Callicles: Yes, by Zeus! And I'm giving you the right advice.

Socrates: What about swimming, then, most excellent fellow? Does it seem to you the knowledge of swimming is anything awe-inspiring?

Callicles: By Zeus, not to me.

Socrates: And yet that saves human beings from death, whenever they've fallen into any situation of the sort that requires that
D knowledge. But if that seems to be a petty thing, I'll tell you one greater than that, helmsmanship, which saves not only our souls but also our bodies and our possessions from the most extreme dangers, the same way rhetoric does. And this one is self-effacing and orderly, and doesn't have an exalted air about it as though it were accomplishing some high and mighty feat; but when it does accomplish the same things as lawyering, if it gets someone here safely from Aegina, I think it charges a couple of cents, or if it's
E from Egypt or from the Black Sea, for this great benefit of saving the things I was just speaking of—oneself and one's children, possessions, and women—when it lands them in the harbor it charges, at the very most, a couple of dollars.[47] And the one himself who has the art and has accomplished these things steps off at the seaside and stretches his legs next to the ship with a modest air about him; I imagine that's because he knows that it's an unclear thing to figure out which of the passengers he's done a favor to by not letting them sink under the sea, and which ones he's done harm,
512A since he knows that he's put them off the ship no better sorts of people than they were when he took them on, in either body or soul. So he reasons that, if someone afflicted in body with great and incurable diseases hasn't drowned, and that person is miserable because he hasn't died, and isn't benefited at all by him, it's therefore not the case when someone has many incurable diseases in something more valuable than his body, his soul, that his life is worth living and he'll be doing him a favor if he saves him either
B from the sea or the lawcourt or from anything else whatever. He knows that it's not better for a depraved person to live, since it's a necessity that he'll live a bad life.

That's why it's not the custom for a helmsman to exalt himself, even though he saves our lives, or, you amazing fellow, for a maker of war machines either, and he sometimes has the power to save no fewer lives than a general, much less a helmsman or anyone else, since there are times when he saves whole cities. He doesn't seem to you to rank with a lawyer, does he? Yet if he wanted to
C speak the way you people do, Callicles, making something exalted

47 The words translated "dollars" and "cents" are literally drachmas and obols. In purchasing power they were more substantial sums than the translation would suggest, but they were the smallest named divisions of the currency, and the translation is intended to convey something of Socrates' tone.

out of his concerns, he could deluge you with speeches, speaking in exhortation about how people need to become war-machine makers, since nothing else is any big deal, because he'd have enough to say. But you look down on him and on that art of his nonetheless, and would toss the name "mechanic" at him as if in reproach, and wouldn't be willing to let your daughter marry his son or accept his daughter for your own son. Yet on the basis of the things you praise your own specialty for, what reason do you have with any justice to it for looking down on the war-machine maker or the others I was just speaking of? I know you'd claim to
D be better and to come from better stock. But if better isn't what I say it is, and virtue is just this saving of oneself and one's things, whatever sort of person one happens to be, your fault-finding becomes ridiculous when applied to a war-machine maker, to a doctor, or to any of the other arts that have been devised for the sake of saving people. But, you blessedly happy fellow, see whether what's high-born and good isn't something other than saving and
E being saved. Because *that*, just living for some length of time, is something to be disdained by anyone who's truly a *man*; being in love with life on any terms is not for him. He turns over concern for those things to the god instead, and believes what the women say, that no single person can escape what's allotted; on that view, the thing that needs to be considered is in what manner he can live this time he's going to live in the best possible way. Is it by turning
513A himself into a likeness of that regime in which he happens to have his home? Therefore in the present instance you'd need to become exactly like the Athenian populace if you're going to be loved by it and have great power in the city. See if this is profitable for you and for me, you strange fellow, so that we don't suffer the same fate they say the Thessalian women do when they pull down the moon; our choice of that power in the city will be in exchange for the things we love most.[48] If you imagine that any human being
B whatsoever is going to hand over to you any kind of art that will make you have great power here in this city while you're *un*like its regime, for better and for worse, then the way it seems to me, Callicles, is that you're not being given the right advice. Because you can't be an imitator, you have to *be* like them in your very nature, if you're going to work your way into any genuine friendship with the Athenian populace, and yes, with Pyrilampes' son too, by Zeus![49] So whoever is going to turn you into the most complete likeness of these is the one who'll make you a politician in the way you want to
C be a politician, and a rhetorician, because people of each type take

48 Witches were thought to gain their powers, such as that of causing eclipses, at the price of losing loved ones, their own sight, or something else precious to them.

49 See 481D and footnote.

delight in speeches made in accord with their own character, and are put off by speeches meant for anyone else's character—unless you say something different, dear heart. Do we say anything in response to this, Callicles?

Callicles: Something about the way you're speaking seems good to me, Socrates—I don't know what it is—but I'm having the experience most people do: I'm not entirely persuaded by you.

Socrates: That's because the love of the populace that's there in your soul, Callicles, is resisting me, but if we examine these same things
D over and over, and better, you'll be persuaded. Anyway, remember that we were claiming there are two kinds of preparation for taking care of each thing having to do with the body and the soul, one that goes about its business with a view to pleasure, the other doing so with a view to what's best, and not giving in but struggling for it. Weren't these the things we distinguished then?

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: And one of them, the one looking toward pleasure, is of base lineage and turns out to be nothing other than pandering, right?

E *Callicles:* Have it your way, if you want.

Socrates: While the purpose of the other is that the thing we're caring for, whether it happens to be a body or a soul, will be the best it can be?

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: And shouldn't we attempt to care for the city and its citizens in that way, to make the citizens themselves the best they can be? Because failing that, as we discovered in the earlier discussion,
514A it's of no benefit to perform any other service if the people who are going to get a lot of money, or a position of rule over anyone, or any other power whatever, aren't beautiful and good in their thinking. Shall we set this down as being so?

Callicles: Quite so, if that's more pleasing to you.

Socrates: So, Callicles, if we were going to enter into action in public in political matters, and we exhorted one another toward matters pertaining to building walls or shipyards or temples, for the great-
B est building projects, would we have to examine and test ourselves first to see if we're knowledgeable or not about the art of building, and who we learned it from? Would we have to do that or not?

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: And then, second, this: if we'd ever built any building privately for any of our friends or our own selves, and whether that building is beautiful or ugly? And if we found out after consider-
C ing it that our teachers had been good and reputable, and many beautiful buildings had been built by us along with our teachers, and many private ones also by us after we'd left our teachers, those would be the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for people with any sense to go in for public works. But if we had no

teacher of ours to point to, and either no buildings or a lot of worthless ones, in that case, presumably, it would just be senseless to attempt public works or to exhort one another toward them. Shall we set these things down as being rightly said or not?
D

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: And is it that way with everything else too? If we'd tried to go into public life and were urging one another to it as competent doctors, no doubt I would have examined you and you me: "Come now, before the gods, how is Socrates himself doing in regard to health in his body? Or has anyone else, slave or free, gotten free of disease before now because of Socrates?" And I imagine I'd have looked into other things of that sort about you. And if we discovered that no one had become better in body because of us, none of
E the foreigners or townspeople, no man and no woman, then before Zeus, Callicles, wouldn't it be truly ludicrous that human beings could go so far in senselessness that before doing a lot of private work, however we might do at that, correcting a lot of our errors and getting adequate training in the art, we tried, as that saying goes, to learn pottery on an urn and go into public life ourselves and exhort others to do that sort of thing? Doesn't it seem senseless to you to act that way?

Callicles: To me, yes.

Socrates: Now then, most excellent of men, since you yourself are
515A just starting to take an active part in the affairs of the city and urging me to, and blaming me for not taking an active part, shall we not examine one another: "Come now, Callicles, which of the citizens have you made better before now? Is there anyone who was depraved before, unjust and self-indulgent and stupid, who became beautiful and good in character because of Callicles, any foreigner or townsman, slave or free?" Tell me, Callicles, if some-
B one puts you to the test on these matters, what will you say? What human being will you claim you've made better by his association with you? Are you reluctant to answer, if there is in fact any deed of yours, while still in private life, prior to your attempting to go into public life?

Callicles: You just love to win arguments, Socrates.

Socrates: I'm not asking the question out of a love of winning arguments, but truly wanting to know how in the world you imagine you ought to behave in politics among us. Or will you, after you
C go into the affairs of the city with us, really be putting your effort into something *other* than how we, the citizens, might be the best we can be? Haven't we already agreed repeatedly that that's the way a political man ought to act? Have we agreed to that or not? Answer me. We *have* agreed; I'll answer in your place. So if that's what a good man ought to provide for in his own city, recalling now, tell me about those men you were speaking of a little while

ago, whether they still seem to you to have been good citizens,
D Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles.
Callicles: To me, yes.
Socrates: So if they were good, it's obvious that each of them used to make the citizens better instead of worse. Is that what they used to do, or not?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: So when Pericles began speaking among the populace, the Athenians were worse than when he spoke for the last times?
Callicles: Maybe.
Socrates: No maybe about it, most excellent one, but by necessity, based on the things that have been agreed, if in fact he was a good citizen.
E *Callicles:* So, what then?
Socrates: Nothing. But tell me this on that point, whether the Athenians are said to have become better because of Pericles or completely the opposite, to have been corrupted by him. Because what *I* hear is this: that Pericles made the Athenians lazy, cowardly, babbling money-lovers, by having first brought in fees for public service.[50]
Callicles: You hear those things from guys with cauliflower ears, Socrates.[51]
Socrates: But the following are no longer things I hear but things I know clearly, and you know as well as I: that at first Pericles used to be well thought of, and the Athenians didn't vote any shameful penalty against him at the time when they were worse; but when
516A they'd become beautiful and good in character thanks to him, at the end of Pericles' life, they voted him guilty of theft, and they were little short of condemning him to death, obviously on the grounds that he was a reprehensible person.
Callicles: So what, then? Pericles was bad because of that?
Socrates: Well, it would seem that someone in charge of asses or horses or cattle was bad if he was like that—if they weren't kicking or butting or biting him when he took them over and he gives them back doing all those things because of wildness. Doesn't it seem to
B you that anyone, whoever it may be, is a bad caretaker of an animal

50 Pericles introduced the policy of paying the people for days spent on jury duty or military service. These were democratic reforms, permitting all citizens to participate in public life. The policy was extended after his time by fees for attendance at the legislative assembly.

51 The dialogue is set at an indeterminate date; various events that happened years apart are referred to as recent and vivid in the participants' memories. But all these events took place during the period when Athens was at war with Sparta. Callicles is making a not-so-veiled accusation of Spartan sympathies, since boxing was a favorite Spartan sport. The kind of government Socrates considered best, described at length in Plato's *Republic*, is sometimes taken as similar to that of Sparta, but Socrates in fact criticizes the Spartan regime in that dialogue (547E-548C) for one of the same faults he attributes here to Pericles.

if he takes it over tamer and gives it back wilder than he took it? Does it seem that way or not?
Callicles: Quite so, in order that I may gratify you.
Socrates: Then gratify me on this point too by answering whether a human being is also one of the animals or not.
Callicles: Of course he is.
Socrates: And Pericles was in charge of human beings?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: So what, then? Shouldn't they have become more just, as we agreed just now, instead of more unjust because of him, if in fact he had charge of them and was good at political matters? C
Callicles: Quite so.
Socrates: And the just are gentle, as Homer said.[52] What do you say? Isn't it that way?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: But surely he turned them out wilder than the sort of people they were when he took them over, and toward himself at that, what he'd least have wanted.
Callicles: Do you want[53] me to agree with you?
Socrates: Only if I seem to you to be speaking the truth.
Callicles: Let it be so.
Socrates: And if wilder, more unjust and worse?
Callicles: Let it be. D
Socrates: Therefore, on the basis of this speech, Pericles was not good at political matters.
Callicles: You claim he wasn't.
Socrates: By Zeus, you do too by the things you've agreed to. And tell me again about Cimon; didn't the people he took care of ostracize him, so they wouldn't have to hear his voice for ten years? And didn't they do the same things to Themistocles, and punish him with exile on top of it?[54] And Miltiades, who was at Marathon, didn't they vote to throw him down a chasm, and if it hadn't been E for the presiding official, wouldn't he 've gone into it? And yet, if these men were good at what you claim they were, they'd never have suffered those things. Good charioteers certainly don't keep from falling out of the chariots at first, but then fall out of them after they've taken care of their horses and become better charioteers.

52 Scholars worry over the fact that this is not in our texts of Homer, though the phrase "wild, not just" occurs a few times in the *Odyssey*. Socrates is probably making a mild joke at the expense of people who, like Gorgias in 449A, quote Homer in support of the simplest, briefest, and most obvious remarks.

53 The immediate repetition of the word may make one begin to wonder whether Socrates has turned Callicles any tamer than when he took him over, and whether that's what he wants.

54 Ostracism was not a punishment, but a measure to remove from the city someone who was becoming too powerful. Themistocles was first ostracized, then exiled permanently when certain crimes of his came to light.

That's not the way it is in charioteering or in any other work. Or does it seem to you it is?

Callicles: Not to me.

517A *Socrates:* Therefore it looks like the earlier speeches, to the effect that we don't know of any man who's been good at political matters in this city here, were true. You agreed that none of those here now are, although from those here before you picked out these men; but these have been shown up as being on an equal footing with those here now, so if they were rhetoricians, they weren't using the true rhetoric—or they wouldn't have been driven out—or the pandering sort either.

Callicles: But surely, Socrates, any of those here now falls far short of accomplishing deeds of the sort those men accomplished, which-

B ever one of them you want to take.

Socrates: You strange fellow, I'm not blaming them either, at least not in their capacity as servants of the city; they seem to me to have been of more service than those here now, and more capable of providing the city with the things it desired. But as for guiding those desires in a different direction rather than giving way to them, by persuading or compelling them toward what will make

C the citizens be better, there's no difference to speak of between them, and that's the only job there is for a good citizen. I even agree with you too that they were more formidable than these are at providing ships and walls and shipyards and lots of things of that sort. So you and I are doing a comical thing in our speeches, because in all the time we've been having a discussion we've made no end of circling around always to the same point in ignorance of what each other is saying. At any rate, I imagine that several

D times you've agreed and understood that this business concerned with both the body and the soul is something twofold after all, and that one side is fit for service, whereby, if our bodies are hungry, it's capable of providing food, if thirsty, drink, if cold, cloaks, bed coverings, footwear, and other things that bodies come to desire. I'm deliberately speaking to you with the same illustrations so you may understand more easily.[55] Because someone skilled at providing these things is either a retailer, an importer, or a craftsman of

E one of the items themselves, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a leather-worker, a tanner, and there's nothing surprising when someone of that sort seems to himself and to others to be a caretaker of a body, to everyone who doesn't know that there's any art beyond all these of gymnastic training and doctoring, which precisely are in reality the caretaking of a body, and which have the fitting position of ruling over all these arts and using their products on account of knowing what among food and drink is serviceable or

55 See 490E-491A.

worthless toward the virtue of a body, while all these others are 518A ignorant of that. That's exactly why these other arts are slavish and menial and don't pertain to freedom, while gymnastic training and doctoring, according to what's just, are their masters.[56] Now sometimes you seem to me to understand, when I'm saying it, that these same things also apply to the soul, and you agree as though you know what I mean, but here you come a little later saying that people have been beautiful and good citizens in our B city, and when I ask you who, you seem to me to hold out people involved in politics who are exactly the same sort as if I'd asked you who had been or are good caretakers of bodies in matters of gymnastic training, and you told me in all seriousness that Thearion the breadmaker, and Mithaicus, the writer of Sicilian cookbooks, and Sarambus the shopkeeper had been wonderful caretakers of bodies, one providing wonderful loaves, one tasty C food, and one wine.

Now probably you'd get mad if I said to you, "You don't understand anything about gymnastic training, man; you're talking to me about servants and people who provide for desires but don't understand anything beautiful and good about them, who, if it so happens, stuff people's bodies full and add fat to them, and get praised by them, and on top of that ruin the flesh they had origi-

D nally. But they for their part, because of inexperience, won't blame the people who feasted them for being the causes of their ailments and of the ruin of their original flesh. But those who happen to be around them and give them any advice at the time when the gorging they got then, because it happened without regard to what's healthy, comes back on them bringing an ailment a long time later, *they're* the ones they'll blame and criticize and do some harm to

E if they're able, while they sing the praises of those earlier ones who were the causes of their troubles." And now you, Callicles, are doing something exactly like that: you're singing the praises of people who've feasted these citizens with a lavish supply of the things they desired. And people claim they've made the city great, 519A but they don't recognize that the city is swollen and festering with hidden sores on account of those people of earlier times. Because without temperance and justice they filled the city up with harbors and shipyards and walls and tribute[57] and nonsense like that. Then, when that attack of feebleness comes, they'll blame the advisors present at the time, but go on singing the praises of Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the ones who caused the troubles. And maybe they'll attack you, if you're not careful, and my companion

56 See 484A-B.

57 Money or gifts extorted from the cities on Aegean islands and on the coast of Asia Minor for protection by the Athenian navy.

B Alcibiades, when they're losing what they had originally as well as the things they acquired, even though you're not the causes of the troubles, except possibly as accessories.[58]

And in fact I see and hear a senseless thing going on now that has to do with the men of earlier times. Because I notice that whenever the city goes after any of the men in politics for committing injustice they get angry and complain bitterly that they're suffering terrible things; after they've done many good things for the city, they're suddenly being ruined by it unjustly, as their speech goes.
C But the whole thing is false, because a leader of a city couldn't ever be unjustly ruined by that very city he leads—never once could it happen. It's liable to be the same thing with people who hold themselves up as politicians as with those who hold themselves up as sophists. Because the sophists, though they're smart in other respects, do this one ridiculous thing: while they claim to be teachers of virtue they often accuse their students of being unjust to them by cheating them out of their fees and not giving them any other
D thanks, when they've been treated well by them. And what could be a more illogical thing than this speech, claiming that people who've become good and just, with injustice removed from them by their teacher and justice taking it's place, commit injustice by means of that which they don't have? Doesn't that seem absurd to you, my comrade? You've well and truly forced me into talking like a demagogue, Callicles, by not being willing to give answers.

Callicles: And you're the one who can't speak unless someone answers you?

E *Socrates:* It looks like I can. I'm extending my speeches a long way now, anyway, since you're not willing to answer me. But good fellow, tell me, for the sake of Friendship, doesn't it seem to you to be illogical for someone who claims to have made someone good to criticize him because, after becoming and being good thanks to him, he's then depraved?

Callicles: It does seem that way to me.

Socrates: And you do hear such things being said by those who claim to educate people into virtue?

520A *Callicles:* I do. But why should you speak about worthless people?[59]

Socrates: And why should *you* speak about people who claim to be leading the city and taking care that it will be the best it can be, who then in turn accuse it, whenever it happens to suit them, of being depraved? Do you imagine they're any different from those others? You blessedly happy fellow, a sophist and a rhetorician are the same thing, or something close to it and very much alike, as I was saying to Polus, and it's from ignorance that you imagine the
B one, rhetoric, to be something completely beautiful while you look down on the other. The truth is that sophistry is more beautiful than rhetoric to the same degree that lawmaking is more beautiful than judging, and gymnastic training than doctoring. And I'd imagine public speakers and sophists are the only ones who have no room to complain about the very thing that they themselves educate, that it's vicious toward them, or else by that same speech they'll also be accusing themselves at the same time of having been of no benefit to those they claim to benefit. Isn't that the way it is?

Callicles: Quite so.
C

Socrates: And no doubt it's likely that they're the only ones who would have room to give away the favor without a fee, if they were speaking the truth. Because anyone who's received any other favor, such as becoming fast thanks to a trainer, might possibly cheat him of his due, if the trainer had given it to him freely and hadn't agreed on a fee, and gotten the cash as nearly as possible at the same time he
D imparted the speed. Because I don't imagine it's from slowfootedness that people behave unjustly, but from injustice—right?

Callicles: Yes.

Socrates: And if someone takes that away, injustice, there's no fear that anything unjust will ever be done to him, but to him alone it's safe to give away that favor freely, if in reality anyone were capable of making people good. Isn't that so?

Callicles: I'd say so.

Socrates: It's likely on that account, therefore, that it's not a shameful thing for someone to take cash for giving other sorts of advice, such as about housebuilding or the rest of the arts.

Callicles: Likely so.
E

Socrates: But as far as *this* activity is concerned, about how someone might be the best possible and manage his household and city the best, it is conventionally regarded as a shameful thing to refuse to give advice unless someone gives one cash—right?

Callicles: Yes.

Socrates: Because it's clear that this is the reason: that this favor alone makes the one who's well treated desire to do good in return, so that it seems to be a beautiful sign if the one who does good by this favor is done good to in return, and it's not a beautiful sign if he's not. Is that how these things are?

521A *Callicles:* It is.

Socrates: Then which way of taking care of the city are you urging me toward? Draw the line for me. Is it that of doing battle with the Athenians, like a doctor, so they'll be the best they can be, or is it being

58 This is the only hint in the dialogue at what may have become of Callicles. Alcibiades became a scapegoat for Athenian anxiety while he was at the height of his popularity and power. Callicles' public career may have ended before it began.

59 Sophists were traveling teachers who claimed not to impart skills but to make their students excellent people. Native Athenians considered themselves better able than any learned foreigners to do that for their children. In Plato's *Meno* (91B-95A), Anytus displays the typical attitude.

like a menial servant, and joining in with them for gratification? Tell me the truth, Callicles, because you're being just if, the same way you began by speaking frankly to me, you finish up by saying what you think. Now speak well and like a well-born man.

Callicles: Then I say it's being like a menial servant.

B *Socrates:* Therefore, best-born of men, you're urging me to be a panderer.

Callicles: Call it being a Mysian,[60] Socrates, if that gives you more pleasure; because unless you do these things—

Socrates: Don't tell me what you've said repeatedly, that anyone who wants to will kill me, so I won't have to say back that a worthless person would be killing a good one. And don't say that he'll take away whatever I have, so I won't have to say back that once he's taken it he won't have a clue about how to use it, but just as he took

C it from me unjustly, so too when he's got it he'll use it unjustly, and if unjustly shamefully, and if shamefully badly.

Callicles: The way it seems to me, Socrates, is that you believe not one of these things could happen to you, as if you lived in isolation and couldn't be dragged into court by some quite possibly vicious and degenerate human being.

Socrates: Then I'm a truly senseless person, Callicles, if I don't imagine that in this city, anyone whatever might happen to have that happen to him. *This*, however, I know for sure, that if I do go into court in

D danger of any of these things you speak of, it will be a worthless person who drags me in—because no decent person would drag a human being who'd done no injustice into court—and there'd be nothing strange about it if I were to be put to death. Do you want me to tell you why I foresee that?

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: I believe I'm one of a few Athenians, not to say the only one, to make an attempt at the political art in the true sense, and the only one of the present day to be actively engaged in political matters. Seeing as how I'm not speaking with a view to gratification when I make the speeches I make on each occasion, but with a view to

E what's best and not most pleasing, and I'm not willing to do what you recommend, "those fancy subtleties,"[61] I won't have anything to say in the courtroom. The same speech I was making to Polus pertains to me, because I'll be judged the way a doctor would be judged among children on the accusation of someone who cooks tasty food. Just consider what such a person, caught in these circumstances, could say in his defense if someone were to accuse him

60 A race of people thought of as fit only for the lowest and most unmanly activities, probably the tribe of Lydians to which I. 155 of Herodotus's *History* applied most. In his exasperation, Callicles is saying, in effect, "Let's drop the rhetoric where life or death choices are at stake."

61 See 486C.

by saying, "Children, this man here has done a lot of bad things even to you yourselves, and he corrupts the youngest among you by cutting and burning, and he makes you helpless by shriveling you up and choking you, giving you the most sharp-tasting things to drink and forcing you to go hungry and thirsty, not like me, who feasted you on lots of pleasing things of all kinds." What do you imagine a doctor caught up in this sort of trouble would have to say for himself? Or if he told the truth, "I was doing all these things, children, in the interest of health," how big a howl of protest do you imagine such judges would make? Wouldn't it be a huge one? 522A

Callicles: Possibly.

Socrates: You'd better believe it. And don't you imagine he'd be in a state of complete helplessness about what he should say? B

Callicles: Quite so.

Socrates: I know, though, that I too would suffer an experience of that sort if I went into court. Because I won't have any pleasures to say I've furnished them with, which they regard as favors and benefits, though I feel no envy either of those who provide them or those they're provided to. And if anyone claims that I corrupt younger people by making them feel helpless, or insult their elders by making sharply pointed speeches either in private or in public, I won't be able to tell the truth—"I say and do all these things in C the interest of justice, and that's precisely *your* interest, men of the jury"—or say anything else. So probably I'll suffer whatever happens to come to pass.

Callicles: Does that seem to you, then, Socrates, to be a beautiful condition for a person in a city to be in, when he's in that plight and powerless to stand up for himself?

Socrates: Yes, Callicles, if that one thing belongs to him that you've repeatedly agreed about: if he's stood up for himself by having said D or done nothing unjust toward human beings or gods. Because this has been agreed by us over and over to be the most powerful way of standing up for oneself. Now if someone were to refute me by proving that I'm powerless to stand up for myself or for anyone else with *that* sort of help, I'd be ashamed, whether I'd been refuted in front of many people or few, or even alone by one person alone, and if I were to die on account of that sort of powerlessness, I'd be deeply distressed. But if I were to meet my end for lack of a pandering sort of rhetoric, I know for sure that you'd see me endure my death as something easy. Because no one is afraid of dying E itself, unless he's completely and totally irrational and unmanly; he's afraid of being unjust. Because arriving in the realm of Hades with one's soul weighed down with a lot of injustices is the utmost of all evils. And I'm willing to make you a speech, if you'd like, to show that's the way things are.

523A *Callicles:* Seeing as how you've finished everything else, just finish that too.

Socrates: Then listen to an ever so beautiful speech, as people say. You'll consider it a myth, I imagine, but I consider it a speech, because I'll be telling what I'm about to say as something true. Because just as Homer tells,[62] Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided up the rulership among themselves when they took it over from their father. Now in Cronos's time there was this law concerning human beings, and it's still in effect now and always among the gods, that any human being who'd gone through life in a just and pious way would go off when he died to the Isles of the Blessed to live in complete happiness apart from evils, while any who'd lived in an unjust and godless way would go to the prison house of punishment and just penalty which people call Tartarus. In Cronos's time, and while Zeus still newly held his reign, the judges of these people were living, while they too were living, giving judgment on that day on which they were going to die, so the judgments were decided badly. So Pluto, and those in charge of the Blessed Isles, came and said to Zeus that undeserving human beings were constantly coming to them in both places. So Zeus said, "Well, I'll put a stop to that. Because the way the judgments are being judged is bad. That's because those who are judged are judged," he said, "with their clothes on, since they're alive. So many people," he said, "who have deplorable souls are decked out in beautiful bodies and families and riches, and when the judgment takes place, lots of witnesses come with them to testify that they've lived their lives justly. So the judges are overly impressed by these things, and at the same time, they do the judging with their clothes on, with eyes and ears and the whole body acting as a veil in front of their own souls. All these things get in their way, both their own coverings and those of the ones who are being judged. So first," he said, "they're to be stopped from knowing their death ahead of time, because now they have foreknowledge of it. So Prometheus has been given the word to put a stop to that in them. Next, they're to be judged while naked, stripped of all those things, because they need to be judged when they're dead. The judge too needs to be naked, dead, gazing upon the soul itself with the soul itself, immediately upon the death of each person, when he's bereft of all his kinspeople and has left behind on earth all that adornment of his, so the judgment may be just. So knowing all this before you did, I made sons of mine judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. So when they've died, they'll do the judging in

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62 In the *Iliad*, XV, 187 and following. Socrates adds a couple of details later from Book XI of the *Odyssey*, and others from Hesiod, but the story he tells is pure invention. The details give a flavor of myth and legend to an image that in some way sums up the *logos* that has unfolded.

the meadow where three roads meet and a pair of roads carry on, one to the Isles of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus. Those from Asia, Rhadamanthus will judge, and those from Europe, Aeacus will judge; to Minos, because of his elder rank, I shall give the right of rendering final judgment, in case the other two are unable to resolve any point, so that the judgment on the journey of human beings may be as just as it can be."

That's what I've heard, Callicles, and what I believe to be true. And from these speeches, I reason out that something like this follows: Death, it seems to me, is precisely nothing other than a separation from each other of a pair of things, the soul and the body. Therefore, when they're separated from each other, each of them keeps its condition not much lessened from what belonged to it when the human being was alive, with the body having its own nature, and the care and experiences it's had, all plainly visible. For instance, if anyone's body was big by nature or nurture or both when he was alive, his corpse will also be big when he's dead, and if it was fat, it will be fat after he's died too, and so on with other things; and if he made a practice of wearing long hair, his corpse will also be long-haired. Also, if anyone was always getting whipped, and had traces of his beatings as festering sores on his body while living, either from whippings or other wounds, then also when he's dead his body is there to see with these marks on it. Or if anyone's limbs were broken or twisted when he was living, these same things are also plainly visible when he's dead. In a word, what he'd prepared his body to be while living is plainly visible when he's dead as well, either every one of those things or most of them, for some time. Therefore, this exact same thing seems to me to be the case with the soul too, Callicles. Everything in the soul is plainly visible when it's made naked, stripped of the body—the things belonging to its nature and the experiences the human being had in his soul as a result of his pursuit of every activity. So when they come before the judge, before Rhadamanthus in the case of those from Asia, Rhadamanthus stops them and gazes upon the soul of each, not knowing whose it is; but often when he's taken hold of the Great King or of some other king or emperor, he sees that there's nothing healthy in the soul, but it's been thoroughly whipped and filled with festering sores by false oaths and injustice, sores which every one of its acts has left as a blot on the soul, and everything is crooked as a result of lies and hypocrisy, and nothing is straight because of an upbringing without truth. And he sees the soul filled with disproportion and ugliness as a result of license and luxury and insolence and lack of self-control in its actions. And seeing that, he sends that soul off in disgrace directly on the way to the place of detention where, upon its arrival, it's to endure the appropriate sufferings.

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B And it's appropriate for everyone who's undergoing punishment, when he's punished in the right way by anyone else, either to become better and profit from it or to become an example for others, so that others who see him suffering the things he suffers might be afraid and become better. And the ones benefited by paying the just penalty at the hands of gods and humans are those who commit curable transgressions; still, the benefit, both here and in Hades' realm, comes to them through grief and pain, C because it's not possible to get rid of injustice in any other way. But it's from the ones who commit the most extreme injustices, and by means of such injustices become incurable, that the examples come; they themselves can no longer be profited in any way since they're incurable, but others are profited as they see them undergoing, throughout all time, the greatest, most grievous, and most frightening sufferings for their transgressions, literally hung up there in the dungeon in Hades' realm as examples, displays, and D warnings to those among the unjust who are continually arriving. I claim that Archelaus will also be one of these, if Polus is telling the truth, as will anyone else who's a tyrant of that sort, and I imagine most of those examples have come from tyrants, kings, members of dictatorial groups, and people active in the affairs of cities, because they, on account of their authority, commit the greatest and most unholy transgressions. Homer too bears witness to this, since he's E depicted kings and dictators, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus, as those being punished in Hades' realm through all time, while no one has depicted Thersites,[63] or any other private person who might have been depraved, as someone incurable, afflicted with great punishments. I believe that's because he didn't have any authority, and for that reason he was more fortunate than those who did have 526A authority. Really, Callicles, it's from among the powerful ones that the exceptionally depraved human beings come, though nothing prevents good men from also turning up among them, and any who come along are exceptionally worthy of being admired. Because it's a difficult thing, Callicles, and worthy of abundant praise, when someone who comes into a position with great license for committing injustice lives out his life justly; but there are a few people of that sort, since they've turned up both here and elsewhere, and I imagine they'll continue to do so, people who are beautiful and B good at that virtue of administering justly whatever anyone turns

63 A loudmouth, smart-aleck foot-soldier in the *Iliad* (II, 211-277). Though Thersites was unworthy of everlasting torment, he was worthy of Socrates' notice in this dialogue, perhaps because his words in public assemblies were described as lacking measure in length (*ametroepês*), lacking order in arrangement (*epea akosma*), and lacking judgment in content (*akritomuthe*). The three souls who do suffer torments in Hades are in *Odyssey* XI, 576-600.

over to them, and there was one in particular, Aristides[64] the son of Lysimachus, who became quite famous to the rest of the Greeks. But most of those who exercise power, you most excellent fellow, turn out bad. So as I was saying, when that judge, Rhadamanthus, gets hold of any such person, he doesn't know anything else about him, not who he is or what family he comes from, except that he's someone depraved. And when he sees that, he sends him off to Tartarus with a mark on him signifying whether he seems to be curable or incurable, and when he arrives there, he suffers what's C appropriate. And when, on occasion, he sees a soul that has lived piously and in company with truth, that of a private man or anyone else, and especially, I claim, Callicles, that of a philosopher who's been active in his own concerns in life and hasn't meddled in other people's business, he's struck with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus does the same things as well, with each of the two holding a rod, while Minos sits overseeing them, he alone holding a golden scepter, as Homer's Odysseus D claims he saw him,

> Holding a golden scepter, declaring what's rightful to the spirits of the dead.

So, Callicles, I'm persuaded by these speeches, and I look out for the way I might display my soul to the judge in the healthiest possible condition. So saying goodbye to the honors that come from most human beings, I'll try, by a training in the truth, to be in my very being the best I have the power to be, both to live that way, and, when I die, to die that way. And I exhort all other human E beings, as far as is in my power, and in return for your exhortation, I exhort you in particular toward this life and this form of combat, which I claim is the equal of all forms of combat here, and I blame you for the fact that you won't be able to come to your own defense when the trial and judgment I was speaking of just now are before you, but when you come to that judge, Aegina's son,[65] 527A when *he* grabs you and takes you, you'll have your mouth hanging open and your head swimming there no less than I will here, and maybe someone will give you an insulting slap upside the head, and heap abuse on you in every way.

Now this probably seems to you to be a myth, like something told by an old woman, and you look down on it, and there'd be nothing surprising about looking down on it if after searching we were in

64 Called Aristides the Just, he was an Athenian famous for assessing the monetary amounts paid by the cities of the Delian League so fairly that no one could suggest any way of improving them. He was ostracized early in his career, helped Athens in the Persian War even during his ostracism, returned to spend his life exercising power in the highest offices in the city, and died in poverty.

65 Aeacus, judge of European souls.

some way or other able to find anything better and truer than it. But as it is, you see that the three of you, who are the smartest of
B the Greeks of our time, you, Polus, and Gorgias, can't demonstrate that one ought to live any other life than this one, which is plainly advantageous in the other realm as well. But out of so many speeches, of which the rest have been refuted, this speech alone stands undisturbed: that committing injustice is what one ought to take precautions against more than against suffering it; that more than anything, a man ought to take care not to seem to be good but to be so, both in private and in public; that if anyone becomes bad in any respect,
C he ought to be disciplined, and this is the second best thing after being just, becoming so and paying the just penalty by accepting discipline; that every sort of pandering ought to be avoided, with regard to oneself or to others, with regard to a few people or a large number; and that the way one ought to make use of rhetoric, and every other activity, is always toward the end of what's just.

So if you're persuaded by me, follow me to the place where, once you've arrived, you'll be happy both while you live and when you've died, as our speech indicates. Let anyone look down on you as senseless, and hurl abuse at you, if he wants to, and yes, by Zeus, *you* have
D the guts to let him give you that insulting slap, because you won't suffer anything terrible by it if you're beautiful and good in your very being, training yourself in virtue. And then, once we've trained ourselves in that way, that's the time when, if it seems to be right, we'll apply ourselves to politics, or we'll deliberate then on whatever might seem good to us, when we're better at deliberating than we are now. Because it's a shameful thing for people in the condition we now appear to be in to turn around and be brash, as if we were really something, when things never seem the same to us about the
E same things, even when these are the greatest things—that's how far our lack of education goes. So let's take as a guide the speech that has now made its appearance in our presence, which indicates to us that this way of life is best, to live and to come to death training ourselves in justice and the rest of virtue. Let's follow this way, and exhort others to it, not that way you put your trust in and exhort me to, because it's not worth anything, Callicles.

ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*: CHAPTER SUMMARIES

BOOK I RHETORICAL SPEECH: its nature, its kinds, and the opinions it is based on

Chapter 1

There is an art of rhetoric centered on the study of enthymemes, persuasive arguments, in the same way dialectic is a preparatory study of demonstrative philosophic arguments. The current books called "arts of speeches" deal only with incidentals and not with the central activity of rhetoric. In lawcourts and legislative assemblies, there is not sufficient time or common ground for teaching or for a common pursuit of knowledge, but things that are true or just have an inherent persuasiveness. A study of common opinions and possible arguments from them gives one the means to see the better course in any situation requiring a decision, and to counteract weaker arguments.

Chapter 2

Since artful rhetoric is not manipulation into conclusions but the showing of evidence for them, the study of the art requires seeing what is available to be shown. An artful speech will show not only reasons for believing something to be factual or true, but also grounds for trusting the character of the speaker and for holding certain attitudes toward others. The two means by which all of this is done are enthymemes, which reason about matters of opinion, and examples, which suggest an interpretation of facts. Enthymemes argue from likelihoods, rather than from necessary or demonstrable premises, and by way of signs, rather than necessary inferences, and the arguments they use apply to any sort of subject matter.

Chapter 3

There are three forms of rhetoric. In the courtroom, speeches are made about past matters of fact, for the sake of attaining justice. In public assemblies, speeches give advice about future actions, for the sake of securing advantage.