive to Donald Trump's harsh rhetoric about immigration.

← LOOKING BACK

Consistent with the motivational perspective on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, people are inclined to favor ingroups over outgroups, even when the basis of group membership is trivial. Part of the reason is that people identify with their groups and feel good about themselves when they feel good about their groups. Threats to self-esteem also result in the denigration of outgroup members.

The Cognitive Perspective

From the cognitive perspective, stereotyping is inevitable. It stems from the ubiquity and necessity of categorization. People categorize nearly everything, both natural (bodies of water—creek, stream, river) and artificial (cars—sports car, sedan, SUV). Even color, which arises from continuous variation in electromagnetic wavelength, is perceived as distinct categories.

All of this categorizing has a purpose: it simplifies the task of taking in and processing the incredible volume of stimuli surrounding us. The American journalist Walter Lippmann, who is credited with coining the term *stereotype*, stated:

The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting, for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. . . . We have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. (Lippmann, 1922, p. 16)

Stereotypes provide us with those simpler models that allow us to deal with the "great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 96).

Stereotypes and the Conservation of Cognitive Resources

If stereotypes are useful schemas that enable us to process information efficiently, then we should be more inclined to use them when we're overloaded, tired, or mentally taxed in some way—in other words, when we're in need of a shortcut.

Several experiments have demonstrated exactly that (Kim & Baron, 1988; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Stangor & Duan, 1991; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004).

In one intriguing study, participants were more likely to invoke stereotypes when tested at the low point of their circadian rhythm. "Morning people," when tested at night, tended to invoke a common stereotype and conclude, for example, that a person charged with cheating on an exam was guilty if he was an athlete. "Night people," when tested in the morning, were more inclined to conclude that a person charged with dealing drugs was guilty if he was black (Bodenhausen, 1990). Thus, people are more likely to fall back on stereotypes when they lack mental energy. Not surprisingly, then, people have also been shown to stereotype others more when they're intoxicated with alcohol and their mental capacities are low (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006).

If the use of stereotypes conserves intellectual energy, then using them should free up extra cognitive resources that can be applied to other mental tasks. In one test of this idea, participants performed two tasks simultaneously (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). On one task, they formed an impression of a (hypothetical) person described by a number of trait terms presented on a computer screen (for example, *rebellious, dangerous, aggressive*). The other task involved monitoring a tape-recorded lecture about Indonesia and then taking a quiz on the content of the lecture. For half the participants, the trait terms were accompanied by a stereotype associated with those terms (such as skinhead); for the other half, the trait terms were presented alone. The key questions were whether presenting participants with the stereotype would help them later recall the trait terms they'd seen and, more importantly, whether being prompted to stereotype would also release extra cognitive resources that could be devoted to the lecture on Indonesia.

As the experimenters anticipated, the use of stereotypes made the first task easier and thereby freed up cognitive resources that allowed them to perform better on the second task (**Figure 11.5**). Those given a stereotype not only remembered

the relevant trait information better, but also performed better on the test on Indonesia (Macrae, Milne, et al. 1994).

Construal Processes and Biased Assessments

Not every member of a given category conforms to the group stereotype. So while relying on stereotypes can save time and effort, it can also lead to mistaken impressions and unfair judgments about individuals.

Social psychologists have produced countless demonstrations of this point. A simple and particularly unsettling example comes from an early study by John Darley and P. H. Gross (1983). They had students watch a videotape of a fourth-grader named Hannah. One version of the video reported that Hannah's parents were professionals and showed her playing in an obviously upper-middle-class area. Another version reported that Hannah's parents were working class and showed her playing in a rundown environment.

The next part of the video showed Hannah answering questions involving math, science, and reading. Her performance was ambiguous; she answered some difficult questions well but also seemed distracted and flubbed easier questions. The researchers asked the students how well they thought Hannah would perform in relation to her classmates. Those who saw an upper-middle-class Hannah estimated she would perform better than average, while those who saw working-class Hannah assumed she would perform worse than average.

What's especially sad is that these assumptions about a student's performance based solely on her social class are grounded in fact (Jussim, 2012). On average, upper-middle-class children perform better in school than working-class children. Therefore, given an ambiguous performance by a child, we might reasonably anticipate her long-term academic success would be greater if she's upper middle class than if she's working class.

The reason is that working-class Hannah starts life with two strikes against her. People will expect and demand less of her and will perceive a given performance as worse than if she were upper middle class. Moreover, the mistaken impression about Hannah will tend to reinforce the stereotype that working-class children are less academically able than middle-class children.

Biased information processing is especially harmful when the stereotypes on which it's based are completely lacking in validity. If people suspect—because of something they've been told or the implications of a joke they heard or a misinterpreted statistic—that a particular group of people might differ from other groups in some way, it's shockingly easy to construe information about an individual in a way that confirms that suspicion. The stereotype is then strengthened due to "confirmation" by the biased observations. A vicious cycle indeed.

DISTINCTIVENESS AND ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS As we noted in Chapter 4, people sometimes "see" correlations (relationships) between events, characteristics, or categories that are not actually related—a phenomenon referred to as illusory correlation (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Freytag 2004; Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996; Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993; Klauer & Meiser, 2000;

SIPRESS

"Why is it we never focus on the things that unite us, like falafel?"

FIGURE 11.5
CONSERVING COGNITIVE RESOURCES
Providing participants with an applicable stereotype makes it easier for them to recall stereotypically consistent information, thereby conserving mental energy for use in performing other tasks, such as the quiz on Indonesia.
Source: Adapted from Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994.

Number of items recalled

■ Stereotype provided
■ No stereotype

Participants with a stereotype that could be applied to a person they read about recalled more trait information about that person, as well as more information about Indonesia on another test.

Subject of memory test: Trait-relevant information / Indonesian economics and geography

Shavitt, Sanbonmatsu, Smittipatana, & Posavac, 1999). Illusory correlations can arise for many reasons, with some being simply the result of how we process unusual or distinctive events.

Distinctive events capture our attention. We would notice if a student came to a lecture wearing a clown outfit—or nothing at all. Because we attend more closely to distinctive events, we're also likely to remember them better, and as a result they may become overrepresented in our memory. These processes have important implications for the kinds of stereotypes that are commonly associated with minority groups. By definition, minority groups are distinctive to most members of the majority, so minority group members stand out. In addition, negative behaviors, such as robbing, assaulting, and murdering are (fortunately) much less common than positive behaviors, such as saying thank you and obeying traffic signs, so negative behaviors are distinctive as well. Negative behavior on the part of minority group members is therefore doubly distinctive and doubly memorable. Minority groups are therefore vulnerable to being stereotyped as more likely to engage in negative behavior than they actually are.

David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) explored the impact of **paired distinctiveness**—the pairing of two distinctive events that stand out because they occur together—in an experiment that examined the formation of such illusory correlations from scratch. Participants were presented with information about the actions of members of "group A" or "group B." Those were the only group labels they received; these were not existing groups they were familiar with, such as theater arts majors, Native Americans, or heterosexual or transgender individuals. They learned, for example, that "John, a member of group A, visited a sick friend in the hospital" and "Bill, a member of group B, always talks about himself and his problems." Mimicking real life, most of the actions by members of each group were positive (69 percent, to be exact). Thus, there was no correlation between group membership and the likelihood of positive or negative behavior. But two-thirds of the actions they read about described the actions of someone in group A, thus making A the majority group.

When later asked to remember who did what, participants overestimated how often the negative behaviors were performed by a member of the minority group. They also rated members of the minority group less favorably. Even though participants knew nothing about these two arbitrary "groups" beforehand, and even though they were exposed to the same ratio of positive and negative actions on the part of both groups, they came away thinking that the smaller group did more bad things (**Figure 11.6**). A distinctiveness-based illusory correlation became lodged in participants' minds; that is, they "detected" false correlations based on the distinctiveness of minority group members and the distinctiveness of negative behaviors.

Subsequent research has shown that beliefs in such illusory correlations can be formed on the basis of a single instance of unusual behavior by someone from a minority group. If you've seen few Polynesians in your life, for instance, but you see a Polynesian curse at the bank teller serving your line, you might be tempted to conclude that something about being Polynesian was at least part of the reason ("I guess that's just the way they are"). Of course, if a member of your own ethnic group behaved that way, you probably wouldn't consider ethnicity

paired distinctiveness The pairing of two distinctive events that stand out even more because they occur together.

Over- and under-attribution

**FIGURE 11.6
DISTINCTIVENESS AND ILLUSORY CORRELATION**
Distinctive events, such as negative actions by members of minority groups, tend to stand out and exert a disproportionate influence on judgments. In this study, participants attributed more of the negative behaviors to the minority group than the members of that group were actually responsible for.
Source: Adapted from Hamilton & Gifford, 1976.

PAIRED DISTINCTIVENESS
(A) When we see unusual actions performed by people we rarely encounter (such as, for Westerners, these Vietnamese children), we tend to wonder whether "those people" are fond of that type of activity, and a link between the two is often formed. (B) When the same actions are performed by types of people we encounter frequently (such as, for Westerners, a child from the United States), we don't draw any conclusions about "those people."

as a possible explanation ("Every group has some jerks") (Risen, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2007). Members of your group do plenty of obnoxious things as well as wonderful things, but being a member of your own group doesn't normally count as an explanation for any specific behavior.

EXPECTATIONS AND BIASED INFORMATION PROCESSING To stereotype is to overgeneralize. But of course, people don't generalize everything they witness to the same degree. Some acts (an epileptic seizure, for example) discourage generalization from the individual to the group no matter who the actor is; other behaviors (such as rudeness) invite it. In general, people are more likely to generalize behaviors and traits they already suspect may be typical of the group's members. This is another way in which stereotypes can be self-reinforcing. Actions that are consistent with an existing stereotype are noticed, deemed significant, and remembered, whereas actions that are at variance with the stereotype may be ignored, dismissed, or quickly forgotten (Bodenhausen, 1988; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995).

Stereotypes also influence how the details of events are interpreted. In a striking demonstration of this effect, white participants watched a videotape of a heated discussion between two men, one black and one white, and were asked to code the behavior they were watching into one of several categories, such as "Gives information," "Playing around," or "Aggressive behavior" (Duncan, 1976; see also Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993; Plant, Kling, & Smith, 2004; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). At one point in the video, one of the men shoved the other. For half the participants, a black man shoved the white man; for the other half, the white man did the shoving. The race of the

"Stereotypic beliefs about women's roles, for example, may enable one to see correctly that a woman in a dark room is threading a needle rather than tying a fishing lure, but they may also cause one to mistakenly assume that her goal is embroidery rather than cardiac surgery."
—DAN GILBERT

person made a difference in how the action was interpreted. When perpetrated by a white man, the incident tended to be coded as more benign (as "Playing around," for example). When perpetrated by a black man, it was coded as a more serious action (such as "Aggressive behavior").

These results are remarkable because the participants saw the shove with their own eyes. The influence of stereotypes can be even greater when the episode is presented to people secondhand and is therefore more open to being construed in different ways. In one study, for instance, participants listened to a play-by-play account of a college basketball game and were told to focus on the exploits of one player in particular, named Mark Flick (Stone, Perry, & Darley, 1997). Half the participants saw a photo of Mark that made it clear he was African-American and half saw a photo that made it clear he was white. When participants rated Mark's performance, their assessments reflected commonly held stereotypes about black and white basketball players. Those who thought Mark was African-American rated him as more athletic and as having played better; those who thought he was white rated him as having hustled more and as having played a more savvy game.

Studies like these demonstrate that people don't evaluate information even-handedly. Instead, information that's consistent with a group stereotype typically has more impact than information that's inconsistent with it. This is yet another way that even inaccurate stereotypes can stay alive and even grow in strength.

SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES Stereotypes can also be reinforced by self-fulfilling prophecies: that is, people act toward members of certain groups in ways that encourage the very behavior they expect to see from those groups. For example, thinking that members of a particular group are hostile, a person might act toward them in a guarded manner, thereby eliciting a coldness that's then taken as proof of their hostility (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). A teacher who believes members of a specific group lack intellectual ability may give them less attention in class, thereby increasing the chances that they'll fall behind their classmates. As Robert Merton, who coined the term *self-fulfilling prophecy*, once said, "The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning" (Merton, 1957, p. 423).

The damage that can be done by self-fulfilling prophecies was powerfully illustrated in an experiment in which white undergraduates interviewed both black and white men pretending to be job applicants (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). The interviews were monitored, and the researchers discovered that the students (the white interviewers) unwittingly treated black and white applicants differently. When the applicant was black, the interviewer tended to sit farther away, to hem and haw throughout the session, and to terminate the proceedings earlier than when the applicant was white. That is not the type of environment that inspires smooth interview performance.

Sure enough, the second phase of the experiment showed just how difficult it had been for the black applicants. Interviewers were trained to treat *a new set of* applicants, all of whom were white, the way that either the white or the black applicants had been treated earlier. These interviews were tape-recorded and later rated by independent judges. These new applicants, who had been interviewed in the way the black applicants had been interviewed earlier, were evaluated more negatively than those who'd been interviewed in the way the white

applicants had been interviewed earlier. In other words, by placing black applicants at a disadvantage by treating them differently, the white interviewers confirmed their negative stereotypes of blacks. Similar results have been obtained in interview studies of gay and lesbian job applicants (Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002).

EXPLAINING AWAY EXCEPTIONS If every rule has an exception, the same is true for stereotypes. Groups known for their intellectual talents nonetheless include a few dolts. Groups renowned for their athletic abilities are sure to include a klutz or two. Even if a stereotype is largely accurate, there's almost certain to be examples that contradict it. Of course, if the stereotype is completely invalid, counterexamples will be even more plentiful. What happens when people discover evidence that disagrees with their view? Do they abandon their stereotypes or hold them less confidently?

The way people respond to disconfirmation of their stereotypes varies according to their emotional investment in the stereotype, whether the stereotype is specific to the person who holds it or is widely shared, and numerous other factors. One thing is clear, however: people don't give up their stereotypes easily. As numerous studies have demonstrated, people evaluate disconfirming evidence in a variety of ways that have the effect of reducing its impact. An understanding of these processes provides some insight into one of the most vexing questions about stereotypes—namely, why they so often persist in the face of evidence that would seem to contradict them.

Although we generalize when we stereotype, no one expects perfectly consistent behavior from members of a given group. Groups thought to be dishonest, lazy, or carefree are thought to be dishonest, lazy, or carefree *on average*, or at least more dishonest, lazy, or carefree than other groups; not all members are expected to behave in those ways all the time. This loophole lets people remain unmoved by apparent disconfirmations of their stereotypes, because anyone who acts at variance with the stereotype is simply walled off into a category of "exceptions." Psychologists refer to this tendency as **subtyping** (Queller & Smith, 2002; Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Sexists who believe that women are passive and dependent and should stay home to raise children are likely to subtype assertive, independent women who choose not to have children as "militant" or "strident" feminists, thereby leaving their stereotype of women largely intact. Similarly, racists who maintain that African-Americans can't excel outside of sports and entertainment are likely to remain untroubled by the likes of, say, Barack Obama ("He's half white") or U.S. Senator Kamala Harris ("Her father was born in Jamaica and her mother in India"). To the racist mind, they're merely the "exceptions that prove the rule." (Incidentally, if you've ever wondered how an exception can prove a rule—it can't. The expression uses the word *prove* in its less common meaning: to test, as in, "proving grounds.")

Subtyping reflects a more general truth: people treat evidence that supports a stereotype differently from evidence that refutes it. People tend to accept supportive evidence at face value, whereas they often critically analyze and discount contradictory evidence. One way they do this, in keeping with the self-serving attributional bias (see Chapter 5), is by attributing behavior consistent with a stereotype to the dispositions of the people involved and attributing behavior inconsistent with a stereotype to external causes (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Kulik, 1983; Swim & Sanna, 1996; Taylor &

"Oppression has no logic—just a self-fulfilling prophecy, justified by a self-perpetuating system."
—GLORIA STEINEM

subtyping Explaining away exceptions to a given stereotype by creating a subcategory of the stereotyped group that can be expected to differ from the group as a whole.

Jaggi, 1974). An anti-Semite who believes that Jews are "cheap" is likely to dismiss a Jewish person's acts of philanthropy as reflecting a desire for social acceptance but to interpret any pursuit of self-interest as being a reflection of some "true" Jewish character. Thus, episodes consistent with a stereotype reinforce its perceived validity; episodes that are inconsistent with the stereotype are deemed insignificant (Pettigrew, 1979).

We also treat supportive and contradictory information differently by varying how concretely or abstractly we evaluate the actions of people from different groups. Almost any action can be construed at different levels of abstraction (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; see Chapters 3, 5, and 8). For example, if you see a person lifting someone who has fallen, you could describe the action concretely as exactly that—as lifting. Alternatively, you could say, more abstractly, that the person was "helping" the fallen individual. More abstractly still, you might say the person was being "helpful" or "altruistic." These different levels of abstraction carry different connotations. The more concrete the description ("lifting"), the less it says about the person involved; the more abstract the description ("altruistic"), the more it says about the person.

These differences in concrete versus abstract construal were examined in a study that took place during the annual *palio* competition in Ferrara, Italy (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). The *palio* are horse-racing competitions that have taken place in various Italian towns since the thirteenth century (with a brief interruption during the time of the Black Plague). Pitting teams from different districts, or *contrade*, against one another, the races take place in the context of an elaborate festival in which residents of each *contrada* root for their team. In the weeks leading up to the *palio*, feelings of intergroup competition run high.

Before one such *palio* competition, the researchers showed the residents of two *contrade*, San Giorgio and San Giacomo, a number of sketches depicting a member of their own team or of the rival team engaged in an action. The *contrada* membership of the person depicted was established simply by having the color of the protagonist's shirt match that of one *contrada* or another. Some of the sketches portrayed desirable actions (such as helping someone), and some portrayed undesirable actions (such as littering). After inspecting each sketch, the participants described what it depicted, and their responses were scored for level of abstraction.

The results revealed a clear bias (**Figure 11.7**). Participants maintained positive views of their own group by describing negative actions of members of their own

EXPLAINING AWAY EXCEPTIONS
People who hold stereotypes of ethnic groups sometimes dismiss examples of individuals who don't conform to the stereotype as exceptions or members of relatively rare subtypes.

CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT CONSTRUALS DURING THE PALIO COMPETITION
Fans of the Palio Competition in Ferrara, Italy, tended to see positive actions by members of their team in abstract, meaningful terms and negative actions in concrete, less meaningful terms. They did just the opposite for the positive and negative actions of members of the opposing team, making it easier for them to continue to think more positively of their own team than their opponents.

Legend:
■ Own *contrada* member
■ Rival *contrada* member

Percentage of description in abstract terms

Abstract terms are used more to describe stereotype-consistent actions (desirable actions by ingroup members, undesirable actions by outgroup members).

70 · 60 · 50 · 40 · 30 · 20 · 10 · 0

Desirable events   Undesirable events

FIGURE 11.7
STEREOTYPES AND THE ENCODING OF BEHAVIOR
People encode events consistent with their preexisting stereotypes (both positive events associated with the ingroup and negative events associated with the outgroup) at a more abstract, and therefore more meaningful, level than events that are inconsistent with preexisting stereotypes. This graph shows the percentage of abstract (versus concrete) terms used to describe desirable and undesirable actions by members of the ingroup and outgroup. Abstract terms consist of state verbs or trait terms (*hates, hateful, loves, loving*), and concrete terms consist of descriptive and interpretive action verbs (*hits, hurts, lifts, aids*).
Source: Adapted from Maass et al., 1989.

group on a more concrete level—a low level of abstraction—so the individual was less implicated in the action ("The guy from my *contrada* dropped a piece of paper"). But participants maintained their less favorable views of the other group by describing negative actions of members of the other group at a high level of abstraction ("The guy from your *contrada* is a litterer"). They did precisely the opposite for positive actions. ("The guy from my *contrada* is very kind. The guy from your *contrada* lifted the little kid on his shoulders.") This asymmetry feeds the tendency to perceive the ingroup in a favorable light. Abstractly evaluating events that fit one's stereotypes lends them greater import; concretely evaluating events that violate one's preferences or expectations renders them less consequential.

Accentuation of Ingroup Similarity and Outgroup Difference

There's an apocryphal story about a man who owned a farm near the Russian–Polish border. Over the course of European history, the farm had gone back and forth under the rule of each country many times. After the most recent boundary was drawn, the farmer was uncertain whether he lived in Poland or Russia. To settle the issue, the farmer saved up to have a proper survey conducted and his national identity established. When the survey was finished, the farmer, scarcely able to contain his anticipation, asked, "Well, do I live in Russia or Poland?" The surveyor replied that although remarkably near the border, the entire farm was located in Poland. "Good," the farmer stated, "I don't think I could take those harsh Russian winters."

The point of the story, of course, is that although an arbitrary national border can't affect the weather at a fixed location, arbitrary categorical boundaries can have significant effects on the way we perceive things. Indeed, research has shown that merely dividing a continuous distribution into two groups leads people to see less variability within each group and more variability between the

two groups. In one study, participants were divided into two arbitrary groups. They then filled out an attitude questionnaire twice—once to record their own attitudes and once to record how they thought another ingroup member or outgroup member might respond. Participants consistently assumed that their beliefs were more similar to those of another ingroup member than to those of an outgroup member, even though the basis of group membership was arbitrary (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Wilder, 1984).

The remarkable thing about this result is *not* that people assume more similarity between members within a group than across groups. That makes sense. After all, why categorize members into groups in the first place if the members of each group are not, on average, more similar to one another than they are to the members of the other group? What *is* remarkable, and potentially troubling, is that people make such assumptions even when the groups are formed arbitrarily or on the basis of a dimension (such as skin color, age, or body weight) that has no bearing on the attitude or behavior under consideration. In these circumstances, the pure act of categorization distorts judgment. Also, the more people think of outgroup members as homogeneous, the more likely they are to spout prejudices about them and discriminate against them (Brauer & Er-rafiy, 2011).

THE OUTGROUP HOMOGENEITY EFFECT Think of a group to which you do not belong: Islamic fundamentalists, reality TV participants, heroin addicts, Tesla owners. It's tempting to think of such groups as a unitary *they*. We tend to call to mind an image of such groups in which all members think alike, act alike, even look alike. We also tend to assume that the members of an outgroup are more similar to one another than those of us in our ingroup are. *They* all think, act, and look alike. *We*, on the other hand, are a remarkably varied lot. This tendency is called the **outgroup homogeneity effect**. The effect can be seen in different perspectives on Latin America. Anglo-Americans often lump all "Latinos" together, regardless of whether they're from Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, or Chile. Meanwhile, Chileans, Puerto Ricans, Nicaraguans, and Mexicans see a great many important differences between the residents of their countries (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995).

One study examined the outgroup homogeneity effect by showing Princeton and Rutgers students a series of videos of other students making decisions, such as whether to listen to rock or classical music or whether to wait alone or with other participants during a break in an experiment (Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Half the participants were told the students on the video were from Princeton; half were told they were from Rutgers. Afterward, the participants estimated the percentage of students at the same university who would make the same choices as those they had seen on the video. The results indicated that the participants assumed more similarity among outgroup members than among ingroup members. Princeton students who thought they had witnessed the behavior of a Rutgers student were willing to generalize that behavior to other Rutgers students. In contrast, Princeton students who thought they had witnessed the behavior of a Princeton student were less willing to generalize. The opposite was true for Rutgers students. People see more variability of habit and opinion among members of the ingroup than they do among members of the outgroup (Quattrone & Jones, 1980; see also Bartsch, Judd, Louw, Park, & Ryan, 1997; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; Park & Judd, 1990; Read & Urada, 2003; Simon et al., 1990).

outgroup homogeneity effect The tendency for people to assume that within-group similarity is much stronger for outgroups than for ingroups.

It's easy to understand why the outgroup homogeneity effect occurs. For one thing, we typically have much more contact with members of our own ingroup than with outgroup members, so we have more opportunity to encounter evidence of divergent opinions and habits among ingroup members. Indeed, sometimes *all* we know about an outgroup is what its stereotypical characteristics are reputed to be. But having more interactions with the ingroup is only half the story. The *nature* of the interactions we have with ingroup and outgroup members is likely to be different as well. Because we share the same group membership, we don't treat an ingroup member as a representative of a group. It's the person's individual likes, dislikes, talents, and shortcomings that are front and center. Not so with outgroup members. We often treat an outgroup member merely as a representative of a group, so the person's unique characteristics recede into the background. If we think members of that group are all alike, we're more inclined to behave toward all of them in the same way—thereby eliciting the same kind of behavior from all of them.

The expression "they all look alike" finds support in research that examines people's ability to distinguish faces of members of their own and other races. White people are better at recognizing white faces, black people are better at recognizing black faces, Hispanics are better at recognizing Hispanic faces, and both the young and the old are better at recognizing faces from their own age-group (Devine & Malpass, 1985; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Wright & Stroud, 2002). This **own-race identification bias** appears to result from the fact that people interact with members of their own race as individuals, without thinking about race, and so the individual features of the person in question are processed more deeply. When interacting with someone from another race, part of one's attention is drawn to the person's race, taking away from the processing of the person's individuating characteristics (Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007).

own-race identification bias The tendency for people to be better able to recognize and distinguish faces from their own race than from other races.

Automatic and Controlled Processing

Some of the cognitive processes that give rise to stereotyping and prejudice are deliberate, mindful, and conscious—in other words, controlled. Subtyping ("He doesn't count because...") is often a conscious process (Devine & Baker, 1991; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Other cognitive processes, however, give rise to stereotyping and prejudice rapidly and automatically, without much conscious attention and elaboration. This is particularly likely to be the case for distinctiveness-based illusory correlations and the outgroup homogeneity effect discussed earlier.

In the past 30 years, researchers have explored the interplay of automatic and controlled processes (see Chapter 4) and how they collectively influence the way people react to members of different groups (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999; Devine & Monteith, 1999; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2004). This research has shown that our reactions to different groups of people are, to a surprising degree, guided by quick and automatic mental processes that we can override but not eliminate. The findings also highlight the common discrepancy between our immediate, reflexive reactions to outgroup members and our more reflective responses.

Patricia Devine (1989b) examined the joint operation of these automatic and controlled processes by investigating the schism that exists for many people

between their knowledge of racial stereotypes and their own beliefs and attitudes toward those same groups. More specifically, Devine sought to demonstrate that what separates prejudiced and nonprejudiced people is not their knowledge of derogatory stereotypes, but whether they resist those stereotypes. To carry out her investigation, Devine relied on the distinction between controlled processes, which we direct more consciously, and automatic processes, which we do not consciously control. The activation of stereotypes is typically an automatic process; thus, stereotypes can be triggered even if we don't want them to be. Even a nonprejudiced person will, under the right circumstances, access an association between, say, Muslims and fanaticism, blacks and criminality, and WASPs and emotional repression, because those associations are present in our culture. Whereas a bigot will endorse or employ such stereotypes, a nonprejudiced person will employ more controlled cognitive processes to discard or suppress them—or at least try to.

To test these ideas, Devine selected groups of high- and low-prejudiced participants on the basis of their scores on the Modern Racism Scale (Devine, 1989b). To show that these two groups don't differ in their automatic processing of stereotypical information—that is, that the same stereotypes are triggered in both high-prejudiced and low-prejudiced people—she presented each participant with

a set of words, one at a time, so briefly that the words could not be consciously identified. Some of them saw neutral words (*number, plant, remember*) and others saw words stereotypically associated with blacks (*welfare, jazz, busing*). Devine hypothesized that although the stereotypical words were presented too briefly to be consciously recognized, they would nonetheless prime the participants' stereotypes of blacks. To test this hypothesis, she presented the participants with a written description of an individual who acted in an ambiguously hostile manner (a feature of the African-American stereotype). In one incident, for example, the person refused to pay his rent until his apartment was repaired. Was he being needlessly belligerent or appropriately assertive? The results indicated that he was seen as more hostile—and more negative overall—by participants who had earlier been primed by words designed to activate stereotypes of blacks (words such as *jazz*, it's important to note, that are not otherwise connected to the concept of hostility). Most importantly, this result was found equally for prejudiced and nonprejudiced participants. Because the words activated their stereotypes unconsciously, the nonprejudiced participants were unable to suppress the automatic processing of stereotypical information.

To demonstrate that prejudiced and nonprejudiced people differ primarily in their *controlled* cognitive processes, if not in their automatic cognitive processes, Devine next asked her participants to list characteristics of black Americans (Devine, 1989b). As predicted, the prejudiced participants listed many more negative characteristics stereotypically associated with blacks than did nonprejudiced participants. Thus, even though both prejudiced and nonprejudiced people may know the same negative stereotypes of black Americans (as shown in the first part of Devine's study), those who are prejudiced believe them and are sometimes willing to voice those beliefs, whereas those who are not prejudiced reject them.

Other studies of people's automatic reactions to members of stigmatized groups are quite disturbing. In a study by Keith Payne (2001), participants had to decide as quickly as possible whether an object depicted in a photo was a handgun or a hand tool, such as pliers. Each photograph was immediately preceded by a picture of either an African-American face or a white face. The participants (all of whom were white) were faster to identify a weapon as a weapon when it was preceded by an African-American face and faster to identify a hand tool as a hand tool when it was preceded by a white face (**Figure 11.8**, see p. 394).

Do these results mean that the white participants exhibited automatic *prejudice* toward African-Americans? In other words, was the recognition of handguns facilitated by African-American faces because the white participants have negative attitudes about both handguns and African-Americans? Or are these results due to automatic *stereotyping*? In other words, is the facilitation caused by a stereotypical association between handguns and African-Americans that is activated even in people who don't actually hold prejudiced attitudes toward African-Americans?

The good news (limited, perhaps, but good news nonetheless) is that it appears to be the latter. Charles Judd, Irene Blair, and Kristine Chapleau (2004) replicated Payne's experiment with four types of stimuli that varied in whether they were viewed positively or negatively and whether they were stereotypically associated with African-Americans. Specifically, the stimuli associated with African-Americans consisted of pictures of handguns (negative) and sports equipment (positive), and the stimuli not associated with African-Americans consisted of pictures of insects (negative) and fruit (positive). Judd and his colleagues found that

Priming photograph

Object to be identified (as quickly as possible)

FIGURE 11.8
STEREOTYPES AND CATEGORIZATION
In this study, culturally shared stereotypes of African-Americans led white participants to identify handguns more quickly if they had been primed by an African-American face and hand tools more quickly if they had been primed by a white face.
Source: Adapted from Payne, 2001.

African-American faces facilitated the recognition of both positive and negative stereotypical items (handguns and sports equipment), but not the nonstereotypical items (insects and fruits), regardless of whether they were positive or negative.

A similar conclusion emerges from studies with even more chilling implications for the everyday lives of African-Americans (**Box 11.3**, p. 397). This research was inspired by the tragic death of Amadou Diallo, a black West African immigrant who in 1999 was shot 19 times by police officers who later said they thought, incorrectly, that he was reaching for a gun—a tragedy echoed in many of the shootings of African-Americans that have given birth to the Black Lives Matter movement. In these studies, participants watch a video game in which, at unpredictable moments, a target individual—sometimes white, sometimes black—pops up out of nowhere holding either a gun or some other

THE DIRE COST OF STEREOTYPING AND REACTING AUTOMATICALLY
White police officers in New York City attempted to question Amadou Diallo, a black West African immigrant who had gone outside his apartment building to get some air and who seemed to fit the description of the serial rapist they were looking for. Diallo ran up the steps of his building and then reached inside his jacket for what police believed was a gun but was actually his wallet. Reacting out of fear that Diallo was about to start firing a weapon, the four policemen fired 41 shots, striking the innocent Diallo 19 times and killing him.

object (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll, Urland, & Ito, 2006; Ma & Correll, 2011; Payne, 2006). Participants are instructed to "shoot" by pressing one key if the person is holding a gun and to press a different response key if he is not. Because participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible, they are bound to make occasional mistakes. And, as **Figure 11.9** shows, they tend to treat black and white targets differently. In this study, participants made both types of mistakes—shooting an unarmed target and not shooting an armed target—equally often when the target individual was white. But for black targets, participants were much more likely to make the mistake of shooting if the target was unarmed than failing to shoot if the target was armed. This effect is especially pronounced when the background (for example, on a darkened street) is itself threatening (Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, & Goyle, 2011) and when the black individuals depicted in the video game have more

A mistake on an unarmed trial involved shooting when one should not have—and participants did so more often for a black target than a white target.

A mistake on an armed trial involved failing to shoot when one should have—and participants did so more often for a white target than a black target.

FIGURE 11.9
AUTOMATIC STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE
Participants were shown images of an armed or unarmed individual who appeared suddenly on a computer screen. They were told to respond as quickly as possible by pressing one button to "shoot" an armed individual and another button if the individual was unarmed.
Source: Adapted from Correll et al., 2002

stereotypical African features (Ma & Correll, 2011). Notably, the same effect was obtained in a follow-up experiment with African-American participants. This effect has also been observed in participants' decisions about whether to "shoot" men or women wearing an Islamic headdress (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008).

Prolonged experience with these sorts of shoot/don't shoot decisions, either through laboratory exposure or real-world police training and experience, seems to diminish the tendency to shoot unarmed blacks more than unarmed whites, but the reaction time differences (faster to decide to shoot an armed black person and not to shoot an unarmed white person) tend to persist (Correll et al., 2007; Glaser, 2014; Payne, 2006; Plant & Peruche, 2005; Plant, Peruche, & Butz, 2005).

⬅ LOOKING BACK

Consistent with the cognitive perspective, stereotypes help us make sense of the world and process information efficiently, freeing us to use cognitive resources for other work. But they can also cause us to make many errors, as when we form distinctiveness-based illusory correlations. Stereotypes also influence how events are interpreted, and they endure because people act toward members of certain groups in ways that encourage the very behavior they expect (self-fulfilling prophecies). Our expectations of what a group of people is like can lead us to process information in ways that make stereotypes resistant to disconfirmation, as we explain away information that violates a stereotype and subtype members of a group who don't fit the stereotype. We also tend to see outgroup members as more homogeneous than they actually are. Stereotypes can result from both automatic and controlled processing. Even people who don't express prejudicial views may reflexively respond to individuals on the basis of their unconscious stereotypes and prejudices.

Being a Member of a Stigmatized Group

So far, this chapter has focused on the perpetrators of prejudice—who, it should be clear by now, can be presumed to include all of us. But what about the victims of prejudice—members of stigmatized groups? They pay an unfair price in terms of numerous indicators of material and psychological well-being—health, wealth, employment prospects, housing options, and longevity, among others. What's more, members of stereotyped or stigmatized groups are usually aware of the stereotypes others hold, and this awareness can have negative effects on them as well (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Herek, 1998; Inzlicht, Aronson, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Jones et al., 1984; Pinel, 1999; Shelton, Alegre, & Son, 2010; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005). These effects include increased stress, diminished psychological well-being, greater incidence of diseases such as hypertension and diabetes, and greater engagement in unhealthy behavior such as smoking, poor nutrition, and missing doctor appointments (Meyer & Frost, 2013; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014). We focus here on three burdens that come with knowing others might be prejudiced against one's group: attributional ambiguity, stereotype threat, and the psychological costs of concealing one's identity.

Attributional Ambiguity

To function effectively, people need to understand the causes of events happening around them. But this understanding is threatened for members of stigmatized groups because they can't always tell whether their experiences have the same causes as those of members of the ingroup or the majority or whether their experiences are instead the result of prejudice. They suffer from attributional ambiguity—not knowing the underlying causes of what they experience: "Did my officemate get the promotion instead of me because I'm Latino?" "Would the state trooper have pulled me over if I were white?" Questions like these can be distressing even when it comes to positive outcomes: "Did I get that fellowship because I'm African-American?" When someone has to wonder whether an accomplishment is the product of an affirmative action policy, it can be difficult to completely "own" it and reap the full measure of pride it would ordinarily afford.

In one study that examined this type of attributional predicament, African-American and white students received flattering or unflattering feedback from a white student in an adjacent room (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). Half the participants were led to assume that the white student could see them through a one-way mirror, and half thought they couldn't be seen because a blind covered the mirror. Whether or not they could be seen had no effect on how white students reacted to the feedback, but it did affect how black students reacted. When black students thought the other person could *not* see them—and therefore didn't know their race—their self-esteem went down from the unflattering feedback and was boosted by the positive feedback. When they thought the other person *could* see them, in contrast, their self-esteem was not injured by the bad news (presumably because they did not know whether to attribute the negative feedback to their own failings or to the other's prejudice), nor was it enhanced by the good news (presumably because they did not know whether to attribute the positive feedback to their own skill or to the other's condescension). This study indicates that members

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BOX 11.3   FOCUS ON THE LAW

Stereotypical Facial Features and the Death Penalty

The election of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States highlights the often ambiguous nature of race. Although the child of a white mother and black father, Obama is almost always referred to as the first African-American president, not the first biracial president. This is no doubt a legacy of the "one-drop rule": historically, individuals were considered black if they had any trace of black ancestry at all. Various Southern states used this standard to back the notorious Jim Crow laws that enforced racial segregation and restricted the rights of blacks. But now that society has moved beyond the one-drop rule, we are left with the difficult issue of "who counts" as black, white, Asian, Hispanic, and so on. Indeed, many biologists question whether racial categories make any sense at all—that is, whether race really exists (Bamshad & Olson, 2003).

The psychology behind the one-drop rule notwithstanding, race-based judgments about others often differ in intensity depending on how much a person's physical features conform to a stereotype. African-American faces with more stereotypically African features (darker skin, fuller lips, more flared nostrils) elicit prejudiced reactions more readily than faces with less stereotypical features (Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Ma & Correll, 2011). Furthermore, both black and white individuals with more stereotypically African features are assumed to have traits associated with common stereotypes of African-Americans (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002). In the most consequential manifestation of this tendency, both black and white convicts with stereotypically African features tend to receive harsher sentences than those with less stereotypically African features (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004), and blacks accused of capital crimes are more likely to end up on death row if they have stereotypically African features (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). Moreover, testifying to the utility of the motivational perspective on stereotyping and prejudice, people are more likely to categorize ambiguous faces as black when they are primed with thoughts of economic scarcity (Krosch & Amodio, 2014; Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012).

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of stigmatized groups live in a less certain world, not knowing to what cause they can attribute their experience.

Stereotype Threat

An extensive program of research initiated by Claude Steele and his colleagues highlights a second difficulty for members of stigmatized groups (Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Their performance can be impaired by **stereotype threat**, the fear that they will confirm the stereotypes others have about them and their group. In one study, researchers examined the effect on women's math test scores of bringing to mind the stereotype that women don't perform as well as men in mathematics (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). In one condition, participants were told there was no gender difference on a particular test they were about to take. Other participants were told that there was a gender difference in favor of men. As **Figure 11.10** (see p. 398) shows, men and women performed equivalently when they thought there was no gender difference on the test, but women performed worse than men when they thought there was a gender difference.

It's not necessary to blatantly invoke stereotype threat for it to have an effect. Michael Inzlicht and Talia Ben-Zeev (2000) had female undergraduates take a math test in the company of either two other women or two men—they did not say a word about any gender differences on the test. Nonetheless, those who took the test with other women got 70 percent of the problems correct on average. Those who took the test with men got 55 percent correct on average.

stereotype threat The fear of confirming the stereotypes that others have about one's group.

Test scores

When the test was described as one that yields gender differences, it aroused stereotype threat among the female participants, and their performance dipped.

Characterization of the test

FIGURE 11.10
STEREOTYPE THREAT AND PERFORMANCE
This study shows the performance of men and women on a math test when they thought the test tapped gender differences and when they did not.
Source: Adapted from Spencer et al., 1999.

In another study, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson examined the sensitivity to stereotype threat on the part of African-American students (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Playing on a stereotype that questions blacks' intellectual ability, they gave black and white college students a difficult verbal test taken from the Graduate Record Exam. Half the students were led to believe that the test could measure their intellectual ability, and half were told that the investigators were in the early stages of developing the test and that nothing could be learned about intellectual ability from the participants' scores. This information had no effect on the performance of white students. In contrast, the African-American students did as well as the white students when they thought it was the test that was being tested, but they performed much worse than the white students when they thought their intellectual ability was being tested. Again, a blatant manipulation was not required to produce a significant effect on the performance of African-Americans: even without directly priming any stereotypes about African-Americans' intellectual performance, the African-American students still felt the effects of that pervasive stereotype, and it affected their scores accordingly. In a follow-up study, it was enough simply to have participants indicate their race at the top of the page to cause African-American students' performance to be worse than in a control condition in which they did not indicate their race (Steele & Aronson, 1995).

It seems that no one is safe from stereotype threat. Another research team showed that the math performance of white males deteriorated when they were reminded of Asian proficiency in math (Aronson et al., 1999). And in a particularly clever experiment, Jeff Stone and his colleagues had college students perform a laboratory golf task described as a measure of "natural athletic ability," "sports intelligence," or "sports psychology" (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). White and black students performed equally well in the "sports psychology" condition. But black students performed significantly worse when it was described as a test of "sports intelligence," and white students performed worse when it was described as a test of "natural athletic ability." In still another telling study, Asian-American women did worse on a math test than control participants when their gender was made salient, but better than control participants when their race was highlighted (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).

Stereotype threat appears to undermine performance in a number of ways. Stereotype threat leads to increased arousal, which can directly interfere with performance on complex tasks (see Chapter 12; Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, 2005) and serve as a source of distraction that interferes with concentration on the task at hand (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000). Furthermore, knowing that one's group is "suspect" in the eyes of others tends to elicit negative thinking (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005). This can both directly undermine performance and lead individuals to "play it safe" by being more obsessed with avoiding failure than striving for success (Seibt & Forster, 2004). In accordance with the idea that stereotypes affect health, stereotype threats to women's math performance have been shown to increase physiological markers of increased stress (John-Henderson, Rheinschmidt, & Mendoza-Denton, 2015).

Although all people are vulnerable to some type of stereotype threat based on their group memberships, Steele (1997) maintains that the vulnerability of African-Americans has particular potential for damage. Stereotype threat can result in poorer overall academic performance, which undermines confidence, rendering the individual still more susceptible to stereotype threat. This vicious cycle can result in "disidentification" from academic pursuits, as students who feel the threat most acutely often opt out of academics altogether and identify other areas in which to invest their talent and energy and from which to derive their self-esteem. The same process appears to play a role in the underrepresentation of women in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields (Deemer, Lin, & Soto, 2015; Walton, et al., 2015). Fortunately, social psychologists have developed a number of low-cost, highly effective interventions that can help deal with the debilitating effects of stereotype threat in schools (see Application Module 3).

The Cost of Concealment

Australia is known for its powerhouse Olympic swimming teams, but no Aussie swimmer has had a bigger hold on the country's imagination than Ian Thorpe. Nicknamed "the Thorpedo" for the speed and grace with which he cut through the water, Thorpe won five Olympic gold medals in his career. Throughout his career, Thorpe was dogged by rumors that he was gay, rumors he steadfastly denied. "You know, I'm a little bit different to what most people would consider being an Australian male. That doesn't make me gay. I mean I'm straight, so people want to claim me as part of a minority group and put labels on you and that's not what I'm about, and I don't understand why people are like that" (Magnay, 2002). After retiring from swimming, however, Thorpe announced during a television interview that he was in fact gay.

Sadly, Ian Thorpe's experience is not unusual. Members of stigmatized groups throughout history have often felt compelled to hide their true identity. LGBTQ individuals have often chosen to remain "in the closet," light-skinned blacks have sometimes tried to "pass" as white, and many older adults get plastic surgery, tummy tucks, and toupees in an effort to hide their true age. The ubiquity of such underground experiences makes one wonder what sort of toll they exact.

A big one, it turns out. Physically, the concealment of sexual orientation is associated with cardiovascular stress, and gay men who conceal their sexual orientation show more rapid progression of HIV symptoms (Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, & Visscher, 1996; Pérez-Benítez, O'Brien, Carels, Gordon, & Chiros, 2007).

Psychologically, being "out of the closet" is associated with a variety of indicators of better mental health, including reduced depression, less anger, and higher self-esteem (Legate, Ryan, & Weinstein, 2012; Miranda & Storms, 1989; Ross, 1990; Szymanski, Chung, & Balsam, 2001).

Concealment can also take a cognitive toll. In one study, researchers Clayton Critcher and Melissa Ferguson instructed half the participants to conceal their sexual orientation during a mock interview while the control participants were free to say whatever they wanted (Critcher & Ferguson, 2013). The investigators predicted that the act of concealment would be mentally taxing, making them less able to perform well on subsequent tasks. Indeed, across several experiments, they found that those asked to conceal their sexual orientation did less well on tests of spatial ability, self-control, and physical stamina. Concealing an important part of oneself is demanding, and meeting those demands can have unfortunate consequences down the road.

⊘ LOOKING BACK

Victims of stereotyping can suffer attributional ambiguity, not knowing whether others' feedback on their performance is genuine or based on their group membership. They can suffer from stereotype threat, performing worse than they would otherwise because they are afraid of confirming a stereotype that exists about their group. Members of some minority groups feel compelled to try to cover up their minority status, an effort that can exact a physical and psychological toll.

Reducing Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

This chapter began with a discussion of the progress that's been made in intergroup relations in the United States and across much of the globe—and how much farther we must go to achieve true equality of opportunity for everyone. What has contributed to the improvements we've witnessed thus far, and what principles can we draw on to advance even more?

Many factors, including specific legal interventions and broad economic developments, have brought about improved relations between LGBTQ and straight people, blacks and whites, Latinos and Anglos, and numerous other groups. One factor that is both cause and consequence of these developments is the increased daily interactions between members of different groups. When people interact frequently, it becomes easier to see people as individuals, rather than representatives of particular groups. As Barack Obama said in his 2008 inaugural address, "As the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself."

Individual Approaches to Prejudice Reduction

What, then, are the most effective ways to make "our common humanity" clear to one and all? Some efforts to improve intergroup relations are didactic: they use the media or school programs to promote acceptance of outgroups or to

convince individuals that their peers frown on the endorsement of unfounded or overly broad stereotypes, the expression of prejudice, and the perpetuation of discrimination. These efforts are often met with resistance because people don't hold their beliefs and prejudices in isolation; they belong to social groups that pressure them back to their old ways of thinking. Nevertheless, laboratory studies aimed at convincing participants that the prevailing norms favor outgroup tolerance have been shown to be effective in reducing stereotypes of stigmatized groups, at least in the short term (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Outside the laboratory, school reading programs designed to promote greater acceptance of outgroups have also enjoyed some success (Clunies-Ross & O'Meara, 1989; Hughes, Bigler, & Levy, 2007). In one study, for example, British schoolchildren were randomly assigned, during story hour over a six-week period, to listen to and discuss stories about friendships between disabled and nondisabled children or to stories unrelated to disabilities. The children who read about disabled children later expressed more favorable attitudes and a greater willingness to interact with the disabled (Cameron & Rutland, 2006). Venturing further still from the laboratory, a year-long field experiment in Rwanda found that a radio soap opera could be effectively used to heal the scars of ethnic conflict (in this case, between the Hutus and Tutsis). Rwandans who were exposed to the soap opera were more open to intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis and more in favor of putting the past trauma behind them compared with those exposed to a control soap opera (Paluck, 2009).

Intergroup Approaches to Prejudice Reduction

Until the late stages of World War II, soldiers in the U.S. Army were racially segregated. Black soldiers were relegated to combat support roles such as cooks, quartermasters, and grave diggers. Segregation remained official army policy until 1948, but in 1944, black soldiers who volunteered for combat duty were allowed to fight alongside white soldiers in battalions consisting of one all-black platoon and three all-white platoons. Concerned about the influence of this (modest) integration policy on morale, the army commissioned a survey of white soldier's attitudes. The results were striking: Those who actually served in (semi) integrated units expressed little resistance to the idea of fighting alongside their black countrymen—a sentiment that was not shared by white soldiers who remained in entirely segregated battalions (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949).

These results led to early optimism about the **contact hypothesis**, the idea that prejudice would be reduced if members of minority and majority groups were in frequent contact with one another. But it turns out that simple contact between different groups is not a magic solution to the problem of intergroup conflict. Numerous studies examined the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation decision in *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka* (1954) on race relations in American schools, and the results were not encouraging. One review of the literature found that a majority of the studies observed an *increase* in prejudice after schools were integrated (Stephan, 1986).

Not an encouraging finding, to be sure, but given what we learned from the Robbers Cave study, not a surprising finding either. After all, simply bringing the Rattlers and Eagles together did not reduce the animosity between the two groups. As that study suggested and subsequent research has confirmed, contact

contact hypothesis The proposition that prejudice can be reduced by putting members of majority and minority groups in frequent contact with one another.

between different groups is likely to be more positive and more productive if certain conditions are met. First, the groups need to have equal status. If one group feels superior and the other resentful, then harmonious, productive interactions are not likely to be the norm. Second, as in the Robbers Cave study, productive intergroup interactions can occur if the different groups have a shared goal that requires mutual cooperation (a superordinate goal), thereby promoting a common ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2009; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001; West, Pearson, Dovidio, Shelton, & Trail, 2009). That's no doubt a big part of why racial integration of the military and later the acceptance of gay and lesbian soldiers have proceeded relatively smoothly. Soldiers face a common, deadly enemy and must depend on one another for their very survival. Sports teams also face a common foe, and many people have noted that sports have also been effective in tearing down barriers between groups. In one notable study, Kendrick Brown and his colleagues examined the racial attitudes of white athletes at 24 colleges and universities in the United States and found a positive correlation between their attitudes toward blacks and the percentage of minority players they had on their high school teams. But testifying once again to the importance of interdependent action, this was only true for athletes in true team sports like basketball and soccer, not in largely individual sports like swimming and track (Brown, Brown, Jackson, Sellers, & Manuel, 2003). And as we saw in Box 11.2, making school assignments more cooperative and interdependent promotes more favorable attitudes between different ethnic and racial groups.

A third condition that's been shown to be important for promoting positive intergroup relations is community support: a community's broader social norms must support intergroup contact. If children of different races, religions, and ethnicities go to school with one another but their parents send them begrudgingly and rarely miss an opportunity to speak ill of the "other" children, the students themselves are unlikely to reach out across group boundaries. On the other hand, merely knowing that someone in one's group is friends with a member of an outgroup—which strengthens perceived social support for contact with the outgroup—is sufficient to reduce stereotyping and outgroup denigration (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Finally, intergroup contact should encourage one-on-one interactions between members of the different groups. Doing so puts each person's identity as an individual in the foreground and downplays a person's group membership.

An analysis of numerous studies of the effect of desegregation, involving tens of thousands of students in over 25 countries, found that when most of these conditions are met, contact between members of different groups does indeed tend to be effective in reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000, 2006, 2008). In a different study, university students who were assigned roommates of a different race reported reduced anxiety about cross-race interactions and registered a significant improvement on implicit measures of attitudes toward the other group (Shook & Fazio, 2008).

The Dimensions of Productive Intergroup Contact

When groups with a history of animosity and conflict have one-on-one contact with one another under conditions of equal status, interdependence, and supportive social norms, three important changes appear to take place that together reduce prejudice. First, people begin to see members of the outgroup as

Conflict Remediation

Research by social psychologists on the contact hypothesis has inspired numerous efforts to reduce intergroup hostility by bringing together people from groups with a history of conflict. For example, programs have been designed to improve relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Seeds of Peace, for example, is a program that brings groups of Israeli and Palestinian teenagers to the United States for a three-week summer camp experience in which they (like the Robbers Cave participants) tackle a variety of challenges that can only be met if everyone cooperates. Campers are also encouraged to "make one friend" with someone from the other group of kids.

Do these types of coexistence programs work? To find out, Juliana Schroeder and Jane Risen surveyed four sets of Seeds of Peace campers, 279 in all, before camp began, as it ended, and more than nine months later (Schroeder & Risen, 2014).

The participants described their attitudes toward the Israelis and Palestinians they met at camp and toward Israelis and Palestinians in general, and they indicated whether they had made any friends from the other group at camp. The researchers found that living together for three weeks led to attitudes at the end of camp that were more mutually favorable, and more favorable toward each other's ethnic group, than they were at the beginning.

Some of this positive feeling ebbed when the teenagers returned to their homes in the Middle East. But not all of it: attitudes more than nine months later were still more favorable than they had been at the beginning of camp. The investigators also found that forming a friendship with someone from the other group was a significant predictor of favorable attitudes after the teenagers had gone back to their normal lives.

SEEDS OF PEACE When Israeli and Palestinian teenagers are brought together for a three-week residential summer camp experience in which they complete a variety of interdependent tasks, their attitudes toward each other, and toward Israelis and Palestinians in general, tend to improve.

individuals rather than as stereotyped, undifferentiated members of a social category, a process psychologists refer to as personalization (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Personalization makes it easier for people to empathize with outgroup members and to think of them as similar to themselves (Ensari, Christian, Kuriyama, & Miller, 2012). Second, in this kind of one-on-one contact, a person's positive feelings for particular outgroup members start to generalize to the outgroup as a whole. That happens when the outgroup members one interacts with are seen as typical of the group in question (that is, the individual members are not

subtyped as exceptions) and when the individual members' behavior is not construed in a way that reinforces previous stereotypes about the group (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Finally, positive intergroup sentiments are solidified when members of both groups come to think of themselves as sharing a common identity (Gaertner, Dovidio, Guerra, Hehman, & Saguy, 2016). Members of sports teams come to think of themselves primarily as teammates, not as white or black teammates. Members of integrated military units come to think of themselves first and foremost as soldiers, not as Muslim, Christian, or Jewish soldiers. This is the "common humanity" that Barack Obama referred to—something that's most likely to "reveal itself" when people of different backgrounds come together with equal status to work on shared goals.

⬅ LOOKING BACK

Contact between members of different groups can go a long way toward reducing group stereotypes and intergroup hostility. Intergroup contact is especially beneficial when members of different groups interact as equals, work together to try to accomplish common goals, and come together on a one-on-one basis, as well as when these interactions are supported by broader societal norms.

SUMMARY

Theoretical Perspectives

- Three approaches to studying stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are the economic perspective, the motivational perspective, and the cognitive perspective.

Characterizing Intergroup Bias

- *Stereotypes* are generalizations about groups that are often applied to individual group members. *Prejudice* involves either a positive or a negative attitude and emotional response to members of a group. *Discrimination* is favorable or unfavorable treatment of an individual because of the person's membership in a specific group.
- Blatant, explicit racism has declined in much of the world in recent times. But *modern racism* is still prevalent, whereby people consciously hold egalitarian attitudes while nonconsciously having negative attitudes and exhibiting more subtle forms of prejudice.
- "Benevolent" racism and sexism consist of attitudes the individual thinks of as favorable toward a group but that have the effect of supporting traditional, subservient roles for members of disadvantaged groups.
- The *implicit association test (IAT)* measures nonconscious attitudes by comparing reaction times when outgroup pictures (or words) and positive items are in the same response category versus when outgroup pictures (or words) and negative items are in the same category. Other implicit measures involve *priming* with a picture of a member of some group right before the participant must either identify different words or rate different stimuli; speeded response times to negative words and delayed response times to positive words reveal negative prejudice, as do lowered ratings of immediately following stimuli.

The Economic Perspective

- One version of the economic perspective is *realistic group conflict theory*, the theory that group conflict, prejudice, and discrimination are likely to arise over competition between groups for limited resources, whether material/economic or cultural/ideological.
- The classic Robbers Cave experiment put two groups of boys in competition at a camp, and soon they were expressing open hostility toward each other. When the groups were brought together in noncompetitive situations where they had to cooperate to achieve shared *superordinate goals*, the hostility dissipated.

The Motivational Perspective

- According to the *motivational perspective*, poor intergroup relations can result simply because there *are* two groups, and an us/them opposition results. This occurs in the *minimal group paradigm*, where members of arbitrarily defined groups favor their fellow group members over members of the other group.
- *Social identity theory* attempts to explain ingroup favoritism, maintaining that self-esteem is derived in part from group membership and group success.

The Cognitive Perspective

- The *cognitive perspective* focuses on stereotypes, which are a form of categorization. People rely on them all the time, but especially when they are tired or overburdened.
- Several construal processes lead to inaccurate stereotypes. People engage in biased information processing, seeing aspects of other groups that confirm common stereotypes and failing to see facts that are inconsistent with them.
- Distinctive groups (because they are in the minority) are often associated with distinctive (rare) behaviors. This *paired distinctiveness* results in attributing false characteristics or tendencies to such groups, creating illusory correlations.
- Erroneous stereotypes can also be unknowingly maintained through self-fulfilling prophecies, when people act toward members of certain groups in ways that encourage the very behavior they expect.
- Contradictory evidence about group members may not change people's ideas about a group because people often consider such evidence an exception that proves the rule. Behavior consistent with a stereotype tends to be attributed to the dispositions of the group members, whereas behavior that is inconsistent with a stereotype is often attributed to the situation.
- People tend to code favorable evidence about ingroup members more abstractly and the same sort of evidence about outgroup members less abstractly and more concretely. The reverse is true for unfavorable evidence.
- People tend to assume that outgroups are more homogeneous than ingroups, leading to the *outgroup homogeneity effect*.
- People sometimes respond to outgroup members reflexively, relying on automatic processes whereby they reveal their prejudice even without being aware of it. Often these automatic reactions can be corrected by conscious, controlled processes.

Being a Member of a Stigmatized Group

- Members of stigmatized groups suffer from attributional ambiguity. They have to ask themselves whether others' negative or positive behavior toward them is due to prejudice or to some factor unrelated to their group membership.
- The performance of members of stigmatized groups can be impaired by *stereotype threat*, the fear that they will confirm others' stereotypes.
- Members of minority groups are sometimes tempted to try to hide their minority group status, an effort that is associated with physical and psychological costs.

Reducing Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

- According to the *contact hypothesis*, contact between members of different groups can reduce intergroup hostility, especially if the contact involves one-on-one interactions between individuals of equal status, if it encourages the cooperative pursuit of superordinate goals, and if it is supported by the prevailing norms in each group.

THINK ABOUT IT

1. Is it possible for people to be prejudiced without being aware of it? How have researchers addressed this question, and what evidence have they found?

2. Suppose every year, the male CEO of a small company always asks a female employee to take care of organizing the company's holiday party. When one female employee asks the CEO why he always gives this task to women, he says that women are better party planners than men. Is this an example of sexism? Why or why not? What adverse effects might the CEO's positive stereotype regarding women's party planning ability have on the female employees?

3. Describe the Robbers Cave experiment and outline three important points this study revealed about intergroup relations.

4. Imagine that a conversation about race relations in the United States develops during a family dinner. One of your relatives argues that given how ubiquitous stereotypes are, prejudice and discrimination are inevitable. Using research from the cognitive perspective, and controlled and automatic processing in particular, how would you respond to this assertion? Are prejudice and discrimination inevitable? Under which conditions are they more likely to emerge?

5. Suppose a woman named Taylor was applying for a job at an accounting firm, and applicants had to complete a math test as part of the onsite interview process. If Taylor met her older male interviewer just prior to taking the math test and he (inappropriately) exclaimed, "You're Taylor? I was expecting, well, a man . . . ," what impact might that have on Taylor's test performance, interview performance, and eventual likelihood of getting the job?

6. Suppose you are a social psychologist and have been hired to help reduce prejudice and discrimination among students of different races, classes, cultures, and sexual orientations in a school system. What might you suggest in addressing this concern?

The answer guidelines for the think about it questions can be found at the back of the book . . . 👉

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