

THEAETETUS

Theaetetus

EUCLIDES

TERPSION¹

St. I
142 A

EUCLIDES: Just now, Terpsion, or a long time ago from the country?

TERPSION: Fairly long. And I was in fact looking for you throughout the marketplace and was surprised that I couldn't find you.

EUCLIDES: That's because I wasn't anywhere in the city.

TERPSION: Well, where then?

EUCLIDES: On going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus as he was being carried out of Corinth from the army camp to Athens.²

TERPSION: Alive or dead?

EUCLIDES: Alive, barely. He's in a bad way also from some wounds, *B* but the outbreak of the illness in the army affects him more.

TERPSION: Don't you mean dysentery?

EUCLIDES: Yes.

TERPSION: What a man you say's in danger.

EUCLIDES: Beautiful and good, Terpsion, and, you know, I was listening even now to some people highly praising his conduct in the battle.

TERPSION: Well, there's nothing strange in that, but far more surprising if he were not of that sort. But how come he refused to take lodgings here in Megara? *C*

EUCLIDES: He was pressing for home, though I begged and advised him, but he wasn't willing. And then, when I sent him on his way, on my way back I recalled with amazement how prophetically Socrates had spoken about him as well as different things. My impression is that Socrates met him shortly before his death when

Theaetetus was a lad, and on the basis of his association and conversation with him expressed great admiration for his nature. And when I came to Athens he narrated to me the speeches of his conversation with him—they're well worth hearing—and he said there was every necessity that he become renowned if he reached maturity.

D TERPSION: Yes, and he did, it seems, tell the truth. But what were the speeches? Could you be their narrator?

143 EUCLIDES: No, by Zeus, not at any rate straight off from memory, but I did write down reminders just as soon as I returned home, and later, in recalling it at my leisure, I proceeded to write them up. And as often as I returned to Athens, I questioned Socrates repeatedly about whatever I hadn't remembered, and then on my return here I made corrections. So pretty nearly the entire speech has been written by me.

TERPSION: True. I've heard you mention it before, and though you know I always intended to urge you to show it, I've delayed doing so up till now. Well, what prevents us from going through it now? As for myself, I really need a rest in any case, since I've come from the country.

B EUCLIDES: But of course, I myself escorted Theaetetus up to Erineos;³ so I wouldn't take a rest without pleasure. Well, let's go, and while we're resting, the boy will read.

TERPSION: A good suggestion (What you say's right).

C EUCLIDES: Here's the book, Terpsion. And I wrote the speech down on these terms, not with Socrates narrating them to me as he did, but with Socrates conversing with those with whom he said he conversed. He said they were the geometer Theodorus and Theaetetus. In order that the narrations between the speeches might not cause trouble (*pragmata*) in the writing, whenever either Socrates spoke about himself, for example, "And I said" or "And I spoke," or in turn about whoever answered, "He consented" or "He refused to agree," it's for these reasons that I removed things of this sort and wrote it as if he were conversing with them.

TERPSION: And there's nothing wayward in that, Euclides.

EUCLIDES: Well, boy, take the book and read.⁴

SOCRATES

THEODORUS

THEAETETUS⁵

SOCRATES: If I were to care, Theodorus, more for those in Cyrene, I *D*
 would be asking you about the state of affairs there and whether
 any of the young there make geometry or something else of phi-
 losophy their concern. But as it is I don't, for I'm less a friend to
 those there than to these here, and I'm more desirous of knowing
 who of our young are expected to prove good and able. Now I
 myself examine this on my own, to the extent that I can, and I
 ask everyone else with whom I see the young are willing to as-
 sociate. Now it's not the smallest number who consort with you, *E*
 and it's just that they do so, for you deserve it on account of
 geometry as well as for everything else. So if you did meet anyone
 worth speaking of, I would hear about it with pleasure.

THEODORUS: As a matter of fact, Socrates, it's certainly worth it for
 me to tell and for you to hear about the sort of lad of your fellow
 citizens I met. And if he were beautiful, I'd be afraid to speak of
 him with intensity, should anyone in fact get the impression that
 I'm desirous of him. But as it is—please don't get annoyed with
 me—he is not beautiful, but he resembles you in the snubness of
 his nose and the bulging of his eyes, but he has them less than
 you do. I'm speaking fearlessly. Know well, of all whom I've ever *144*
 met—and I've consorted with very many—I'm aware of no one
 yet whose nature is as wonderfully good. For to be as good a
 learner as he is, in a way that's hard for anyone else to match,
 and yet to be exceptionally gentle, and on top of this to be manly
 beyond anyone whatsoever, I would have suspected that it doesn't
 occur and I don't see it occurring, for those who are as sharp as
 he is, quick witted, and with good memories are for the most part
 also quickly inclined to bursts of anger, and in darting about *B*
 they're swept along like unballasted ships, and they grow up rather
 more manic than more manly, whereas those in turn who are
 more grave face up to their lessons somewhat sluggishly and are
 full of forgetfulness. But he goes so smoothly, so unfalteringly,
 and so effectively to his lessons and investigations, and all with so
 much gentleness, just as a stream of olive-oil flows without a sound,
 as for it to be a cause of wonder that someone of his age behaves
 in this way.

SOCRATES: You report well. But which citizen is his father?

C THEODORUS: Though I've heard the name, I don't remember. But as a matter of fact, of those here approaching us, he's the one in the middle. He as well as some of his comrades were just now oiling themselves in the course outside, and it's my impression that with the oiling over they're coming here. But do consider whether you recognize him.

SOCRATES: I recognize him. He is the son of Euphronius from Sunium, a man, my friend, who's very much of the sort you describe him to be, otherwise well thought of and moreover who left, you know, a great deal of property. But I don't know the name of the lad.

D THEODORUS: Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name. But it's my impression that some guardians of his have wasted the property, though all the same, Socrates, he's of an amazing liberality when it comes to money.

SOCRATES: How grand a nobleman you speak of. Please urge him to sit alongside me here.

THEODORUS: It shall be done. Theaetetus, come over here to Socrates.

E SOCRATES: Yes, please do, Theaetetus, so that I too may examine myself as to what sort of face I have. Theodorus says I have one similar to yours. Still, if each of the pair of us had a lyre and he said they had been similarly tuned, would we straight off trust him, or would we go on to examine whether he's speaking as one who is skilled in music?

THEAETETUS: We would go on to examine.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case that if we found him to be of that sort we would be persuaded, but if unmusical, we would distrust him?

THEAETETUS: True.

145 SOCRATES: Yes, and now, I suspect, if our concern was at all for the similarity of faces, we would have to examine whether he speaks as one who is a skilled draftsman or not.

THEAETETUS: That's my opinion.

SOCRATES: Is Theodorus really then a skilled painter?

THEAETETUS: No, not as far as I know.

SOCRATES: And not skilled in geometry either?

THEAETETUS: There's really no doubt that he is, Socrates.

SOCRATES: As well as skilled in astronomy, logistics, music, and every-thing connected with education?

THEAETETUS: That's my opinion at least.

SOCRATES: So whereas, in something of the body, if in praising or blaming us in some respect, he says we are similar, it's scarcely worthwhile to pay him any mind—

THEAETETUS: Perhaps not.

B SOCRATES: But what if he should praise the soul of either one of us

in point of virtue and wisdom? Isn't it then worthwhile for him who hears it to be eager to examine the one praised, and for the latter as eagerly to display himself?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well then, it's time, my dear Theaetetus, for you to display and for me to examine, since, know well, though Theodorus has praised many to my face, strangers as well as fellow townsmen, he did not yet praise anyone as he did you just now.

THEAETETUS: That would be all to the good, Socrates, but look and see whether he was not speaking in jest. C

SOCRATES: This is not Theodorus' way. But don't back out of what has been agreed upon by pretending that he was speaking in jest, in order that he may not be compelled actually to bear witness—no one will in any case denounce him for false evidence—but stand by your agreement with confidence.

THEAETETUS: Well, I must do it, if that's your opinion.

SOCRATES: So tell me. You're surely learning from Theodorus something of geometry?

THEAETETUS: Yes I am.

SOCRATES: And of that which pertains to astronomy, harmony, and calculations? D

THEAETETUS: Yes, and I'm certainly eager.

SOCRATES: Why, I am too, my boy, from him and everyone else who I suspect has a professional competence in any of these things. But still and all, though everything else about them I have down to a fair degree, there's a small point about which I'm perplexed that has to be examined with you and these here. Tell me. To learn, isn't it to become wiser in whatever one learns?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Yes, and the wise, I suspect, (are) wise by wisdom.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And this doesn't differ at all, does it, from knowledge (science)? E

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing?

SOCRATES: Wisdom. Or isn't it in just those things in which they (are) knowledgeable that they (are) wise?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: So knowledge and wisdom (are) the same?⁶

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, this is the very point about which I'm perplexed, and I'm incapable of grasping it adequately by myself, whatever knowledge is. Can we really say it? What do you all say? Who would be the first of us to speak? The one who makes a mistake, and 146

whoever at any time makes a mistake, will, as children playing ball say, take his seat, an ass; but whoever prevails without a mistake, he'll be our king and enjoin us to answer whatever he wants.⁷ Why are you all silent? It surely can't be, Theodorus, that in my love of speeches I am being boorish, eager as I am to make us converse and become friends and mutually agreeable?⁸

B THEODORUS: Not in the least, Socrates, nothing of the sort would be boorish, but urge any of the lads to answer you. I am unused to conversation of this sort, and I'm not of an age to get used to it either. But it would be fitting for these here, and they would improve much more, for youth truly is open to improvement in everything. But, just as you began, don't let go of Theaetetus but ask away.

C SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus is saying? He's not one, I suspect, that you'll be willing to disobey, and it's not sanctioned either for a younger to disobey a wise man who enjoins things of this sort. But in a good and noble fashion speak out. Knowledge is what in your opinion?

THEAETETUS: Well, I must, Socrates, since you all urge it, for if I do make any mistake, you'll all in any case correct it.

SOCRATES: Yes of course, if, that is, we can.

D THEAETETUS: Well, then, it's my opinion that whatever one might learn from Theodorus are sciences (knowledges)—geometry and those you just now went through and, in turn, shoemaking and the arts of the rest of the craftsmen—all and each of them, are nothing else than knowledge.

SOCRATES: That's noble and lavish, my dear, when you're asked for one, you offer many and complex instead of simple.

THEAETETUS: Just how do you mean this, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Perhaps it's nothing, but what I suspect, however, I'll point out. Whenever you say leathermaking, you're not pointing out anything else, are you, than a knowledge of the making of shoes?

THEAETETUS: Nothing else.

E SOCRATES: And what about when you say carpentry? Are you pointing out anything else than a knowledge of the making of wooden utensils?

THEAETETUS: Just this.

SOCRATES: Isn't it that in the case of both, of whatever each of the two is a knowledge, this is what you are determining?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes, but the question, Theaetetus, was not this, of what things there's knowledge, nor how many sciences there are either,

for we didn't ask because we wanted to count them but to get to know knowledge whatever it itself is. Or am I making no sense?

THEAETETUS: Yes, that's right of course.

SOCRATES: Then examine this as well. If someone should ask us about something trifling and ready at hand, for example, about mud (clay) whatever it is, if we should answer him that there's the mud of potters, the mud of furnace makers, and the mud of brick-makers, wouldn't we be ridiculous? 147

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: First of all, for one thing, because we surely must believe that the questioner understands our answer whenever we say mud, regardless of whether we add that of dollmakers or of all the rest of the craftsmen whatsoever. Or do you believe that someone understands some name of something if he doesn't know what it is? B

THEAETETUS: In no way.

SOCRATES: So whoever does not know science does not understand the science of shoes either.

THEAETETUS: No, he doesn't.

SOCRATES: So whoever's ignorant of science does not understand the leatherworking (science), or any different art either?

THEAETETUS: That is so.

SOCRATES: So the answer to the question "What is science?" is laughable, whenever one answers with the name of some art, for though one's not been asked this, one answers with the science of something. C

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: And in the second place, though it surely must be possible to answer trivially and briefly, one goes round on an endless road. For example, in the case of the question of mud, it's surely trivial and simple to say that should earth be kneaded with a liquid there would be mud and to dismiss whatever it is of.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, it now appears easy in this way. And you're probably asking the sort of thing that recently occurred also to ourselves as we were conversing, I mean myself and your homonym here, Socrates. D

SOCRATES: What sort of thing, exactly, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Theodorus here was giving us some proof (drawing) about powers (roots), about the three-foot (line) and the five-foot (line)—that they're not commensurable in length (*mêkos*) with the one-foot (line)—and in this way he went on choosing each (line) one by one up to the seventeen-foot (line), where for some reason or other he got stuck.⁹ Then something of the following sort occurred to us, since the powers (roots) appeared infinite in mul-

titude, to attempt to gather them together into one, by whatever
 E we'll address all these powers (roots).

SOCRATES: And did you really find something of the sort?

THEAETETUS: My impression is that we did, but you too examine it.

SOCRATES: Speak.

THEAETETUS: We took all of number in two, and the number that has
 the power of coming to be by the multiplication of an equal by
 an equal we made a semblance of its figure to a square and ad-
 dressed it as a square and equal-sided number.

SOCRATES: That's really good.

THEAETETUS: Then again, the number between this—of which there
 148 is the three, the five, and every one which does not have the power
 of coming to be by the multiplication of an equal by an equal, but
 its becoming is either by the multiplication of a greater number
 by a less, or a less by a greater, and a larger and a less side always
 comprehend it—we made a semblance of it in turn to the oblong
 figure and called it an oblong number.

SOCRATES: Most beautifully. But what next?

THEAETETUS: All lines that make a square of the equal-sided and plane
 number, we determined as length (*mêkos*), and all that make a
 square of the other-lengthed number, we determined them as
 B powers (roots), on the grounds that they are not commensurable
 in length with the former lines but with the planes of which they
 are the powers. And something else of the sort about solids (cubes).

SOCRATES: That's really the best that human beings can do, boys. So
 my impression is that Theodorus will not be found guilty of false
 evidence.

THEAETETUS: And yet, Socrates, as to what you're asking about knowl-
 edge, I wouldn't be capable of answering it as I did about length
 (rational root) and power (root), even though it's my impression
 that you are seeking for something of the same sort, and so once
 more Theodorus appears false.

C SOCRATES: But what of this? Suppose he had said in praising you for
 running that he had not met any youngster who was so skilled in
 running, and then in running the course, you had been defeated
 by the fastest at his peak, do you believe he would have praised
 any less truly?¹⁰

THEAETETUS: No, I don't.

SOCRATES: But knowledge, as I was speaking of it just now—do you
 believe that to find out about it is something small, and it's not a
 job for the all-round tip-top?

THEAETETUS: Yes, by Zeus, I do, it's certainly for the topmost.

SOCRATES: Well, then, be confident about yourself and believe that

Theodorus is making sense, and be eager in every way both about everything else as well as about knowledge to grasp a speech as to whatever in fact it is. D

THEAETETUS: As far as eagerness goes, Socrates, it will come to light.

SOCRATES: Come then—you just now led the way beautifully—in imitation of your answer about powers (roots), just as then you comprehended them, though they were many, in one species, so now try to address the many sciences too with one speech.

THEAETETUS: But know well, Socrates, it's often that I tried to make an examination of it, in hearing the questions that are reported as coming from you. But for all of that, I am myself incapable of either persuading myself that I say anything adequately or hearing some one else speaking in just the way you urge, and I'm incapable as well of getting rid of my concern with it. E

SOCRATES: The reason is, my dear Theaetetus, that you're suffering labor pains, on account of your not being empty but pregnant.

THEAETETUS: I don't know, Socrates, what, however, I've experienced I say.

SOCRATES: And then, you most ridiculous fellow, you've not heard that I am the son of a midwife, very noble and farouche, Phaenarete?¹¹ 149

THEAETETUS: Yes, I've heard it before now.

SOCRATES: And you've not heard as well that I practice the same art?

THEAETETUS: In no way.

SOCRATES: Well, know well that's the case. Don't, however, denounce me before the rest. They have not been aware, comrade, that I have this art, and so, because they do not know, they don't say this about me, but they say I'm most strange and make human beings perplexed.¹² Have you heard this too?

THEAETETUS: Yes I have. B

SOCRATES: Am I then to tell you the cause?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Do reflect, then, about that which in its entirety characterizes midwives, and you'll more easily understand what I want to say. You know surely that none of them is still conceiving and giving birth when she acts as midwife to anyone else, but it's those who by that time are incapable of giving birth.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And they do say that Artemis is the cause of this, because unallied her lot has lain with lying-in.¹³ Now she does not after all grant the barren to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to grasp an art of whatever it is inexperienced, and so, in C

honor of their similarity to herself, she charged those who do not bear on account of their age.

THEAETETUS: It's likely.

SOCRATES: Then isn't the following as likely as it is necessary,¹⁴ that those who are pregnant and those who are not are recognized by the midwives rather than by anyone else?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

D SOCRATES: And, what's more, the midwives by giving drugs and singing incantations are capable of arousing labor-pains or, if they want, of making them milder, and getting those who are having a hard time of it to give birth, and if it's decided to abort at an early stage,¹⁵ they abort.

THEAETETUS: That is so.

SOCRATES: Have you further perceived this, that the following thing is theirs—they also are the most uncanny go-betweens, since they are all-wise when it comes to getting to know what sort of woman must be with what sort of man to give birth to the best possible children?

THEAETETUS: I don't know that at all.

E SOCRATES: Well, know that they take greater pride in this than in the cutting of the umbilical cord. Reflect. Do you believe that the care and harvesting of the fruits from the earth and the recognition, in turn, of what sort of plant and seed must be cast into what sort of earth are of the same or a different art?

THEAETETUS: No, but of the same.

SOCRATES: And into woman, my dear, do you believe there's a different art of something of this sort, and a different one of harvesting?

THEAETETUS: It's unlikely at any rate.

150 SOCRATES: Yes it is. But on account of the unjust and artless bringing together of man and woman—its name is pimping—the midwives, because they are august, shun even the art of go-between, in fear that they may fall into the former charge on account of it, since it's surely suitable for only those who are in their being midwives also to act as go-betweens correctly.¹⁶

THEAETETUS: It appears so.

B SOCRATES: Well, then, that which characterizes midwives is of this extent, but it's less than my own action, for it's not the case that sometimes women give birth to images and sometimes to the simply true, and that it's not easy to gain recognition of the difference. For if it were the case, it would be the greatest and most beautiful work for midwives to discriminate whatever's true and whatever's not. Or don't you believe it?

THEAETETUS: Yes I do.

SOCRATES: Yes, but to my art of midwifery everything else belongs just as it does to them, and it differs as much by the fact that it midwifes men and not women as by the fact that it examines their souls in giving birth and not their bodies. But this is the greatest thing in our art, to be capable of assaying in every way whether the thought of the young is giving birth to an image and a lie or something fruitful and true. Since this too belongs to me as it does to midwives, I am sterile of wisdom, and that for which many before now reproached me—that I ask everyone else but I myself don't declare anything about anything because I don't have anything wise—this reproach of theirs is true. The cause of this is the following. The god compels me to midwife and prevented me from generating. Now I myself therefore am obviously hardly wise at all, and I have not had a discovery of this sort as an offspring of my soul. But whoever associate with me, some appear at first as even very foolish, but all—whomever the god allows—as the association advances, make an amazing lot of progress. It's their own opinion and everyone else's too. And this too is as plain as day, that they never learnt anything from me, but they on their own from themselves found and gave birth to many beautiful things. Now of the midwifery the god and I (are) responsible, and it's plain in the following way. Many before now who failed to recognize this and held themselves responsible and despised me, either on their own or persuaded by someone else departed earlier than they should have. And after their departure, they aborted the rest on account of a poor association, and in bringing up badly the things that I midwifed, they lost them, and made more of false things and images than of the truth, and finally they got to be of the opinion (and everyone else was too) that they were fools. Aristides the son of Lysimachus has been one of them, and there have been very many different ones too, and whenever they come back, begging for my association and doing amazing things, the *daimonion* that comes to me checks me from associating with some and allows me to associate with some, and it's these who once more improve.¹⁷ And whoever associate with me undergo this same thing as women in giving birth do. They suffer labor-pains and are filled with perplexity for nights and days far more than women are, and my art is capable of arousing this kind of labor-pain and putting it to rest. Now this is the way it is for these. But sometimes, if I somehow get the impression, Theaetetus, that they're not pregnant, in recognition of the fact that they don't need me, I very kindly act as go-between and, with allowance made for a god's help, guess very adequately by whose association

they would be benefited. And many of them I gave in marriage to Prodicus, and many to different wise and divinely-speaking men.¹⁸ Now I lengthened this out for you, my excellent fellow, for the sake of the following. I suspect that you, just as you yourself believe, are pregnant with something within and are suffering from labor pains. Therefore apply yourself to me as to the son of a midwife and myself skilled in midwifery too, and whatever I ask be eager to answer in just the way you can. And if, after all, on examining something of whatever you say, I believe it an image and not true, and then take it out and throw it away, don't be angrily savage as those who give birth for the first time are about their children. Many before now—my wonderful fellow!—have got so disposed toward me as to be simply (artlessly) ready to bite, whenever I remove any nonsense of theirs, and they don't believe I'm doing this out of goodwill. They are far from knowing that no god is ill-disposed to human beings, and I don't do anything of the sort either out of ill-will, but it's in no way sanctioned for me to make a concession to falsehood and wipe out truth. Accordingly, once more from the beginning, Theaetetus, try to say whatever is knowledge, and never say you can't, for if a god's willing and you're manly, you'll be able.

C THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, when you're encouraging me in this fashion, it's shameful not in every way to be eager to say whatever one has. My opinion is then that whoever knows something perceives that which he knows, and as it now appears, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

D SOCRATES: That's good and noble, my boy. One ought to speak in this way when one makes a declaration. But come, let's examine it in common, whether it's in fact fruitful or a wind-egg.¹⁹ Perception, you say, (is) knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

E SOCRATES: Well, you've probably not spoken a trivial speech about knowledge, but the one Protagoras too used to say. He's said these same things in a somewhat different way. He says somewhere, "Of all things (*khremata*) (a) human being is the measure, of the things which are, that (how) they are, and of the things which are not, that (how) they are not."²⁰ Surely you've read it?

THEAETETUS: I've read it, and often.

152 SOCRATES: Isn't this more or less the sense of what he says, that of whatever sort things severally appear to me, that's the sort they are for me, and of whatever sort to you, they're of that sort in turn for you, and you and I (are) human being?

THEAETETUS: Indeed, he is speaking in this way.

SOCRATES: Well, it's likely you know for a wise man not to talk non-sense, so let's follow him up. Isn't it sometimes the case when the same wind's blowing one of us is cold and one not? And one is slightly cold and one intensely? B

THEAETETUS: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: Are we to say that at that time the wind itself in itself is cold or not cold? Or are we to obey Protagoras that it's cold for whoever's cold and not for whoever's not?

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: Doesn't it then appear thus to each of the two?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes, but this "appear" is "perceive"?

THEAETETUS: Yes it is.

SOCRATES: So appearance and perception (are) the same in hot things and everything of the sort. For whatever sort each perceives, it's that sort that they probably are for each.²¹ C

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: So perception is, after all, always of that which is, and it's without falsehood inasmuch as it is knowledge.

THEAETETUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: Was Protagoras really then, by the Graces, someone all-wise, and did he make this an enigma for us, the vast refuse-heap, but was he telling the truth as if it were a forbidden secret to his pupils?

THEAETETUS: How exactly are you saying this, Socrates? D

SOCRATES: I shall speak actually a not trivial speech. It says, "After all, nothing is one alone by itself, and you would not address anything correctly or of any sort whatsoever, but if you address it as big, it will also appear small, and if heavy, light, and all things in this way, on the grounds that nothing is one, neither something nor of any sort whatsoever. But all things—it's those we say are the things which are (not addressing them correctly)—come to be from locomotion and motion and mutual mixing; for nothing ever is, but (everything) always becomes." And about this let all the wise in succession except Parmenides converge,²² Protagoras and Heraclitus, and Empedocles, as well as the tip-top poets of each kind of poetry, Epicharmus of comedy and Homer of tragedy.²³ Homer with the line "Ocean and mother Tethys, the becoming (*genesis*) of gods"²⁴ has said that everything is the offspring of flowing and motion. Or doesn't he seem to mean this? E

THEAETETUS: Yes, to me he does.

SOCRATES: Who, then, would still be capable, should he dispute against 153

so large an army and so great a general as Homer, of not proving himself to be ridiculous?

THEAETETUS: It's not easy, Socrates.

SOCRATES: No, it isn't, Theaetetus. Since, actually, the following kinds of things are adequate signs for the speech that says that motion supplies that which seems to be and the fact of becoming, and rest the fact of nonbeing and perishing. For the hot and fire—it's that which both generates and manages everything else—is itself generated from locomotion and rubbing, and these are a pair of motions. Or aren't these the comings-into-being of fire?

B THEAETETUS: Yes, they are indeed.

SOCRATES: And what's more, the genus of animals gets born out of these same things?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Doesn't the condition of bodies get destroyed by quiet and idleness, but get preserved for the most part by exercises and motion?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And doesn't the condition in the soul acquire learnings by learning and practice, which are motions, and get saved and become better, but by quiet, which is lack of practice and folly, it does not learn anything at all and forgets whatever it does learn?

C

THEAETETUS: Indeed it does.

SOCRATES: So the good is motion both in terms of soul and in terms of body, and the (bad) the contrary?

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: Am I then further to tell you of occasions of windlessness and calm seas and everything of the sort, that quiet conditions rot and destroy, but the other things preserve? And am I to add to them as their summit the golden chain, by which Homer means nothing else than the sun, and he makes plain that as long as the sun and its orbiting are in motion, all things are and are preserved both among gods and human beings, but if this should stop as if it were bound, all things (*khremata*) would be corrupted, and, as the saying goes, everything would become topsy-turvy?²⁵

D

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, my opinion is that he's making plain just those things you mean.

SOCRATES: Make then the following kind of supposition, my excellent fellow. First, in connection with the eyes, that which you call white color—don't appoint it to be itself as something other outside your eyes any more than in your eyes or any place for it at all, for otherwise it would surely be in order and abiding and not be becoming in becoming.

E

THEAETETUS: Well, how?

SOCRATES: Let's follow the speech of the moment, and set down nothing alone by itself as being one. And in this way black and white and any color whatsoever will come to light for us as having come to be from the application (*prosbolê*) of the eyes onto the suitable local motion (*phora*), and precisely that which we say each color to be will be neither that which applies (strikes against) nor that to which there is application (struck against), but something in between that has become private (peculiar) for each. Or would you insist that what sort each color appears to you, it's that sort for a dog and any animal whatsoever? 154

THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Does anything at all appear similar to a different human being and you? Do you have (know) this strongly, or is it much more the case that not even for you yourself (is there) the same thing, on account of the fact that you yourself are never in a condition similar to yourself?

THEAETETUS: I'm rather of this opinion than of that.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case, then, that if that against which we're measuring ourselves or which we're touching were great or white or hot, it would never, in its fall on something else, have come to be something else, if, that is, it itself does not at all alter. And if, in turn, that which is doing the measuring against or the touching were each of these things, it would not have become, if itself were not affected in any way, different when a different thing approached it or underwent something. Since as it is now, my dear, we're being compelled somehow or other to say without qualms amazing and laughable things, as Protagoras would say and everyone who tries to say the same as he does. B

THEAETETUS: How do you mean it exactly, and what sort of things?

SOCRATES: Take a small paradigm, and you'll know everything I want. We say surely that six dice, if you apply four to them, are more than the four and one and a half times as much, and if you apply twelve, they're less and half as much, and it's insupportable to speak in a different way. Or will you put up with it? C

THEAETETUS: No, I won't.

SOCRATES: What then? If Protagoras or someone else asks you, "Theaetetus, is it possible that anything become bigger or more in a different way than by increase?" what will you answer?

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, if I answer in light of the present question that which is my opinion, I'll answer that it's impossible, but if in light of the former, being on guard lest I say contrary things, I'll answer that it's possible. D

SOCRATES: Gosh, that's good, by Hera, my dear, and divine. But, it seems, if you answer that it is possible, something Euripidean will result, for our tongue will be irrefutable, but our mind (*phrên*) not free from refutation.²⁶

THEAETETUS: True.

E SOCRATES: Then if you and I were dreadfully canny and wise, having scrutinized all the things of our minds (*phrenes*), we would then for the future be testing one another out of a superabundant store and, engaged in sophistic fashion in a battle of this sort, we would proceed to strike and ring the speeches of one against the speeches of the other. But as it is, because we're laymen, we'll want to observe them in relation to themselves, as to whatever they are which we're thinking, whether in our view they are consonant with each other or not in any way whatever.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course I would want this.

155 SOCRATES: And I would too no less. And since this is so, shall we do anything else than calmly go back over the examination, on the grounds that we're very much at our leisure, without feeling peevish, but truly scrutinize ourselves as to whatever these hallucinations in us are?²⁷ The first of which we'll say in our reexamination is, I suspect, that nothing would ever become greater or less, either in bulk or number, as long as it is equal to itself. Isn't this so?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes, and a second: To whatever there should be neither addition nor subtraction, this never either increases or decreases but is always equal.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

B SOCRATES: And isn't there a third too: Whatever was not before, this is incapable of being later without having come to be and becoming?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it seems so anyhow.

C SOCRATES: It's precisely these three agreements, I suspect, that fight against themselves in our soul whenever we speak of the agreement about the dice or whenever we say that I, in being the size I am, without increasing or undergoing the contrary, am within a year now taller than you the youngster but later smaller, though nothing of my bulk has been removed but when you increased. For I am later what I was not before without having come to be, for without becoming it's impossible to come to be, and if I lose nothing of my bulk I would never be becoming less. And there are moreover thousands upon thousands of things in this state, provided we shall accept this case. Surely you're following, Theaetetus; it's my impression at any rate that you're not inexperienced in things of this sort.

THEAETETUS: Yes indeed, by the gods, Socrates, I wonder exceedingly as to why (what) in the world these things are, and sometimes in looking at them I truly get dizzy.

SOCRATES: The reason is, my dear, that, apparently, Theodorus' guess about your nature is not a bad one, for this experience is very much a philosopher's, that of wondering. For nothing else is the beginning (principle) of philosophy than this, and, seemingly, whoever's genealogy it was, that Iris was the offspring of Thaumias (Wonder), it's not a bad one.²⁸ But do you understand by now why these things are of this sort on the basis of which we say that Protagoras speaks, or not yet? D

THEAETETUS: Not yet, in my opinion.

SOCRATES: Then you'll be grateful to me if I join with you in ferreting out the hidden-away truth of the thought of a renowned man, or rather, of renowned men. E

THEAETETUS: Of course I'll be grateful, and not a little either.

SOCRATES: Take a look around then and make sure no one of the uninitiated can overhear. They are those who believe that nothing else is except whatever they are capable of getting a tight grip on with their hands, but actions, becomings, and everything invisible they don't accept as in the class (part) of being.

THEAETETUS: Why, it's of stiff and repellent human beings, Socrates, that you're speaking. 156

SOCRATES: The reason, my boy, is that they are without the Muses to a large degree, but the rest are far cleverer, whose mysteries I'm about to tell you. Their principle (beginning), from which everything is attached—even what we were just now speaking of—is this: the all was motion and there (is) nothing else beyond this, but there (are) two species of motion, and each of the two (is) infinite in multitude, and one (is) with a power to affect (make) and one with a power to be affected. And out of the association and rubbing of these against one another, there come to be offspring, infinite in multitude but twins (double)—that which (is) perceived and that which (is) perception—which (the latter) (is) always falling out together with and (is) getting generated with that which (is) perceived. Now the perceptions have for us the following sorts of names: sights and hearings and smellings and freezings and burnings and, yes, pleasures certainly and pains and desires and fears (are) their designations and different ones as well, the nameless of which (are) without limit, and the named very many. And the perceived genus in turn (is) cogenerated with each of these, omnifarious colors with omnifarious sights, and likewise sounds with hearings, and all the rest of the things per- B

ceived which come to be congeners with all the rest of the perceptions.²⁹ Now what exactly, in light of the former assertions, does this myth of ours want, Theaetetus? Do you have it in mind?

THEAETETUS: Hardly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, look and see whether it may be here brought to completion in some sense. It just wants to say that all these are in motion, as we're saying, and speed and slowness are in their motion. Now everything slow conceives its motion in the same and relative to the things consorting with it and precisely in this way generates, and the things precisely so generated are faster, for they are born(e) and their motion is by nature in bearing (moving locally).³⁰ Whenever, then, an eye and something else of the things commensurate with it consort and generate the whiteness and perception cognate with it, which would never have come to be if each of the two of them had come to anything else, it's precisely at that time when they are being born(e) between—the sight from the side of the eyes and the whiteness from the side of that which (is) giving birth along with sight to the color—that the eye, lo and behold, becomes full of sight and precisely at that time sees and becomes not sight but an eye seeing. And that which cogenerated the color gets filled all round with whiteness and becomes in turn not whiteness but white, whether it (is) wood or stone or whatever thing (*khroma*) turns out to get colored with a color (*khroma*) of this sort. And for all the rest in precisely this way, stiff and hot and everything, it must be supposed in the same way, nothing is itself by itself—it's what we were saying even then—but in the association with one another, all things become and become of all sorts from the motion, since actually it's impossible in any single case to think fixedly, as they say, on that which affects (makes) as being something and that which gets affected as being by itself separately. For there's neither anything affecting before it comes together with that which (gets) affected, nor anything affected before it comes together with that which affects, and so that which comes together with something and affects, if it falls in turn on something else, comes to light as being affected. Consequently, on the basis of all this, just as we were saying at the beginning, there is to be nothing that is one itself by itself, but always to become for something, and "be" must be removed from everywhere—not that we've not been often compelled even now by habituation and lack of knowledge to use it. But, as is the speech of the wise, one must make no concessions: to be is neither a something nor of something nor of me nor this nor that nor any different name that makes for stoppage, but one must make utterances

in accordance with nature—becomings and makings and perishings and alterings—since if one stops something in one’s speech, whoever does (makes) it is easily refutable. One must also speak in this way piecemeal (part by part) and about many things collected together; it’s to this aggregate that they lay down for themselves the names human being and stone and each animal and species. Are you then of the opinion, Theaetetus, that these things are pleasing to you, and would you enjoy the taste of them as satisfying? C

THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates, for I’m not even capable of understanding how it is with you, whether you’re speaking your very own opinions or you’re testing me.

SOCRATES: You don’t remember, my dear, that it’s I who neither know nor adopt (produce) anything of the sort as mine, for I am incapable of generating them. But I midwife you and for the sake of this I sing incantations and serve up for you to get a taste of the several wise things until I may help to lead out into the light your very own opinion. And then, when it is led out, I’ll go ahead and examine whether it will show up as a wind-egg or fruitful. But be confident and persistent, and in good and manly fashion answer whatever appears to you about whatever I ask. D

THEAETETUS: Ask then.

SOCRATES: Well, say once more whether it satisfies you that there not be anything, but good and beautiful and everything we were just now going through (be) always becoming.

THEAETETUS: Well, to me at least, when I listen to you explicating it in this way, it surprisingly appears to make sense, and one has to suppose it to be in just the way you’ve gone through it.

SOCRATES: Then let’s not leave out anything that’s missing from it. What’s missing is the stuff about dreams and illnesses—madness as well as everything else—and everything said to be a mishearing or misseeing or any different misperceiving. You know surely that, in all these cases, it seems to be widely agreed upon that the speech which we were just now going through gets refuted, since it’s as certain as can be that false perceptions come to be for us here. And far from it being the case that the things appearing to each also are these things, but, wholly the contrary, none of the things which appears is. E

THEAETETUS: What you say, Socrates, is most true.

SOCRATES: Then precisely what speech, my boy, is left for him who’s laying down perception as knowledge, and that the things appearing to each also are these things for him to whom they appear?

THEAETETUS: Well, I, Socrates, am reluctant to say that I don’t know what I’m to say, because you just now rebuked me when I said it, B

since truly to this extent I would be incapable of disputing that the crazy or the dreamers are not opining false things, whenever some of them believe they are gods and some feathered and they're thinking of themselves in their sleep as flying.

SOCRATES: Then you really don't have in mind the following sort of disputation about them, and especially about dreaming and waking?

THEAETETUS: What sort?

C SOCRATES: That which I suspect you've often heard from questioners—what evidence could one have to prove, if someone should ask now on these terms at the present moment, whether we're asleep and dreaming everything we're thinking, or we're awake and conversing with one another while awake.

THEAETETUS: That's it, Socrates, it is perplexing as to what evidence one must use for showing it, for all the same things follow in parallel as if they were correlative. For just as there's nothing to prevent that what we've now conversed about also be dreamt as (seem) a conversation with one another in sleep, so whenever in a dream what we dream we're explaining (what we seem to be explaining) are dreams, the similarity of these to those is strange.

D SOCRATES: You do see, then, that it's not the possibility of disputation which is difficult, when it's even open to dispute as to whether it is in waking or in dreaming, and when indeed the time we spend in sleeping is equal to that when we're awake. In each of the two times, our soul insists that whatever its opinions are at the moment cannot be more certainly true, so for an equal time we say these things are the things which are, and for an equal time those, and we insist with a similar vehemence in each time.

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: Doesn't, then, the same speech hold as well for bouts of illness and fits of madness, except for the time, which isn't equal?

THEAETETUS: Right.

SOCRATES: What then? Will the truth be determined by the length and brevity of the time?

E THEAETETUS: But that would be laughable in many ways.

SOCRATES: Well, do you have anything else that's a clear pointer as to which sorts of these opinions (are) true?

THEAETETUS: No, not in my opinion.

SOCRATES: Well, in that case, listen to me as to what sort of things they would say about them, those who determine that the opinions at any moment are true for him who is of that opinion. I suspect that they speak, by questioning, in this way: "Theaetetus, whatever is altogether other, will it have in any respect any power the same

as the other? And let's not suppose that our question is about that which is in some respect the same and in some respect other, but suppose it wholly other."

THEAETETUS: Well, then it's impossible for it to have anything the same either in power or in anything else whatsoever, whenever it is utterly other. 159

SOCRATES: Isn't it then necessary to agree that something of the sort is also dissimilar?

THEAETETUS: Yes, that's my opinion at least.

SOCRATES: So if it turns out that something is becoming similar or dissimilar to something, either to itself or to something else, shall we say that in becoming similar, it's becoming the same, and in becoming dissimilar, other?

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Weren't we saying before that the things which affect are many and infinite, and likewise too the things that are affected?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And further that if something else mingles with something else, it will not generate the same things but others if it then mingles with something else?

THEAETETUS: Yes of course. B

SOCRATES: Let's speak then from now on of me and you and everything else in accordance with the same speech, Socrates healthy and, in turn, Socrates sick. Are we to say that this is similar to that or dissimilar?

THEAETETUS: Do you mean the sick Socrates, this as a whole, is similar or dissimilar to that as a whole, the healthy Socrates?

SOCRATES: You've got it most beautifully. That's the very thing I mean.

THEAETETUS: Surely dissimilar then.

SOCRATES: So he's other too in just the way in which he's dissimilar.

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: And you'll speak similarly of his sleeping and everything we just now went through? C

THEAETETUS: Yes, I will.

SOCRATES: Then for each of the things whose nature is to affect something, will anything else be the case than that whenever it gets a healthy Socrates, it will use me as other, and whenever sick, as an other?

THEAETETUS: Why of course it won't.

SOCRATES: And so I, the affected, and that, the affecting, will generate others in each of the two cases?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Whenever, being healthy, I drink wine, it appears to me pleasant and sweet?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

D SOCRATES: The reason is that, precisely on the basis of what has been previously agreed upon, that which affects and that which is affected generate a sweetness and a perception, both being born(e) together. And the perception, being from the side of that which is affected, renders the tongue perceiving, and the sweetness born(e) about it from the side of the wine makes the wine both be and appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course. The prior things had been agreed upon by us in this way.

SOCRATES: But whenever it gets me being ill, is anything else the case than that first of all in truth it does not take the same me. That's precisely because it approaches a dissimilar.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

E SOCRATES: The Socrates of this sort and the drinking of the wine generate, when paired, other things, about the tongue a perception of bitterness, and about the wine a bitterness coming to be and being born(e), and the wine is not bitterness but bitter, and I'm not perception but perceiving.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

160 SOCRATES: And just as I shall never become in just this way if I'm perceiving anything else—for a different perception is of the different, and it makes the perceiver a different sort and different—so that which affects me shall never generate the same and become of the same sort if it comes together with a different thing. For if it generates a different thing from a different thing, it will become a different sort.

THEAETETUS: That is so.

SOCRATES: Nor again shall I become of the same sort as myself any more than that will become of the same sort as itself.

THEAETETUS: No indeed.

B SOCRATES: Yes, and it's just as much a necessity that I become of something (perceiving something) whenever I become perceiving—for it's impossible to become perceiving and perceiving nothing—as for that to become for someone whenever it becomes sweet or bitter or anything of the sort. For it's impossible to become sweet and sweet for no one.

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: Then I believe the only thing thing left is for us to be for one another if we are, or if we become, to become for one another, since necessity binds our being together and it binds it to nothing

else of all the rest, not even to ourselves, so it's only left that it has become bound with one another. Consequently, regardless of whether it's for being or becoming, if someone gives a name to something, he must state that it is or becomes for someone (something) or of something or relative to something. But neither he himself must say that there's something in itself which is or becomes, nor must he accept it from anyone else who says it, as the speech we've gone through indicates. C

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case, then, that it's precisely inasmuch as that which is affecting me is for me and not for anyone else, that I in fact perceive it and anyone else does not?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: My perception's after all true for me—for it is of my being on every occasion—and I (am) the judge according to Protagoras of the things which are for me that (how) they are, and of the things which are not that (how) they are not.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: How, then, if I am without falsehood and do not stumble in my thought, would I not be a knower of the things which are or become of which I'm the perceiver? D

THEAETETUS: In no way is it possible that you're not.

SOCRATES: So after all, it has been said by you very beautifully that knowledge is not anything else than perception, and there has been a coincidence to the same point of the assertion, according to Homer and Heraclitus and the entire tribe of this sort, that all things are in motion like streams; of the assertion, according to Protagoras the most wise, that (a) human being is the measure of all things (*khrêmata*); and of the assertion, according to Theaetetus, that since these things are so, knowledge comes to be perception. Is it really so, Theaetetus? Are we to say this is yours, a newborn child as it were, and mine the delivery? Or how do you say? E

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity in just this way, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well this, it seems, we have at last generated with difficulty, whatever in fact it is. But after its birth, on its name-day, it truly has to be run around in a circle by the speech, as we examine it, lest, without our being aware of it, that which is coming to be be unworthy of rearing but be a wind-egg and a falsehood.³¹ Or do you believe that in any case, regardless, you must rear that which is your own just because it is yours and you must not expose it, or will you in fact put up with seeing its being tested, and will you not be vehemently distressed if someone slips it away from you though you are giving birth for the first time? 161

THEODORUS: Theaetetus will put up with it, Socrates, for he's not in any way peevish. But by the gods speak, and say in turn in what respect it's not in this way.

SOCRATES: You are simply (artlessly) a lover of speeches, Theodorus—yes, you are—and good, because you suspect that I am a kind of
 B sack of speeches. And I would with ease take one out and say, “On the other hand, these things are not in this way.” But you don't understand that which is happening (coming to be), that not one of the speeches comes out of me but always from whoever is conversing with me. And I, I know nothing of a superior kind, except a little bit, as much as to take a speech from another who's wise and accept it in a measured way. And now I'll try to take it from him here and not at all speak myself.

THEODORUS: What you say's more beautiful, Socrates. And do it in this way.

SOCRATES: Do you know, then, Theodorus, what I wonder at (admire) in your comrade Protagoras?

C THEODORUS: What sort of thing?

SOCRATES: All the rest of what he has said pleases me a lot, that that which is the opinion of each this also is for each. But I've been in a state of wonder at the beginning of his speech, that he did not say in beginning his Truth, “Pig is the measure of all things (*khêmata*)” or “Dog-faced baboon,” or anything else of those with perception that's stranger, in order that he could have begun to speak to us in a magnificent and very contemptuous way, by showing that though we admired him as if he were a god for his wisdom, he is, after all, not at all better in point of intelligence than a tadpole, let alone than anyone else of human beings. Or how are we to speak, Theodorus? For if it will be true to each whatever each opines through perception, and if neither someone else will discriminate the experience of someone else better nor will another be more competent to examine the opinion of another whether it's correct or false, but as it has been said many times, each one alone by himself will opine his own things, and all these
 D (are) correct and true, however can it be, comrade, that Protagoras (is) wise, so as actually to claim for himself that he justly deserves to be the teacher—with great wages—of everyone else, and we (are) more foolish and have to frequent his school, since each of us is the measure for himself of his own wisdom? How are we to deny that Protagoras says these as a wooer of the public? As for myself and that which characterizes my own art, the maieutic—I keep silent about it and all the laughter we incur—but I suspect that the entire business of conversation is also open to ridicule.
 E

For to examine and try to refute the appearances and opinions of one another, when those of each are correct—isn't that a long and immense piece of nonsense, if the Truth of Protagoras (is) true and she did not make her utterances in jest out of the inner sanctum of the book? 162

THEODORUS: Socrates, the man's a friend, as you just now said. I wouldn't choose then through an agreement of my own for Protagoras to be refuted, any more than I would choose to resist you against my opinion. So take Theaetetus back. He appeared in any case just now to comply with you harmoniously.

SOCRATES: Would you really, Theodorus, should you go to Sparta, to the palaestras there, would you claim it as your right, on observing everyone else naked, and some in poor shape, not to display in turn your looks (species) by stripping alongside them? B

THEODORUS: Well, what's your impression, if they were going to leave it up to me and obey me (be persuaded by me)? Just as in the present case I suspect I'll persuade you to allow me to observe and not to drag me, stiff as I already am, to the stripping-place, and to wrestle against the younger and more supple.

SOCRATES: Well, if that's to your liking, Theodorus, it's no skin off my nose, as the proverbialists say.³² Then I have to go back to the wise Theaetetus. Do say, Theaetetus, first in regard to what we just now went through, aren't you really surprised if so suddenly you'll show up as in no way worse in point of wisdom than anyone whatsoever of human beings or maybe gods? Or do you believe the Protagorean measure is spoken less pertinently for gods than for human beings? C

THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I don't. And as to what you're asking, I'm very surprised. For while we were going through in what way they were saying that of whatever opinion each is, this also is for him whose opinion it is, it appeared to me to be very well said. But now it has quickly changed around to the contrary. D

SOCRATES: That's because you are young, my dear boy. You therefore comply too keenly with demagogery and are persuaded. For Protagoras or someone else on his behalf will say in reply to this: "Noble children and elders, you're sitting down together and making a public speech, and you bring gods into the middle, though I except them from my speaking and writing, that they are or that they are not, and you say just what the many would welcome hearing—It's just dreadful if each human being will not differ at all in point of wisdom from any kind of cattle whatever. But you don't speak any demonstration and necessity of any kind, but you employ the likely, which if Theodorus or anyone else of the ge- E

163 ometers should be willing to use in geometry, he wouldn't even be worth a single pip.³³ So you and Theodorus consider whether you'll accept speeches about matters of so great an importance that are spoken by way of plausibility and likelihoods (semblances)."³⁴

THEAETETUS: But it's not just, Socrates, as either you or we would say.

SOCRATES: Then it has to be examined in a different way, it seems, as is your speech and the speech of Theodorus.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course, in a different way.

SOCRATES: Let's then examine in the following way whether knowledge and perception are after all the same or other, for surely our entire speech was tending toward this point, and for its sake we set in motion these many strange things. Isn't that so?

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

B SOCRATES: Shall we really then agree that whatever we perceive by seeing or by hearing, all these we also at the same time know? For example, before we understand the language of the barbarians, shall we either deny that we hear whenever they speak or assert that we hear and know what they're saying? And if in turn we do not know letters but we're looking at them, shall we insist that we don't see them or we know them if we see them?

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, we'll say we know that very thing of them which we see and hear. For we see and know, we'll say, the shape and color of the letters, and we hear and at the same time know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds. But what the letter-experts and the interpreters teach about them, we neither perceive by seeing or hearing nor know.

C

SOCRATES: That's excellent, Theaetetus, and it's not worthwhile to dispute with you on these points, in order that you may grow. But look! Here's something else on the attack, and consider at what point we'll repel it.

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing exactly?

D SOCRATES: It's of the following sort. If someone should ask, "Is it possible, in the case of whatever one should become a knower, while still having a memory of this very thing and keeping it safe, not to know this very thing which one remembers at the moment when one remembers it?" I'm being long-winded, it seems, in wanting to ask whether someone if he gets to know (learn) something does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAETETUS: But how could that be, Socrates? What you're saying would be a monster.³⁵

SOCRATES: I am uttering nonsense, you mean? But consider. Don't you say seeing's perceiving and sight perception?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case then that, according to the speech of the moment, whoever saw something has become a knower of that which he saw? *E*

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Now memory, don't you say it's something?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Of nothing or something?

THEAETETUS: Of something, doubtless.

SOCRATES: Isn't it of whatever one learnt and whatever one perceived, of some sorts of things like this?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Then precisely that which one saw, one surely remembers sometimes?

THEAETETUS: One remembers.

SOCRATES: Even with one's eyes shut? Or if he does this he forgets?

THEAETETUS: But it's dreadful, Socrates, to assert that.

SOCRATES: Yes, but we must, however, if we're to save the former speech, and if not, it's lost and gone. *164*

THEAETETUS: I too, by Zeus, suspect it, yet I don't quite adequately understand. Say in what respect.

SOCRATES: In the following. Whoever sees, we say, has become a knower of that which he sees, for sight and perception and knowledge have been agreed to be the same.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Yes, but whoever sees and has become a knower of what he was seeing, if he shuts his eyes, he remembers but does not see it. Isn't that so?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes, but "he doesn't see" is "he doesn't know," if "he sees" is also "he knows." *B*

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: So it turns out, of whatever someone becomes a knower, that though he's still remembering, he doesn't know, since he doesn't see. And we said it would be a monster should that prove to be the case.

THEAETETUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: So it appears that something impossible results if one says knowledge and perception are the same.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: So one must say each of the two (is) different.

THEAETETUS: Probably.

SOCRATES: What then would knowledge be? We have to speak again *C*

from the beginning, it seems. But, Theaetetus, what in the world are we about to do?

THEAETETUS: About what?

SOCRATES: It appears to me that we jumped away from the speech and just like an ignoble cock we're crowing before we've won.

THEAETETUS: How's that exactly?

SOCRATES: We seem in the contentious way of contradiction to have gained an agreement in light of agreements about words (names) and to be satisfied with our prevailing over the speech by something of the sort. And though we say we're not competitors but philosophers, we are, without our being aware of it, doing the same things as those dreadful men.

THEAETETUS: I don't yet understand how you're speaking.

SOCRATES: Well, I shall try to make plain about them just exactly what I have in mind. We asked whether someone doesn't know something if once he's learnt it he remembers, and we proved that whoever saw it and shut his eyes was remembering and not seeing, and we then proved that he did not know at the same time he was remembering, but this was impossible. And it was precisely in this way that the Protagorean myth got lost and perished, as well as your own at the same time, that knowledge and perception are the same.

E THEAETETUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: It wouldn't have, I suspect, my dear, if the father of the other myth were still alive, but he would now be defending it in lots of ways. But as it is, we're casting reproaches on a lone orphan, for not even its guardians, whom Protagoras left behind—and Theodorus here is one of them—are willing to take the field; but, more to the point, we'll probably have to go to its assistance ourselves for the sake of the just.

165 THEODORUS: That's because it's not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus who's the guardian of his things,³⁶ but we for some reason or another inclined rather early away from bare speeches and toward geometry. Still and all, we'll be grateful to you if you do assist it.

SOCRATES: You speak beautifully, Theodorus. Consider then my assistance, such as it is. If one should not pay attention to words, on whose terms for the most part we've got accustomed to affirm or deny, one would agree to more dreadful things than those just now. As to what the terms are, am I to tell you or Theaetetus?

B THEODORUS: No, rather in common, but let the younger answer, for if he makes a slip he'll cut a less disgraceful figure.

SOCRATES: Then I speak the most dreadful question, and it is, I sus-

pect, something of the following sort. “Is it possible for the same person in knowing something not to know this which he knows?”

THEODORUS: Then what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Impossible, surely, I suspect.

SOCRATES: No, not, that is, if you’re to set down seeing as knowing.

For how will you handle an inescapable question, when you’re stuck, as the saying goes, in a well and an unflappable man asks, once he’s covered your other eye with his hand, whether you see the cloak with the covered eye?

C

THEAETETUS: I suspect that I’ll deny that I see with this one of course but I’ll affirm, however, that I do with the other.

SOCRATES: Then aren’t you seeing and not seeing the same thing at the same time?

THEAETETUS: Yes, this is somehow the case.

SOCRATES: I’m not at all ordering this, he’ll say, nor did I ask as to the how, but only whether what you know this you also do not know, and it’s now evident that you’re seeing what you do not see. And you’ve in fact agreed that seeing’s knowing and not seeing not knowing. Then on the basis of this, figure out what’s the result for you.

THEAETETUS: Well, I figure that it’s the contrary to what I just laid down.

D

SOCRATES: Yes, and perhaps—my wonderful fellow!—you would have experienced several more of the sort if someone went on to ask you whether it is possible to know sharply, and is it possible bluntly, and to know close at hand but not far away, and to know intensely the same thing and slightly. There are thousands of different things with which—had a light-armed mercenary in speeches asked them as he lay in ambush, when you set down knowledge and perception as the same, and with an assault on hearing, smelling, and perceptions of that sort—he would now be pressing his refutative attack and not let up before in amazement at his much prayed-for wisdom you had been hobbled by him, and exactly where he had worsted you and bound you hand and foot, he would then be holding you for as big a ransom as you and he decided on. Now perhaps you would say, what kind of speech will Protagoras speak as an auxiliary to his own? Are we to try to say?

E

THEAETETUS: Yes of course.

SOCRATES: There are not only all these things—as many as we say in defending him—but, I suspect, he’ll come and engage in close combat (with that mercenary) out of contempt for us and say: “Here’s that good Socrates of yours! He’s responsible for a mere child getting a fright, when he was asked whether it was possible

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for the same person to remember and at the same time not know the same thing, and in his fright denied it on account of his incapacity to see ahead, and thus in his speeches showed up poor little me as a laugh. But, most slovenly Socrates, this is the way it is: whenever you're examining any of my things through questioning, if the one to whom the question is put slips up in answering it in just the sort of terms that I would answer, then I

B am refuted, but if the terms are different, then the one to whom the question is put is alone refuted. For instance, is it your impression that anyone will concede to you that a memory of what one experienced, if it is present to one, is an experience of just the sort that it was when he experienced it, if he is no longer experiencing it? Far from it. Or is your impression that he will, in turn, be reluctant to agree that it's possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or if he is frightened of this, that he'll ever grant that whoever is getting to be dissimilar is the same as the one who he is before he is getting to be dissimilar? And, if he'll really have to take precautions against the spoils of the chase of each other's words, he'll prefer to grant that someone is he but not *hes*, and, what's more, these *hes* keep on becoming infinite, provided that dissimilarity keeps on becoming?

C But," he'll say, "You blessed innocent!—Approach what I'm saying in a nobler and grander way, if you're capable, and prove straight out that to each of us there do not come to be private (peculiar) perceptions, or that though they do come to be private, it would not any the more follow that that which appears becomes for him alone, or—if 'be' has to be the name used—is for just him to whom it appears. But in speaking—of all things!—of swine and dog-faced baboons, not only are you yourself a swine, but you're convincing also your auditors to do this against my writings. There's

D nothing beautiful in doing (making) that. I assert the truth is as I've written: each of us is the measure of the things which are and are not, and another differs from an other in thousands of things by this very fact, that to one different things are and appear, and to one different. And I'm far from denying that wisdom and a wise man are, but I'm saying that he's the very one who's wise, whoever by inducing a change makes appear and be good things for anyone of us to whom they appear and are bad. So don't prosecute again the speech by my phrasing, but learn with still

E greater clarity in the following way what I'm saying. Recall the sort of thing that was being said in the previous remarks, that whatever he eats appears and is bitter to whoever is ill, but to whoever is healthy the contrary is and appears. Now one must

not make either of these the wiser—for it's not at all possible— 167
nor deliver the accusation that the ill (is) a fool because he opines
those sorts of things, and the healthy (is) wise because he opines
different sorts of things, but one has to change the former to the
other things, for the other condition (is) better. And this holds as
well in education—one has to effect a change from another con-
dition to the better. But the physician effects a change by drugs,
the sophist by speeches. Since it's not at all the case that one makes
someone who's opining false things later opine true things, for
it's impossible to opine either the things which are not or different
things beyond whatever one experiences, but these things (are)
always true. But, I suspect, whoever is opining by a poor condition B
of soul things akin to itself, a good condition makes him opine
other things of the sort. It's these that some out of inexperience
call the apparitions that are true, but I call the others better than
the others, but in no way truer. And I'm far from saying, my dear
Socrates, that the wise (are) frogs, but I am saying they're phy-
sicians in terms of bodies and farmers in terms of plants, for I
assert that they too make good and healthy perceptions and truths C
be in plants in place of poor perceptions,³⁷ whenever any of them
is ill. But it's wise and good public speakers who make cities be
of the opinion that the good things in place of the poor things
are just. Since no matter what sorts of things these are that are
just and beautiful in the opinion of each city, these also are for
it as long as it holds them to be so, but the wise makes good things
be for it and be so in its opinion in place of the several poor things
it has. And in accordance with the same speech, the sophist too, D
if he's capable in this way of tutoring those who are being edu-
cated, (is) wise and deserves a lot of money in the eyes of the
educated. And so others are wiser than others and no one opines
false things, and you have to put up with being a measure, whether
you want to or not, for it's in these terms that this speech gets
saved. If you can dispute it from the beginning, then go ahead
and range a counterspeech against it and dispute it; or if you want
to do it through questions, do it through questions, for this in no
case must be avoided, but anyone of sense must pursue it most
of all. Act (make), however, in this way; don't be unjust in your
questioning. For it makes little sense to claim to care for virtue E
and then to go ahead and continually be unjust in speeches. And
to be unjust in a situation of this sort is to fail to separate, whenever
one's engagements are of this kind, competition and conversation,
and in the former be playful and trip up one's opponent to the
extent that one is capable of it, but in conversation be in earnest

168 and put one's interlocutor on his feet again, pointing out to him only the slip-ups in which he had been led astray by himself and his former associations. For if you act (make) in this way, those who spend their time with you will blame themselves for their own confusion and perplexity, and they won't blame you, and they'll pursue you and love you; they'll hate themselves and flee from themselves into philosophy in order that, once they've become different, they may be rid of who they were before. But if, just as the many do, you do the contrary of this, the contrary will befall you and instead of as philosophers you'll reveal your associates as loathers of this business (*pragma*) whenever they become older. If you obey me then—and this was stated even before—if not in a spirit of enmity or contention, but with gracious condescension in thought, you will truly examine what we're saying, in declaring that all things are in motion, and that which is the opinion of each, this also is for a private person and a city. And on this basis, you'll go on to examine whether knowledge and perception (are) the same or maybe different, but not as you're doing it now on the basis of the habitual usage of words and phrases: it's these that the many, by dragging and pulling in any which way, make the occasion for mutual perplexities of all sorts.

B

C

I offer this, Theodorus, to your comrade by way of assistance to the best of my capacity, a small bit from a small store. But if he were still alive himself, he would have gone to the assistance of his own things in a more magnificent way.

THEODORUS: You're joking, Socrates. You've assisted the man in a very lively way.

SOCRATES: It's good of you to say so, comrade. Tell me. You surely noticed that when Protagoras was speaking just now and reproaching us because in conducting our speeches before a mere child we competed against his own things by means of the boy's fear, and in his calling off in disparagement any kind of charming whimsy, while setting off the measure of all things with august majesty, he urged us to be in earnest about his own speech?

D

THEODORUS: Of course I noticed it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: What then? Do you urge obedience to him?

THEODORUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: Do you see then that all these here are mere children except for you? So if we'll obey the man, then it's you and I who must, in asking and answering one another, prove to be in earnest about his speech, in order that he cannot bring this charge at least, that in being playful before lads we examined his speech.

E

THEODORUS: But what of it? See here. Wouldn't Theaetetus better

follow an examination of a speech than many who have long beards?

SOCRATES: Well, not at all better than you at least, Theodorus. So don't suppose that I must defend your dead comrade in every way and you in none. But come—my excellent fellow!—do follow just a little way, up to this very point, when we know whether you, after all, must be the measure of geometrical theorems (drawings) or all are as competent for themselves as you are in astronomy and everything else in which you are charged with excelling. 169

THEODORUS: It's not easy, Socrates, to sit beside you and not give an account (*logos*), and I was just now distracted into uttering nonsense when I said that you'd leave it up to me not to strip and wouldn't use compulsion as the Spartans do. But my impression is that you tend rather toward Sciron, for Spartans order one either to go away or to strip, but my impression is that your act is rather on the model of Antaeus, for you don't release anyone who approaches before you compel him to strip and go to the mat in speeches.³⁸ B

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, it's an excellent semblance that you made of my disease; I am however more stubborn than they. Thousands of Heracleses and Theseuses, mighty in speaking, have before now met and thrashed me roundly, but I none the less do not stand aside and withdraw—it's to that extent that a dreadful love of exercise in matters of this kind has slipped into me. So don't you begrudge a drubbing and a benefit of yourself and me at once. C

THEODORUS: I no longer speak of resisting, but lead wherever you want, for I must in any case be refuted and endure whatever fate you spin out for me in these matters.³⁹ I'll not, however, be able to submit myself to you beyond what you propose.

SOCRATES: Well, it's enough even to go so far. Now please watch the following sort of thing very closely, lest at some point we slip unawares into conducting a childish species of speeches, and someone once more reproach us for it. D

THEODORUS: Well, I'll try of course, to the extent that I'm able.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's get our grip back on this at just the same point as before, and let's see whether we were correctly or incorrectly annoyed when we faulted that speech that was making each one self-sufficient in point of intelligence. And Protagoras did concede to us that some are superior when it comes to the better and worse, and it's these he granted were the wise. Isn't that so?

THEODORUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now if he were present and was making the agreement himself, and it was not we who had in taking the field conceded E

it on his behalf, there would now be no need to take it up again and confirm it; but as it is, someone might cancel our authority to make an agreement on his behalf. It's for this reason that it's more beautiful to come to an agreement of greater clarity about this very point, for it's not just a slight variance whether it's in this or a different way.

THEODORUS: What you say is true.

170 SOCRATES: Let's not then through different (speeches) but on the basis of his speech gain the agreement as briefly as possible.

THEODORUS: How?

SOCRATES: In this way. He surely says that whatever is the opinion for each, this also is for him whose opinion it is?

THEODORUS: Yes, he says so indeed.

B SOCRATES: Then aren't we too speaking, Protagoras, the opinions of (a) human being, or rather of all human beings, and we assert that there's no one who's not convinced that he's wiser than everyone else in some things but in some things different people are wiser than he is. And in the greatest dangers, whenever they are foundering on campaigns, in illnesses, or at sea, their relation to the rulers on these several occasions is as to gods, in the expectation that they're their saviors, and they don't differ by anything else than by the fact that they know. And all human affairs surely are as full of people seeking teachers and rulers of themselves, of the rest of the animals, and their occupations, as they are of those who believe in turn that they're competent to teach and competent to rule? And in all these matters what else shall we say than that human beings themselves are convinced that wisdom and folly are at home among them?

THEODORUS: Nothing else.

SOCRATES: They're convinced that wisdom (is) true thought and folly false opinion?

C THEODORUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: How then shall we handle the speech, Protagoras? Are we to assert that human beings always opine what is true, or at times true and at times false? For it surely turns out on the basis of both that they don't always opine what is true but both. Consider, Theodorus, whether anyone of Protagoras' circle or you yourself would be willing to insist that no other is convinced that an other is foolish and opines what is false.

THEODORUS: Well, it's unbelievable, Socrates.

D SOCRATES: And yet the speech that says (a) human being (is) the measure of all things (*khrēmata*) has come to the point of submitting to this necessity.

THEODORUS: How's that exactly?

SOCRATES: Whenever you judge something by yourself and declare in front of me an opinion about something, then in accordance with his speech let this be true for you. But is it not possible for all the rest of us to come to be judges of your judgment, or are we always deciding that you opine what's true? Or don't thousands battle you on each occasion with counteropinions, convinced that you judge and believe what is false?

THEODORUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it's indeed thousands, Homer says, and it's they who give me all the trouble (*pragmata*) that I have from human beings.⁴⁰ E

SOCRATES: What then? Do you want us to say that you at that time are opining what is true for yourself and false for the thousands?

THEODORUS: It seems on the basis of the speech at least to be a necessity.

SOCRATES: And what of Protagoras himself? Isn't it a necessity that if not even he were to believe that (a) human being was the measure, or the many either—just as they don't at all believe it—this truth which he wrote is strictly for no one? And if he were to believe it, and the multitude do not share his belief, you know that first of all, to the extent that more are of the opinion that it's not than that it is, to that extent it is not more than it is. 171

THEODORUS: It's a necessity, provided, that is, it will be and will not be in accordance with each opinion.

SOCRATES: Yes, and, in the second place, this is the cleverest thing about it. He surely concedes that the belief of those who have a counteropinion to his own about his own belief—in which they're convinced that he's speaking what is false (lying)—is true, since he agrees that everyone opines the things which are.

THEODORUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Would he then concede his own is false if he agrees that the belief of those convinced he's speaking falsely (lying) is true? B

THEODORUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Yes, but everyone else does not concede that they themselves are speaking falsely?

THEODORUS: Indeed they don't.

SOCRATES: Yes, but he's agreeing that this opinion too is true on the basis of what he has written?

THEODORUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: So will there be after all a dispute from all who take their start from Protagoras, or rather won't there be an agreement at least by him, whenever he concedes to the one contradicting him that he's opining what is true, and at that time Protagoras himself will also concede that neither a dog nor the chance human being C

is a measure about even one thing which he does not understand (learn)? Isn't that so?

THEODORUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case then that since it's disputed by all, the Truth of Protagoras would not be true for anyone, neither anyone else nor himself?

THEODORUS: We're running down my comrade too much, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, you know, my friend, it's not plain whether we're not
D in fact running right past the right, for it's likely that he, since he is older, be wiser than us. And if he should for instance pop up here on the spot and just up to his neck, he would, as is likely, once he charged me with talking a lot of nonsense and you with agreeing, slip down out of sight and be off and running. But I suppose it's a necessity for us to deal with ourselves as the sort we are, and to say whatever are our own opinions on each and every occasion. And so, now in this particular case, are we to assert that anyone whatsoever would agree to this at least, the fact of another being wiser than an other and similarly more foolish?

THEODORUS: It's my opinion at any rate.

SOCRATES: Are we also to say that the speech would especially take its
E stand in the region we outlined when we were going to the assistance of Protagoras, that the many things in which, in whatever way one's opinion is, it's in that way that they are for each—hot things, dry things, sweet things, all things of this cast? But if it's anywhere that he'll concede that in some things someone differs from someone else, he would be willing to say it's about the healthy and the sick things that not every mere woman and child, let alone every beast, is competent to cure itself, because it recognizes what is healthy for itself, but it's exactly here if anywhere that someone differs from someone else.

THEODORUS: I'm of the opinion, at least, that this is the way it is.

172 SOCRATES: Isn't it the case about political things too, that though for beautiful and ugly things, just and unjust, and holy and not, of whatsoever sort they are that each city in its belief lays down for itself as lawful, these also are in truth for each, and in these things neither layman than layman nor city than city is in any way wiser? Still, in the case of laying down for itself things that are to its own advantage or not to its own advantage, it's here, if anywhere, that he'll agree again that adviser differs from adviser and another
B opinion of a city from an other in light of truth. And he would scarcely have the nerve to assert that whatever a city lays down for itself in the belief they're to its advantage, it's as certain as can be that these things will be to its advantage. But it's in the former

case, I mean in the just and unjust, holy and unholy things, that they're willing to insist that none of them is by nature with a being of its own, but the opinion resolved on in common, this becomes true at that time, whenever it's resolved on and for as long a time as it's so resolved. And everyone who does not altogether speak the speech of Protagoras,⁴¹ leads wisdom in one way or another to this. But a greater speech, Theodorus, from a lesser speech is overtaking us. C

THEODORUS: Aren't we at leisure, Socrates?

SOCRATES: It appears we are. And though I often realized it at other times of course—you extraordinary being!⁴²—it's striking now as well how likely it is that those who passed much time in the practices of philosophy show up as laughable public speakers when they enter the courts.⁴³

THEODORUS: How exactly do you mean that?

SOCRATES: It's probable that those who since youth knock about courts and places of the sort are, in comparison with those who have been reared in philosophy and that sort of engagement, like domestics in comparison to free. D

THEODORUS: In what respect exactly?

SOCRATES: In the sense that they always have available that which you said—leisure—and they conduct their talks in peace and at their leisure. And just as we at the present moment are now taking for a third time a speech in exchange for a speech, so they do too, if the speech that comes along pleases them more than that which lies in front of them, just as it did us. And it's of no concern to them whether they talk at length or briefly, if only they hit upon 'that which is'. But *they* are always speaking in the press of business—water in its flow is bearing down on them⁴⁴—and there's no room to have their talks about whatever they desire, but the plaintiff stands over them holding necessity and an outline that is read alongside as they speak and outside of which they must not speak.⁴⁵ And their speeches are always about a fellow-slave before a seated master, who holds some kind of suit (justice) in his hand, and the contests are never indifferent, but he's always the case in point, and the course is often in fact about his life (soul): as a result of all this, they become sharp and shrewd, knowing how to cozen their master in speech and beguile him in deed, but they become small and not upright in their souls, for their enslavement since their youth on has deprived them of the possibility of growth, straightness, and liberality. It compels them to do crooked things, imposing on their still tender souls great dangers and fears which they're incapable of supporting with the just E

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B and true, and so turning at once to the lie and mutual injustice they often get bent and stunted, and from lads they end up as men with nothing healthy and sound in their thought. They have become, they believe, dreadfully uncanny and wise. And here you have the sort that they are, Theodorus. But as for those of our chorus, do you want us to go through it or dismiss it and turn once more to the speech, in order that we may not in fact abuse too much in excess the freedom and possibility of exchanging speeches that we were just now speaking of?

C THEODORUS: In no way, Socrates, but let's go through it. You've made a very good point, that we who are choristers in this sort of thing are not subservient to the speeches, but the speeches are as it were our domestics, and each of them waits around to be completed whenever we decide. No judge and no observer supervises us as he does poets to rebuke and rule.

SOCRATES: Let's speak then, since, it seems, you're of the opinion that

we are to, about those at the top—for why should one speak of those who spend their time in philosophy so poorly?—it's surely these who since their youth, first of all, don't know the way to the

D marketplace, or where's a court, councilhouse, or anything else that's a common assembly of the city. And laws and decrees, spoken or written, they neither see nor hear, and the serious business of clubs for gaining office, and meetings, banquets, and revelries with flute girls—it doesn't even occur to them to do them in their dreams. And whether someone has been well-born or base-born in the city, or whether someone has incurred some evil from his ancestors, on the men's or women's side—he's less aware of it than

E of the proverbial pitchers of the sea.⁴⁶ And he doesn't even know that he does not know all these things, for he's not abstaining from them for the sake of good repute, but in truth his body alone is situated in the city and resides there, but his thought, convinced that all these things are small and nothing, dishonors them in every way and flies, as Pindar puts it, "deep down under the earth"⁴⁷ and geometricizes the planes, "and above heaven"

174 star gazing, and in exploring everywhere every nature of each whole of the things which are and letting itself down to not one of the things nearby.

THEODORUS: How do you mean this, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Just like Thales, Theodorus, while star gazing and looking up he fell in a well, and some gracefully witty Thracian servant girl is said to have made a jest at his expense—that in his eagerness to know the things in heaven he was unaware of the things in front of him and at his feet. The same jest suffices for all those

who engage in philosophy. For someone of this sort has truly become unaware of his neighbor next-door, not only as to what he's doing but almost to the point of not knowing whether he is a human being or some different nursling. But what (a) human being is and in what respect it's suitable for a nature of that sort to act or be acted on that's different from all the rest—he seeks that, and all his trouble (*pragmata*) is in exploring it. Surely you understand, Theodorus, or don't you? B

THEODORUS: Yes I do, and what you say is true.

SOCRATES: It's precisely for this reason, my friend, that whoever is of this sort in associating with each in private and in public, just as I was saying at the beginning, whenever he's compelled in a court or anywhere else to converse about the things at his feet and things before his eyes, he gives not only Thracian girls but the rest of the crowd a laugh, falling into wells and every kind of perplexity by inexperience, and his lack of deportment is dreadful as he gives the impression of plain silliness. For just as on occasions of abuse he has nothing peculiar to revile anyone with, because he knows of no evil of anyone from his failure to have practiced it (and so in his perplexity he's evidently laughable), so no less on occasions of praise and the boastings of everyone else when he's not in any feigned way but truly and openly laughing, he seems to be nonsensical. For when a tyrant or a king is praised, he's convinced he's hearing that one of the herdsmen is deemed to be happy—a swineherd, for example, a shepherd, or some cowherd—for milking a lot of cattle. But he holds that they are grazing and milking a more peevish and conspiratorial animal than the herdsmen are, but it's necessary that a ruler of this sort become by lack of leisure no less boorish and uneducated than the herdsmen, with his wall cast around him as a sheepfold on a mountain. C

And whenever he hears of someone in possession of ten thousand acres of land or still more—"Oh! he possesses an amazing quantity"—his impression is that he's hearing of a very small amount, accustomed as he is to look at the entire earth. And when people harp on families—"How grand and noble so-and-so is; he can show seven wealthy ancestors"—he's convinced the praise is from those whose sight is altogether dim and limited, who are incapable, by lack of education, of looking over all eternity and calculating that each and every one has had countless thousands of grandfathers and ancestors, and anyone whatsoever has had among them many thousands of rich men and beggars, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. But for those who make themselves august in a recitation of twenty-five ancestors and refer themselves to D

B Heracles the son of Amphitryon, their petty calculation seems strange to him; and because whoever was the twenty-fifth further back from Amphitryon was the sort he was as chance befell him, and the fiftieth further back from him no less, he laughs when they're incapable of calculation and release from the vanity of a foolish soul. And on all these occasions whoever is of this sort is laughed at by the many, since he seems to be partly arrogant and partly ignorant of the things at his feet and is perplexed in particular.

THEODORUS: You altogether speak, Socrates, of the way it happens.

SOCRATES: Yes, but whenever he himself gets to drag someone up,

C my friend, and he's responsible for someone being willing to leave off from "How am I wronging you, or you me?" and turns to the examination of justice itself and injustice, what each of the pair (is) and in what respect they differ from everything or each other, or from "Whether a king's happy in possession of mickle gold,"⁴⁸ and turns to an examination of kingship and of human happiness and misery in general, of what sort the pair is and in what way it's suitable for the nature of (a) human being to acquire one and

D avoid one of the pair—whenever that one who's small in his soul and shrewd and a shyster has to give an account (*logos*) of all these things, then he pays back the converse. Hung up on high he's dizzy and looking from high above he's in dismay by his unfamiliarity, he's perplexed and stutters, and he does not give Thracian girls a laugh, or anyone else who's uneducated either—for they don't perceive it—but all those who have been reared in a fashion contrary to slaves. So here you have the way of each of the two, Theodorus: the way of him who has been truly nurtured

E in freedom and leisure—he's the one you call a philosopher—it's no matter of indignation for him to seem to be naive and nothing, whenever he falls into slavish services (it's as if he does not know how to pack up bedding or flavor a relish or fawning speeches); and the way of him in turn, who's capable of serving in all things of this sort keenly and sharply, but who doesn't know how to arrange his cloak on the right in a free man's way or for that matter get a harmony of speeches and hymn correctly a life of gods and happy men.

176

THEODORUS: If you should persuade everyone, Socrates, of what you're saying as you did me, peace would be more widespread and evils less among human beings.

SOCRATES: But it's not possible for the evils either to perish, Theodorus—it's a necessity that there always be something contrary to the good—or for them to be established among gods, but of ne-

cessity they haunt mortal nature and this region here; it's for this
 reason that one ought to try to flee from here to there as soon as
 possible. Flight (is) assimilation to a god as far as possible, and *B*
 assimilation (is) to become just and holy with intelligence. But as
 a matter of fact, it's hardly at all easy—my excellent fellow!—to
 persuade that it's not after all for the sake of which the many say
 one should avoid wickedness and pursue virtue, that it's for this
 sake that one must practice virtue and not vice, in order that, of
 all things, one may seem to be good and not bad. For all this is,
 as the saying goes, the drivel of old women, as it appears to me.
 But let's tell the truth as follows. A god (is) in no way unjust in *C*
 any respect, but he's the most just that it's possible to be, and there
 is nothing more similar to him than whoever of us becomes in
 turn as just as possible. It's in his dealing with this that there's the
 truly dreadful uncanniness of a man or his nothingness and un-
 manliness, for the cognition of this (is) wisdom and simply true
 virtue, and its ignorance folly and manifest vice, and all the rest
 of seeming uncanniness and wisdom that occur in the practice of
 political power (is) vulgar, and what occurs in the arts common.
 As for whoever, then, is doing an injustice and saying or doing *D*
 unholy things, it's best by far in his case not to make the concession
 that he is uncanny by his criminal willingness to stop at nothing,
 for they glory in the reproach and believe they're hearing that
 they're not utter nonsense, merely burdens of the earth,⁴⁹ but that
 they're men as they ought to be in a city—those who will get
 themselves to safety. So one must tell the truth, that they are by
 so much more the sort they suspect they're not because they don't
 suspect it, for they're ignorant of the penalty for injustice, and
 it's what they least ought to be ignorant of. For it's not what it is
 in their opinion, beatings and executions—people who do no in-
 justice undergo them on occasion—but it's what's impossible to
 avoid. *E*

THEODORUS: What exactly do you mean?

SOCRATES: Paradigms stand in 'that which is', my friend, of the divine
 which is most happy and of the godless which is most miserable,
 and they don't see that this is the way it is, but by their folly and
 extreme foolishness they unawares make themselves similar to the *177*
 latter on account of their unjust actions, and make themselves
 dissimilar to the former. So they pay the penalty for exactly this
 by living the life that resembles that to which they make themselves
 similar. And if we say that unless they get rid of their uncanniness,
 even when they're dead that region clear of the bad won't receive
 them, but it's here they'll always have their own similarity of a

way of life; bad in association with bad, they'll listen to this as altogether the talk of some mindless people, uncanny and criminally willing to stop at nothing as they are.

THEODORUS: Indeed they will, Socrates.

- B SOCRATES: I know it, be sure, comrade. There's one thing, however, that has befallen them. Whenever they have to give and receive in private an account (*logos*) of the things they blame, and they're willing in a manly fashion to put up with it for a long time and not to take flight in an unmanly way, then strangely—you extraordinary being!—they end up as not being satisfied with themselves about what they're saying, and that rhetorical (art) of theirs somehow or other shrinks up, so as for them to seem to be no different from children. Now let's stand apart and withdraw from these things—they were in fact said as by-products—for if we don't, always more will keep on flowing in and choke up the speech with which we began, and let's go to the previous remarks, if you're of that opinion too.

C THEODORUS: As for me, Socrates, things of this sort are less unpleasant to listen to, for they're easier for someone of my age to follow. If, however, it's been resolved on, let's go back.

SOCRATES: Weren't we then at some point hereabouts of the speech, in which, we claimed, those who speak of that sweeping being,⁵⁰ and whatever is the opinion of each on any occasion also is for him whose opinion it is, are willing in everything else to insist upon this and not least in the case of the just things, that it's as certain as can be that whatever a city lays down for itself, once the city has got an opinion about them, these also are just for the city which laid them down for as long as they are laid down. But about the good things, there is no one still so manly as to have the nerve to fight it out that whatever a city lays down for itself in the belief they're beneficial, then these things also are, for as long a time as they are laid down, beneficial—unless one should give it the name, but it would surely be a jest in light of what we're saying. Or isn't it?

D THEODORUS: Certainly.

- E SOCRATES: The reason is that he is not to say the name but to observe the matter (*pragma*) that is named.

THEODORUS: Don't let him then.

SOCRATES: But whatever a city names this, surely it's aiming at that in its legislation, and all the laws, to the extent that it believes and is capable, it lays down for itself as beneficially as possible. Or does the city legislate by looking at anything else?

178 THEODORUS: In no way.

SOCRATES: Does it really then also always hit upon it, or doesn't each often fail too?

THEODORUS: I suspect there's failure too.

SOCRATES: Well, it's still more the case that everyone would agree to these same things from the following viewpoint, should one ask about the species in its entirety in which the beneficial also happens to be. And that surely is in fact about future time. For whenever we legislate for ourselves, we're laying down the laws on the grounds that they will be beneficial in later time, and this we would correctly speak of as "future."

THEODORUS: Certainly.

B

SOCRATES: Come then, let's ask in just this way Protagoras or anyone else of those who say the same things as he does. "Of all things (a) human being is the measure," as you all assert, Protagoras—of white things, heavy things, light things, everything of the sort without exception—for with his own tribunal for them in himself, believing they're the sort as he experiences them, he believes they're true for him and are the things which are. Isn't that so?

THEODORUS: That's so.

SOCRATES: Shall we really assert, then, Protagoras, that he does have the tribunal in himself also for the things that will be, and whatever sort he believes they will be, these things also become to him who conceived the belief? For example, a feverish heat. Whenever some layman believes he'll get a fever and this hotness will be, and another, but a physician, holds the counterbelief, in accordance with the opinion of which of the two are we to assert how the future will turn out? Or will it be in accordance with the opinion of both, and he won't be hot for the physician and won't be feverish, while to himself there'll be both?

C

THEODORUS: In that case it would be laughable.

SOCRATES: Well, I suspect in regard to the future sweetness and dryness of wine, the opinion of the farmer is authoritative and not that of the lyre-player.

D

THEODORUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Nor, in turn, about what will be out of tune and in tune, would a trainer's opinion prove to be better than a musician's, since later, too, the trainer himself will be of the opinion that it is in tune.

THEODORUS: In no way.

SOCRATES: And isn't it also the case for the future feaster, whoever's not an expert cook, when a banquet is being got ready, his judgment is less authoritative than the relish-maker's about the future pleasure. Let's not yet fight it out with the speech about the pleas-

E

ant that is now or has been for him, but about that which will in the future be for each and be the opinion of each—is he himself his own best judge? Or you, Protagoras? Would your anticipatory opinion prove to be better, at least in the case of what will be persuasive in speeches for each of us in court, or any layman’s whatsoever?

THEODORUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, it was in exactly this that he used to promise to surpass everyone.

179 SOCRATES: Yes, by Zeus, my good man,⁵¹ or else no one would converse with him and offer him a lot of money, if he were not persuading his associates that neither a soothsayer nor anyone else would better judge that which will be and will seem than he himself.

THEODORUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it the case, then, that both acts of legislation and the beneficial are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that it is often a necessity for a city in legislating for itself to fail to hit upon the most beneficial?

THEODORUS: Yes indeed.

B SOCRATES: So it will be stated by us in a measured way before your teacher that it’s a necessity for him to agree that someone is wiser than someone else, and that whoever is of that sort is the measure, and there is no necessity whatsoever for me the nonknower to become the measure, as the speech on his behalf was just now compelling me to be of that sort, whether I was wanting to or not.

THEODORUS: It’s my impression, Socrates, that the speech particularly gets convicted in the former way (though it’s also convicted in this), in which it makes the opinions of everyone else authoritative, and these opinions believe, evidently, that his speeches are in no way true.

C SOCRATES: There’re many different ways, Theodorus, in which a conviction of the sort might be gained against the view that every opinion of everyone is true. But in regard to the experience each has in the present, out of which the perceptions and the opinions in conformity with these perceptions come to be, it’s harder to gain the point that they’re not true. But perhaps I’m making no sense, for maybe they are unconvictable, and those who assert they are as plain as day and are sciences would perhaps be saying the things which are, and the speech of Theaetetus here has not been way off the mark when he set down perception and knowledge as the same. We have to approach it more closely, then, as the speech on behalf of Protagoras prescribed, and give this sweeping being a sharp tap and see whether it rings sound or

D

hollow. Now, whichever way it is, there has been a battle about it, not a trivial one, and it has involved not a few.

THEODORUS: It's far from being trivial, but it's been very much on the increase around Ionia, for the comrades of Heraclitus are the very vigorous choral leaders of this speech.

SOCRATES: That's all the more reason, my dear Theodorus, you see, to examine it, and from the beginning, just as they themselves present it. E

THEODORUS: That's altogether so. About these Heraclitean opinions, Socrates, or, as you say, Homeric and still more ancient, it's no more possible to converse with all who pretend to be experienced with them—the members of the Ephesian circle—than with those driven to madness by the gadfly. They simply (artlessly), in accordance with their own writings, sweep along. And as for the possibility of staying by a speech and question, and quietly answering and asking in turn, there is less than nothing in them of that, or rather even nothing does not surpass these men when it comes to the small degree of quietness in them.⁵² But if you ask any of them anything, they send off shots as if they were drawing up enigmatic shaftlets from a quiver, and if you seek to get an account (*logos*) of this, as to what he has said, you'll be struck by another freshly altered name.⁵³ And you'll never get anywhere with any one of them, any more than they themselves will with one another, but they take very good care to permit nothing to be stable either in speech or in their own souls, convinced as they are, in my opinion, that that is to be stationary. And they are wholly at war against that, and as far as they are capable, they throw it out from everywhere. 180
B

SOCRATES: Perhaps, Theodorus, you've seen the men fighting, but you've not been with them when they are at peace, for they are not your comrades. But, I suspect, they point out things of this sort (i.e., the stable things) to their pupils at their leisure, whom-ever they want to make similar to themselves.

THEODORUS: What do you mean, pupils? You extraordinary being! C
For this sort there's not another who becomes the pupil of an other, but they grow up spontaneously, from whatever source each of them happens to get a god in him, and the other is convinced that the other knows nothing. Now from these, as I was going to say, you would never get an account (*logos*) regardless of whether they're willing or unwilling. But we must take it off their hands and examine it by ourselves as if it were a problem.⁵⁴

SOCRATES: And there's a measure of sense in what you say. And as for the problem, have we taken on anything else than this—from D

the ancients who were concealing it from the many with poetry,⁵⁵ it was that the becoming (*genesis*) of everything else happens to be streams, Oceanus and Tethys, and nothing is at rest, and from those later who, because they were wiser, were revealing it openly, in order that even the shoemakers, once they heard it, may understand their wisdom and stop believing in their foolishness that some of the things which are at rest and some in motion, but once they understand that everything is in motion they may honor them? But I almost forgot, Theodorus, that different people, on the other hand, declared the contrary to this—"As the sort that is immovable, there is 'to be' as the name for the all"⁵⁶—and all the different things that the Melissuses and Parmenideses in opposing all of them insist on, that all things are one and it is at rest in itself without a place in which it moves. How shall we handle all of these, Theodorus? For in advancing little by little, we have, without being aware of it, fallen into the middle of both, and unless we somehow manage to defend ourselves and escape, we'll pay the penalty, as those do in gymnasias who play at tug-of-war, whenever they are seized by both sides and dragged in contrary directions.⁵⁷ Now I'm of the opinion that we must examine the others first, toward whom we started out, the streamers. And if it's evident they're making sense, we'll drag ourselves off with them, and try to avoid the others, but if the arresters of the whole seem to be saying truer things,⁵⁸ we'll flee over to them and away from those who set the immovable things in motion.⁵⁹ And if it's evident that there's no measure of sense in what both are saying, we'll be laughable, convinced that we're making sense though we're nobodies, and have repudiated in the scrutiny very ancient and all-wise men.⁶⁰ See, then, Theodorus, whether it's profitable to advance into so great a danger.

THEODORUS: Rather it's unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what each of the two groups of men is saying.

SOCRATES: If you of all people are that eager, we must make the examination. Now it's my impression that the start of our examination is about motion—what sort of thing are they saying after all, those who assert that all things are in motion? I want to say the following sort of thing. Do they say there's some one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two? Don't, however, let it only be my opinion, but you too share in it, in order that we may, if in fact we have to, suffer in common. Tell me. Do you call it motion whenever something changes from place to place or even when it's revolving in the same?

THEODORUS: Yes I do.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let this be one species. But whenever it is in the same but grows old, or becomes black from white or stiff from soft, or alters in any different alteration, isn't it worthwhile to declare it another species of motion? D

THEODORUS: It's necessary rather.

SOCRATES: I mean, then, by the two species of motion this pair, alteration and locomotion.

THEODORUS: And it's right to say so.

SOCRATES: Well, then, now that we made this kind of division, let's converse with those who assert that all things are in motion, and let's ask: Do you assert that everything's in motion in both ways, moving locally and altering, or some move in both ways, and some in one of the two? E

THEODORUS: But, by Zeus, I for one cannot say. But I suspect they would say in both ways.

SOCRATES: Yes, for if not, comrade, it will be evident that for them things are both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEODORUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: Then, since they must be in motion, and nonmotion must not be in anything, it's all things without exception that are always in motion with every kind of motion. 182

THEODORUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Please examine the following point of theirs. In the case of the becoming of hotness, or of whiteness, or of anything whatsoever, weren't we saying that they assert somehow in this way, that each of these is born(e) along with a perception between that which affects and is affected, and that which is affected becomes capable of perceiving (it does not become perception), and that which affects becomes a certain sort (it does not become sortness)? Perhaps "sortness" appears an odd name, and you don't understand it when spoken of collectively.⁶¹ Listen, then, part by part. B
That which affects is neither hotness nor whiteness, but it becomes hot and white—and so for all the rest. You surely remember we were speaking in this way previously, that as nothing is itself one by itself, so neither is that which affects or is affected, but from both of them becoming mutually together, the perceptions and the things perceived come to be and give birth to some as certain sorts and some as perceiving?

THEODORUS: Of course I remember.

SOCRATES: Now let's dismiss everything else, whether they speak in a different way or in this way. But for the sake of which we're C

speaking, let's only guard this, and ask: All things are in motion and flow, as you say? Don't they?

THEODORUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In respect, then, to both the motions we divided, they move locally and they alter?

THEODORUS: Yes, of course, provided that it's in the strict sense they are to move completely.

SOCRATES: Now if there was only local motion but not alteration, we could surely say what sort of things are the things that move locally in their flow. Or how are we saying?

THEODORUS: It's in this way.

D SOCRATES: But since not even this abides, that it's the white that's flowing which flows, but it changes, so as for there to be a flowing even of just this, of whiteness, and a change into a different color, in order that it may not in this way be convicted of loitering, is it ever possible to address it as some color so as really to be addressing it correctly?

THEODORUS: But what possibility is there, Socrates? Or for that matter anything else of the things of this sort, if it's always slipping out and away while one's speaking and precisely because it's flowing?⁶²

E SOCRATES: And what are we to say about any sort of perception whatever, for example, of seeing or hearing? Does it ever abide in just seeing or hearing?

THEODORUS: It ought not, at any rate, if all things are in motion.

SOCRATES: So one must address it no more as seeing than as not-seeing, nor any different perception either rather than not, since all things in all ways are in motion.

THEODORUS: Indeed one must not.

SOCRATES: And yet perception (is) knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.

THEODORUS: That was so.

SOCRATES: So on being asked what knowledge is, we no more answered after all about knowledge than about nonknowledge.

183 THEODORUS: It seems that's what you did.

SOCRATES: The correction of our answer would turn out to be for us a beauty if, in order that that answer may appear, of all things, correct, we should be eager to prove that all things are in motion. For this is what comes to light, it seems, if all things are in motion—every answer, about whatever one answers, is similarly correct. Or if you want, in order that we may not put a stop to them in the speech, every answer becomes correct⁶³—to say “This is so” and “This is not so.”

THEODORUS: What you say's correct.

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, except that I did say “so” and “not so.”

But one must not even say “so,” for “so” would no longer be in motion, nor in turn “not so,” for not even this is a motion. But those who speak this speech must set down some different language, since now at least they don’t have the words for their own hypothesis, unless, after all, “not even so” would most particularly fit them, since it is spoken without a limit. B

THEODORUS: This is at any rate a dialect they’re most at home with.⁶⁴

SOCRATES: Are we then quit of your comrade, Theodorus, and do we not as yet concede to him that every man is the measure of all things (*khremata*), unless someone is intelligent? And we’ll not concede knowledge (is) perception, at least in terms of the quest for all things to be in motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say? C

THEODORUS: What you’ve said is excellent, Socrates. For with this brought to an end, I too must be quit of answering you, in accordance with the contract that specified it as the completion of Protagoras’ speech.

THEAETETUS: Don’t, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates go through those who assert in turn that the all is at rest, as you just now proposed. D

THEODORUS: So young, Theaetetus, and you teach your elders to be unjust and violate agreements? But get yourself ready to give Socrates an account (*logos*) of that which remains.

THEAETETUS: Yes, if, that is, he wants to. I would have listened in any case with the greatest pleasure about those whom I’m speaking of.

THEODORUS: “Horsemen to the plain” is your challenge to Socrates in inviting him to speeches.⁶⁵ Ask and you’ll hear.

SOCRATES: But, Theodorus, it’s my impression that I’ll not obey Theaetetus, at least about what he’s urging. E

THEODORUS: Why exactly won’t you obey him?

SOCRATES: Although I’m ashamed before Melissus and everyone else, who speak of the all as one at rest, lest our investigation be vulgar and common, I’m less ashamed before them than before Parmenides who is one. Parmenides appears to me at once, in the saying of Homer, “as awesome to me as uncanny.”⁶⁶ In fact, I once got together with the man when I was very young and he very old, and he appeared to me to have some altogether grand and noble depth.⁶⁷ So I’m afraid that we’ll fail as much to understand what he was saying as we’ll fall far short of what he thought when he spoke, and—this is the greatest thing—that for whose sake the speech has started out, about knowledge, whatever 184

- it is, that that will prove to be unexamined under the press of the speeches that are bursting in like revellers, if anyone will obey them. And this is all the more the case now, since the speech we now awaken makes it impossible to handle by its immensity, regardless of what one will do. For if one will examine it incidentally, it would undergo what it does not deserve, and if one will do it adequately, it will by its lengthening wipe out the issue of knowledge. We must do neither, but we must try by means of the
- B** maieutic art to deliver Theaetetus from whatever he's pregnant with in regard to knowledge.
- THEODORUS: Well, if it's so resolved, we must do it in this way.
- SOCRATES: Well, then, Theaetetus, go on and examine still further this much of the following sort about what has been said. You answered that knowledge (was) perception. Didn't you?
- THEAETETUS: Yes.
- SOCRATES: If then someone should ask you as follows, "By what does (a) human being see the white and black things, and by what does he hear the high and low notes?" You would, I suspect, say, "By eyes and ears."
- THEAETETUS: Yes, I would.
- C** SOCRATES: To be accommodating when it comes to words and phrases and fail to examine them with precision is in many cases not an ignoble trait, but rather, the contrary to it is illiberal. But sometimes it is necessary, just as now it's necessary to get a handle on the answer you give, in what way it's not correct. Consider. Which answer's more correct? By which we see, this is eyes, or through which we see; and by which we hear, ears, or through which we hear?
- THEAETETUS: It's my opinion, Socrates that it's rather through which we perceive each several thing than by which.
- D** SOCRATES: That's because it's surely dreadful, my boy, if many kinds of perceptions sit in us as if in wooden horses, but all these do not strain together toward some single look (*idea*), regardless of whether it's soul or whatever one must call it, by which we perceive through these as if they're tools all the perceived and perceptible things.
- THEAETETUS: Well, it's my impression that it's more in the latter way than in the former.
- SOCRATES: It's for the following reason, you see, that I'm being such a stickler for precision with you about them—is it by some same kind of thing of ourselves that we attain through eyes white and black things, and through the rest, in turn, some other things?
- E** And will you be able, on being questioned, to refer all things of

the sort to the body? But perhaps it's better for you to speak and answer the question yourself rather than for me to meddle on your behalf. Tell me. Hot things, stiff things, light things, and sweet things—those through which you perceive them, do you set them down severally as belonging to the body? Or is it to something else?

THEAETETUS: Nothing else.

SOCRATES: Will you also be willing to agree that those things which you perceive through another power, it is impossible to perceive them through a different power? For example, what through hearing, through sight, or what through sight, through hearing? 185

THEAETETUS: Of course I'll be willing.

SOCRATES: Then if you think something about both, you would not have any more through the other tool than through the other a perception of both.

THEAETETUS: Indeed I wouldn't.

SOCRATES: So about sound and about color, first, do you think this very thing about both, that both of the pair are?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: And each of the two (is) other than each of the two, but the same as itself?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly. B

SOCRATES: And that both of the pair (are) two, and each of the two one?

THEAETETUS: This too.

SOCRATES: And you are further capable of examining whether as a pair they (are) similar or dissimilar to one another?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: So through what do you think all these things about the pair? For it's possible neither through hearing nor through sight to grasp the common thing about them. And there's still this as a piece of evidence for what we're saying. If it should be possible to conduct an examination as to whether both of the pair are salty or not, you know you'll be able to say by what you'll examine it, and this appears as neither sight nor hearing but something else. C

THEAETETUS: Of course it does, it's the power through the tongue.

SOCRATES: What you say is beautiful. But the power through what exactly makes clear to you that which is common in all things as well as that which is common in these, by which you apply the name "is" and "is not," and what we were just now asking about them? What sort of tools will you assign all these through which the perceiving element of us perceives each thing severally?

THEAETETUS: You mean being and to be not and similarity and dis-

- D similarity and “the same” and other⁶⁸ and, further, one and the rest of number about them. It’s plain that you’re asking about both even and odd as well, and everything else that follows them, through which of the things of the body do we perceive them by means of the soul.
- SOCRATES: You’re following exceedingly well, Theaetetus, and these are the very things I’m asking about.
- THEAETETUS: But, by Zeus, Socrates, I for one could not say, except that I’m just of the opinion that there’s no private (peculiar) tool of that sort at all for these things as there is for those, but
- E the soul itself through itself, it appears to me, examines the common things about all of them.
- SOCRATES: It’s because you *are* beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus was saying, ugly. For whoever speaks beautifully (is) beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful you did me a favor and freed me from a very large speech, if it appears to you that the soul itself through itself examines some things, and some things through the powers of the body. For this, which was my opinion too, I wanted it to get to be your opinion as well.
- 186 THEAETETUS: Well, it does appear to be so.
- SOCRATES: In which of the two do you place being? This most particularly follows along in all cases.
- THEAETETUS: Well, I place it in those things which the soul by itself aims at (desires).⁶⁹
- SOCRATES: And the similar too and the dissimilar and “the same” and other?
- THEAETETUS: Yes.
- SOCRATES: And what of this? Beautiful and ugly, good and bad?
- THEAETETUS: It’s my opinion that it’s the being of these things in their mutual relations which the soul most especially examines, calculating in itself the past and the present things relative to the future.
- B SOCRATES: Hold it. Whereas one will perceive the stiffness of the stiff
- 190 through one’s touch, and the softness of the soft likewise—
- THEAETETUS: Yes.
- SOCRATES: Still, their being, and that the pair of them is, and their contrariety to one another, and the being in turn of the contrariety—does the soul itself go back over them and compare them with each other and try to judge them for us?
- THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.
- SOCRATES: Aren’t there some things that are just there by nature to
- C be perceived for human beings and beasts as soon as they are born—and these are all the experiences that stretch to the soul through the body? But the calculations about these things in re-

gard to being and benefit come about, to whomever they do come about, with difficulty and in much time through a lot of trouble (*pragmata*) and education?

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: Is it possible, then, for him to hit upon truth if he does not even hit upon being?

THEAETETUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: But if one will fail to hit upon the truth of anything, will one ever be a knower of this?

THEAETETUS: But how could that be, Socrates?

D

SOCRATES: So in the experiences, after all, there is no knowledge, but there is in reasoning about them; for in this case, it seems, it's possible to touch upon being and truth, but in that case it's impossible.

THEAETETUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: Do you really then call this and that the same, though the pair of them has so many differences?

THEAETETUS: It's certainly not just, at any rate.

SOCRATES: What name then do you give to that, to seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold, feeling hot?

THEAETETUS: I for one name it perceiving. What else?

SOCRATES: So you call it in its entirety perception?

E

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: For which, we say, there is no share in the possibility of touching on truth, for it cannot on being either.

THEAETETUS: It cannot indeed.

SOCRATES: And so it has no share in knowledge either?

THEAETETUS: No, it doesn't.

SOCRATES: So perception and knowledge, Theaetetus, would never after all be the same.

THEAETETUS: It appears not, Socrates. And it has moreover now become most manifest that knowledge is different from perception.

SOCRATES: Well, it certainly wasn't at all for this purpose that we began conversing, in order that we may find whatever knowledge is not, but what it is. But still and all, we've advanced so far at least, so altogether not to seek it in perception but in that name, whatever the soul has, whenever it alone by itself deals with the things which are.

187

THEAETETUS: Well, this is called, Socrates, as I believe, to opine.

SOCRATES: Yes, it's right for you to believe it. But wipe out everything before, and now, once more from the beginning, look and see whether you can spy out any better, since you've come so far. And say again whatever is knowledge.

B

THEAETETUS: Now it's impossible, Socrates, to say it's every kind of opinion, since there is also false opinion, but it's probable that true opinion is knowledge, and let this be stated as my answer, for if it appears to us as we go on not to be so, we'll try, just as we did now, to say something else.

C SOCRATES: Yes, that's really the way you must speak Theaetetus, eagerly rather than as at first when you hesitated to answer. For if we act in this way, it's one or the other of a pair of things that will follow, either we'll find that toward which we're going, or we'll less believe we know what we in no way know. And for all of that, a wage of this sort is not to be despised. And now in particular what do you assert? When there is of opinion a pair of looks (*ideai*), and one is of the simply true, and one is of the other false, are you defining true opinion as knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Yes I am, for this now appears to me so.

SOCRATES: Is it then still worth it to resume once more about opinion—

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing exactly are you speaking of?

D SOCRATES: It's something that in a sense disquiets me now and often at different times has done so, so as to have got me into a lot of perplexity before myself and before everyone else, when I'm not able to say whatever is this experience we have and in what manner it comes to be in us.

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing exactly?

SOCRATES: The fact of someone opining false things. So I'm considering and I'm still even now in doubt whether we're to let it go, or are we to go on to examine it in a somewhat different way than a little while ago.

THEAETETUS: Why not, Socrates, provided that it appears we should in any sense whatsoever? For just now you and Theodorus were making a good point about leisure—there's nothing urgent in matters of this sort.

E SOCRATES: You rightly recalled it, for perhaps it's not inopportune to track it, as it were, once more, for it's surely a better thing to accomplish a little well than a lot inadequately.

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: How then? What exactly are we saying? We do assert on several occasions there's false opinion, and someone of us is opining false things, and one, in turn, true things, and all on the grounds that it is this way by nature.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we do indeed assert it.

188 SOCRATES: In the case of all things and individually, doesn't this hold for us, either to know or not to know? I dismiss for the moment

learning and forgetting on the grounds that they are between them, for nothing is pertinent there for our speech.

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, there's nothing left in the case of each except to know or not to know.

SOCRATES: Isn't it a necessity now that whoever opines, opines either something of the things which he knows or does not know?

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: And yet it's just impossible, if one knows, not to know the same thing, or if one does not know, to know. B

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Is it the case then that whoever is opining the false believes these things not to be those things which he knows, but some other things of those which he knows, and though he knows both he is in turn ignorant of both?

THEAETETUS: But it's impossible, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, does he then believe that whatever he does not know are some other things of whatever he does not know, and this is possible, for him who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to take into his thought that Socrates (is) Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

THEAETETUS: But how could that be? C

SOCRATES: Well, it's surely not the case that whatever one knows, one believes they are what one does not know, nor in turn whatever one does not know, what one knows.

THEAETETUS: It will be a monster.

SOCRATES: How then would one still come to opine false things? For outside of these, it's surely impossible to opine, inasmuch as either we know or we don't know all things, and in these cases it nowhere appears possible to come to opine false things.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Are we then not to examine what we're looking for along these lines by proceeding in terms of knowing and not knowing, but in terms of being and not? D

THEAETETUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Maybe it's this simple, that whoever is opining the things which are not about anything whatsoever cannot possibly not opine false things, regardless of whatever different conditions may hold for the state of his thought.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it's likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES: How then? What shall we say, Theaetetus, if someone quizzes us, "But is that which is being said possible for anyone whatsoever, and will any human being opine that which is not, whether about any of the things which are or itself by itself?" And then we shall

- say, it seems, in reply to this, “Yes, whenever in believing he does not believe what is true.” Or how shall we speak?
- E* THEAETETUS: In this way.
 SOCRATES: Is there something of this sort also anywhere else?
 THEAETETUS: What sort of thing?
 SOCRATES: Can someone see something but see nothing?
 THEAETETUS: But how?
 SOCRATES: But if he sees some one thing at least, he sees something of the things which are. Or do you believe that the one is ever among the things which are not?
 THEAETETUS: No, I don't.
 SOCRATES: So whoever sees some one thing at least, sees something which is.
 THEAETETUS: It appears so.
- 189 SOCRATES: And so whoever hears something, hears some one thing at least and hears something which is.
 THEAETETUS: Yes.
 SOCRATES: And besides, whoever touches something, touches some one thing at least and which is, since (it is) one?
 THEAETETUS: This too.
 SOCRATES: Then whoever opines, doesn't he opine some one thing at least?
 THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.
 SOCRATES: But whoever's opining some one thing, isn't he opining something which is?
 THEAETETUS: I concede it.
 SOCRATES: So whoever opines that which is not, opines after all nothing (not even one thing).
 THEAETETUS: It appears he does not.
 SOCRATES: But whoever then opines nothing is altogether not opining at all.
 THEAETETUS: Plainly, it seems.
- B* SOCRATES: So it's not possible after all to opine that which is not, either about the things which are or itself by itself.
 THEAETETUS: It appears not.
 SOCRATES: So to opine what is false is something else than to opine the things which are not.
 THEAETETUS: It's something else, it seems.
 SOCRATES: So neither in this way nor as we were examining it a little while ago is there false opinion in us.
 THEAETETUS: No, there isn't in fact.
 SOCRATES: Well, do we then address it with this name when it comes to be in the following way?

THEAETETUS: How?

SOCRATES: It's by being a certain kind of else-opining that we claim there is false opinion. It's whenever someone makes an exchange in his thought of some one of the things which are for something else of the things which are and says it is that. For in this way he's always opining that which is, but it's another instead of an other, and in mistaking that which he was aiming at, he would be justly spoken of as opining false things. C

THEAETETUS: It's my opinion that you've now spoken most correctly. For whenever anyone opines (something as) ugly instead of (as) beautiful or beautiful instead of ugly, then truly he's opining false things.

SOCRATES: It's plain, Theaetetus, you despise me and do not fear me.

THEAETETUS: Why exactly?

SOCRATES: You're of the opinion, I suspect, that I would not attack your "truly false," and ask whether slowly swift is possible or heavily light, or it's possible for anything else that's a contrary to become contrary to itself, not in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the nature of its contrary. Now as for this, I let it go, so that you may not have gained confidence to no purpose. But it's satisfactory, you say, to opine what is false is to else-opine? D

THEAETETUS: It satisfies me at any rate.

SOCRATES: So it is possible, according to your opinion, to set down in one's thought something other as an other and not as that (i.e., other)?

THEAETETUS: Of course it is possible.

SOCRATES: Then whenever the thought of someone does this, isn't it also a necessity that it by itself think either both or the other? E

THEAETETUS: Yes, it's a necessity, and either together or in turn.

SOCRATES: Most beautiful! But do you call thinking just what I do?⁷⁰

THEAETETUS: What do you call it?

SOCRATES: A speech which the soul by itself goes through before itself about whatever it is examining. As one who does not know, of course, I'm declaring it to you. Soul thinking looks to me as nothing else than conversing, itself asking and answering itself, and affirming and denying. But whenever it has come to a determination, regardless of whether its sally was on the slow or keen side, and then asserts the same thing and does not stand apart in doubt, we set this down as its opinion. Consequently, I for one call opining speaking, and opinion a stated speech; it's not, however, before someone else any more than it's with sound, but in silence before oneself. But what of you? 190

THEAETETUS: I too.

SOCRATES: So whenever someone opines the other as an other, he then asserts before himself, it seems, the other is an other.

B THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Then go ahead and recall whether you ever said before yourself, "It's as certain as can be, you see, the beautiful is ugly," or, "The unjust is just." Or even, and this is the chief point, consider whether you ever did try to persuade yourself, "It's as certain as can be, the other is an other." Or it's wholly the contrary, that not even asleep did you ever yet get the nerve to say before yourself, "It's altogether so after all, the odd is even," or anything else of the sort.

THEAETETUS: What you say is true.

C SOCRATES: But do you believe that anyone else, whether healthy or crazy, had the nerve to speak before himself in all seriousness in persuading himself that it's a necessity for the ox to be a horse or the two one?

THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: Then if to speak before oneself is to opine, no one, in speaking and opining both, would come to say and opine, in touching on both with his soul, "The other is an other." Now you too must disregard my wording, for I mean it in the following way: no one opines that the ugly (is) beautiful or anything else of the sort.

D

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I disregard it, and it's my opinion that it is as you say.

SOCRATES: So it's impossible in opining both to opine the other as an other.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: And further, if it's only the other one's opining and in no way the other, one will never opine the other to be an other.

THEAETETUS: What you say is true, for otherwise he would be compelled to touch on that which he is not opining.

E

SOCRATES: So there's no room, after all, in opining either both or the other to else-opine. Consequently, if one will define to other-opine as false opinion, one would not be making any sense, and that's because it's evident that neither in this way nor in terms of the former is there false opinion in us.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely that there's not.

SOCRATES: But, Theaetetus, if it will be evident that it is not, we'll be compelled to agree to many strange things.

THEAETETUS: What sorts of things exactly?

SOCRATES: I shan't tell you before I try to examine it in every way, for I would be ashamed on our behalf, in the perplexity in which we are, if we're compelled to agree to the sorts of things I'm speaking of. But if we find a way out and get ourselves free of it, it's then that we'll speak about everyone else as if they're suffering from it, while we stand free and clear of ridicule. But if we turn out to be perplexed in every way, then, I suspect, in all humility we'll hand ourselves over to the speech to be trampled on like the seasick and be handled in whatever way it wants. So listen to the kind of way out I still find for our inquiry. 191

THEAETETUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: I'll deny we agreed correctly when we agreed that it's impossible to opine what one does not know to be what one knows and to be deceived, but it's possible in a sense. B

THEAETETUS: Do you mean what I even then suspected, when we said it to be of this sort, that sometimes I, being familiar with Socrates, but seeing someone else from a distance with whom I'm not familiar, came to believe he was Socrates whom I know? For in a situation of that sort, there occurs the sort of thing you say.

SOCRATES: Didn't we stand apart and withdraw from it because what we know was making us, though we know, not to know?

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: Then let's not set it down in this way but as follows. Perhaps one will make us some concession, and perhaps one will resist, but in the sort of situation in which we're caught, it's a necessity to twist around every speech and put it to the torture. Consider, then, whether I'm making sense. Is it possible not to know something earlier and understand (learn) it later? C

THEAETETUS: Of course it is.

SOCRATES: And at a later time another and another.

THEAETETUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Then please set down for talking's sake a wax block in our souls, larger for someone and less for someone else, of purer wax for someone and more fouled for someone else, and stiffer for some and more liquid for some, and for some it's of a measured consistency. D

THEAETETUS: I'm setting it down.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's say it is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and whatever we want to remember of the things we see, hear, or we ourselves think of, by submitting it to our perceptions and thoughts, we strike off into this, as if we were putting in the seals of signet-rings. And whatever gets impressed, let's say

E that we remember and know as long as its image is in it, but whatever is wiped off or cannot get impressed, that we forget and do not know.

THEAETETUS: So be it.

SOCRATES: Then observe whether in the following sort of way whoever knows them and is examining any of the things he see or hears, might after all opine what is false.

THEAETETUS: In what sort of way exactly?

SOCRATES: In the belief that what he knows are sometimes what he knows and sometimes what he does not. Our prior agreement that this was impossible was not beautifully agreed on.

THEAETETUS: But now, how do you say it is?

192 *B* SOCRATES: We must make a reckoning of them as follows, by determining from principle that (1) whatever one merely knows, if one gets a memorial of it in the soul, but is not perceiving it, it's impossible to believe it's something other of what one knows, if one has an impress of this too but does not perceive it; and (2) it's impossible to believe that just what one knows is whatever one does not know and does not have a seal of either; and (3) whatever one does know, whatever else one does not know; and (4) whatever one does not know, what one knows; and (5) what one just perceives, it's impossible to believe it's some other of what one perceives; and (6) what one perceives, it's something of what one does not perceive; and (7) whatever one does not perceive, it's of what one does not perceive; and (8) whatever one does not perceive, of what one perceives. And still further, (9) what one knows and perceives and has the seal of in conformity with the perception, to believe it's some other of what one knows and perceives and has the seal of that too in conformity with the perception, that's still more impossible, if possible, than the former cases. And (10) what one knows and perceives having the memorial of it correctly, it's impossible to believe it's what one knows; and (11) what one knows and perceives having it on the same terms, what one perceives; and (12) what else one does not know and perceive, what one does not know and perceive; and (13) what one does not know and perceive, what one does not know; and (14) what one does not know and perceive, what one does not perceive.⁷¹ It's in the impossibility of anyone opining what is false in these cases that all of them go beyond anything. So it's left in the following sort of cases, if there's anywhere else at all, that something of the sort must occur.

C

THEAETETUS: In what cases exactly? Maybe I'll get some better understanding from them, for up to now I'm not following.

SOCRATES: In those cases in which one knows, it's possible to believe them some other things of which one knows and perceives; or of what one does not know but perceives; or of what one knows and perceives, of what else one knows and perceives. D

THEAETETUS: But now I'm left much further behind than before.

SOCRATES: Then hear them all over again as follows. If I know Theodorus and remember in myself the sort he is, and Theaetetus likewise, don't I sometimes see them and sometimes not, and touch them at times and sometimes not, and hear them or gain some different perception of them, and sometimes I have no perception of you all, but I remember you no less and I myself know you in myself?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course. E

SOCRATES: Well, understand, then, that's the first of the things I want to make clear, that it is possible not to perceive what one knows and it is possible to perceive.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And whatever one does not know, it is often possible not to perceive it at all, and it's often possible only to perceive it?

THEAETETUS: This too is possible.

SOCRATES: See then whether you are now following somewhat better. 193

If Socrates is familiar with Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of the two, and there is present to him no different perception about them, he would never come to opine in himself, "Theaetetus is Theodorus." Am I making any sense or not?

THEAETETUS: Yes it's true.

SOCRATES: Well, this was the first of those I was speaking of.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: Then the second case is when in being familiar with him (you) and unfamiliar with you (him), and on perceiving neither, I would never come to believe that the one I know is the one I don't know.

THEAETETUS: Right.

SOCRATES: And the third case is if I should be unfamiliar with either and not be perceiving either, I would not come to believe the one I do not know to be some other of the ones I do not know. And suppose that you've heard once more in order all the rest of the previous cases, in which I shall never opine what is false about you and Theodorus, neither being familiar with nor being ignorant of both, nor being familiar with one and with one not, and about perceptions—it's on the same terms, if after all you follow. B

THEAETETUS: I follow.

SOCRATES: To opine the false things, then, is left only for this kind of situation: Whenever in being familiar with you and Theodorus, and having in that waxen thing the ring-seals, as it were, of both of you, I see you both from a distance and not adequately, and in assigning the proper seal of each of the two to its proper sight, I'm eager to set it in and fit it to its own trace, in order that recognition may occur. And then, of all things, I mistake them, and like those who put their shoes on backwards, I exchange them and apply the sight of each to the seal of the other. Or it's even like the experiences of sight in mirrors, when the sight exchanges its flow from right to left;⁷² this is when other-opining and to opine what is false result.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it does seem likely, Socrates. The experience of opinion—how amazingly you speak of it.

SOCRATES: Well, there's still further the case when, in being familiar with both, one I perceive (in addition to knowing) and one I don't, but I do not have cognition of the other in conformity with its perception—this is the way I was speaking of it before, when you couldn't understand me.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, I could not.

SOCRATES: Well, I meant this, if in being familiar with and perceiving the other, one has the cognition of him in conformity with his perception, one will never believe that he is some other with whom one's familiar and perceives, and of whom, too, one has one's cognition in conformity with his perception. Wasn't this agreed on?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But what is now said was surely at least left open. It's the case in which we assert false opinion occurs when being familiar with both and seeing both or having some different perception of both, one does not have the pair of seals in conformity with the perception of each, but like the shooting of a poor bowman, one deviates from the mark and mistakes it—it is precisely this that has in fact been named falsehood.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it's likely enough.

SOCRATES: And so further, whenever perception of one of a pair of seals is present and one is not, and one adjusts the seal of the absent perception to the present perception, in this way thought is wholly deceived. And in a word: about whatever one does not know and never perceived, it is not possible, it seems, either to be deceived (speak falsely) or for there to be false opinion, if we are now saying anything sound. But about what we know and are perceiving, it's in these very cases that opinion whirls and twists

about and becomes true and false—true if it brings together its own impressions and (fresh) impresses straightforwardly and in a direct line, but false if it's crosswise and crooked.

THEAETETUS: Isn't it said beautifully, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Well, once you hear this, you'll say it all the more. Now to opine what is true (is) beautiful, and to speak falsely (be deceived) ugly. C

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: They assert, then, that these conditions arise from the following. Whenever the wax in someone's soul is deep, extensive, smooth, and kneaded in a measured way, the things that are proceeding through perceptions, in putting their seals into that feature of the soul which Homer, in hinting at its similarity to wax (*kêros*), said was heart (*kear*),⁷³ it's then that the seals for them come to be pure in the wax and with adequate depth prove to be long lasting. And people of this sort first of all learn easily and secondly have good memories, and so it's not they who interchange the seals of their perceptions, but they opine what is true. For inasmuch as their seals are plain and have plenty of room, they distribute them quickly to their own several casts,⁷⁴ and it's these casts which get called the things which are, and it's these people who get called wise. Or aren't you of this opinion? D

THEAETETUS: Yes, I am, overwhelmingly.

SOCRATES: So whenever the heart of someone is shaggy—it's that which the all-wise poet praised⁷⁵—or whenever it's as dirty as dung and its wax is impure, or it's excessively liquid or stiff, if theirs is liquid they learn easily but prove to be forgetful, and if theirs is stiff, it's the reverse. But whoever have a shaggy, rough, and somewhat stony heart, full of either earth or dung mixed in, they obtain casts without clarity; and theirs are without clarity too who have their casts stiff, for there is no depth to them; and theirs are without clarity too who have them liquid, for they quickly become dim by being confounded. And if, besides all this, they have been made to fall in a heap together on top of one another by the narrowness of the room, if the 'soullet' of anyone is small, the casts are with still less clarity than the former. All these then prove to be the sort who opine what is false, for whenever they see, hear, or think of anything, in their incapacity to assign quickly each to each, they are too slow, and, in distributing what does not belong, they missee, mishear, and misthink most of the time. And it's these who get called fools, and they're said to be deceived about the things which are. E

THEAETETUS: What you say, Socrates, couldn't be more correct. B

SOCRATES: Are we to say then that, after all, false opinions are in us?

THEAETETUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: And true too?

THEAETETUS: True too.

SOCRATES: Do we believe, then, that we have by now adequately agreed upon this, that it's as certain as can be that both of this pair of opinions are?

THEAETETUS: Yes, overwhelmingly.

SOCRATES: In all probability, Theaetetus, a chatterbox of a man is truly a dreadful and unpleasant thing.

THEAETETUS: What of it? What's the point of your remark?

C SOCRATES: It's because I'm distressed at my own incapacity to learn easily and at what's truly just chattering. For what different name would anyone give it, when someone drags his speeches up and down, and by his own dullness is incapable of being convinced, and finds it hard to get free from each speech?

THEAETETUS: But why is it you who's distressed?

SOCRATES: I'm not only distressed but I'm afraid as well as to what answer I'll give if someone asks me, "Socrates, you have found false opinion, have you, and it's neither in one's perceptions relative to one another nor in one's thoughts but in the conjunction of perception with thought?" I shall affirm it, I suspect, and preen myself on the grounds that we've found something beautiful.

D

THEAETETUS: I, at least, am of the opinion, Socrates, that what has now been proved is not ugly.

SOCRATES: "Aren't you saying then," he says, "that, on the one hand, the human being we only think of but do not see, we would never come to believe him to be a horse, which, in turn, we neither see nor touch but only think of and perceive nothing else about it?" I suspect I'll say I'm saying this.

THEAETETUS: Yes, and correctly too.

E SOCRATES: "What then?" he says. "The eleven which one only thinks of and does nothing else about, would one never come to believe, on the basis of this speech, to be twelve, which in turn one only thinks of?" Come now, you answer.

THEAETETUS: Well, I'll answer that though, while seeing or touching, someone might come to believe the eleven to be twelve, but that which he has only in his thought, he would never on this condition come to opine this about it.

SOCRATES: What then? Do you believe that anyone has ever alone in himself proposed to examine five and seven—and I don't mean seven and five human beings or anything of the sort, but five and seven themselves, which we say are there as memorials in the block

and in which case it is impossible to opine what is false—did any human being ever yet examine them by themselves and in speaking before himself and asking how many they are, did one of them say, and believe it, they are eleven, and someone else they're twelve, or does everyone say and believe they are twelve?

THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus. But of course there are many who say and believe they're eleven. Yes, and if one examines in the case of a larger number, one is more liable to make a slip, for I suspect you're speaking of every number. B

SOCRATES: Your suspicion's correct. And reflect. Does anything else then happen than the belief that the eleven in the block is the twelve itself?

THEAETETUS: It seems likely at any rate.

SOCRATES: Isn't there then a recurrence to the first speeches? Whoever experiences this believes that which he knows to be another of the things which he knows. And we said this was impossible, and it was due to this that we were making it a necessity for there to be no false opinion, in order that it might not be a necessity for the same person in knowing the same things not to know them at the same time. C

THEAETETUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Then one must show that to opine what is false is anything else whatever than an interchange of thought with perception, for if it were, we would never be deceived in the thoughts by themselves. But as it is, either, you see, false opinion is not, or it's possible not to know what one knows. And which of these do you choose?

THEAETETUS: You're proposing a choice that has no way out, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, it's certainly probable that the speech won't allow both. Still and all—one has to have the nerve for everything—what if we should try to be shameless? D

THEAETETUS: How?

SOCRATES: By our willingness to say what sort of thing it is to know.

THEAETETUS: And why's this shameless?

SOCRATES: It seems that you don't realize that the entire speech has been for us from the beginning a search of knowledge on the grounds that we do not know whatever it is.

THEAETETUS: No, I realize it.

SOCRATES: And then doesn't it seem shameless if we don't know knowledge to declare what sort of thing it is to know? But as a matter of fact, Theaetetus, we've been infected for a long time now by our conversing impurely, for we've said thousands of times "We recognize" and "We don't recognize," and "We know" and "We E

don't know," as though we somehow understand one another while still being ignorant of knowledge. And if you want, even now at the very moment we've used again "to be ignorant" and "to understand," as though it were suitable to use them if we're deprived of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: But, Socrates, in what manner will you converse if you abstain from them?

197 SOCRATES: In none, for I am who I am. But what if I were a contradictor? Suppose that sort of man were now here, he would claim that he abstains from them and he would rebuke us vehemently for what I am saying. Since we're no good, then, do you want me to have the nerve to say what sort of thing it is to know? It appears to me there would be some advantage to it.

THEAETETUS: Well, in that case, by Zeus, be nery. And if you don't abstain from them you'll be much forgiven.

SOCRATES: Have you heard what they're now saying it is to know?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps. I don't, however, remember at the moment.

B SOCRATES: They surely say it is a having of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Well, let us change it a little and say it's a possession of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: How exactly will you say this differs from that?

SOCRATES: Perhaps in none. But still listen to what the difference seems to be and join in confirming it.

THEAETETUS: If I can.

SOCRATES: Well, to have appears to me not to be the same as to possess. For example, if someone buys a cloak and becomes its owner but does not wear it, we would deny he has it but he still possesses it.

THEAETETUS: Yes, correctly.

C SOCRATES: Look then and see whether it's possible in this way to possess knowledge and not have it. But it's just as if someone should hunt down wild birds, doves or anything else, and having arranged a dovecote for them bring them up at home—we would surely say that though in some way he always has them, and precisely because he possesses them—Isn't that so?—

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Still, in a different way he has none of them. But since he's got them under his thumb in his home enclosure, a capacity has accrued to him in regard to them, to seize and hold them whenever he wants to, once he's hunted down whichever one he wishes on any occasion, and again to let it go, and it is possible for him to do this as often as he's of that opinion.

D

THEAETETUS: That is so.

SOCRATES: Once more then, just as when before we were working up in souls some kind of wax mold—I don't quite know what—so now once again let's make in each soul a kind of dovecote of all sorts of birds. Some are in herds apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some are alone and fly through all of them in whatever way they happen to.

THEAETETUS: Let it have been so made. But what follows from it? E

SOCRATES: We have to say that this vessel when we're children is empty, and instead of the birds, we have to think knowledges (sciences). And whatever knowledge one acquires and confines in the enclosure, one has to say that he has learned or found the matter (*pragma*) of which this was the knowledge, and this is to know.

THEAETETUS: Let it be.

SOCRATES: Then the fact of hunting down once more whichever of 198
the knowledges one wants, and once one has seized it to hold it and again let go, consider what names it needs, the same as when one was first gaining the possession of them or other. You'll understand with greater clarity what I'm saying from this position. You say there's an arithmetical art?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then suppose this to be a hunting of the knowledges of every even and odd (number).

THEAETETUS: I'm supposing it.

SOCRATES: It's precisely by this art, I suspect, that both he himself has B
the knowledges of the numbers under his thumb and, in transmitting them, transmits them to someone else.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And transmitting is that which we call to teach, and receiving to learn, and having, by the fact of possessing in that dovecote, to know.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Now pay close attention to that which follows from it. If one is perfectly an arithmetician, does one know anything else than all numbers? For he has knowledges of all numbers in his soul?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Would someone of this sort ever number anything, by C
himself and before himself, either the numbers themselves or anything else of the things outside that have number?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But to number, shall we set it down to be anything else than the examination of how great a number there happens to be?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: So it's evident that the one who we've agreed knows every number is examining as though he does not know that which he knows. You surely hear of disputes of this sort.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.

D SOCRATES: Then we, in making our semblance to the possession and hunting of doves, will say that the hunting was twofold, one before the possession for the sake of possession, and one by the possessor for the sake of seizing and having in his hands what he has possessed for some time. It's in this way that for him there were knowledges for some time of the things he once learned and he knew them, and it is possible to learn to know these same things once more by taking up the knowledge of each and holding it, a knowledge he possessed for some time, but which was not ready at hand for his thought?

THEAETETUS: True.

E SOCRATES: It was precisely this I was just now asking about, as to how one must use the names in speaking about them, whenever the arithmetician goes to number, or the skilled reader to read something, and say, "After all, in a situation of this sort he knows and yet goes once more to learn from himself what he knows?"

THEAETETUS: Well, it's strange, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, are we to say that it's what he does not know he'll read and number, though we've granted him to know every letter and every number?

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THEAETETUS: But this too makes no sense.

SOCRATES: Do you want us to say, then, that we don't care about the names, in whatever way any one enjoys dragging and tugging at 'to know' and 'to learn'? But since we've determined that the fact of possessing the knowledge is some other thing, and the fact of having it is another, we say it is impossible not to possess whatever one possesses, and so it never turns out that one does not know what one knows, and yet it is possible to seize a false opinion about it? For it's possible not to have the knowledge of this, but another instead of that, whenever in hunting on some occasion some knowledge somewhere, while they're all flying about, one misses and seizes another instead of an other, it's just at that time that one comes to believe the eleven is twelve—when one seizes the knowledge of the eleven in oneself instead of the knowledge of the twelve, as if it were a ring-dove instead of a dove.⁷⁶

B

THEAETETUS: That indeed makes sense.

SOCRATES: Yes, but whenever one seizes what one is trying to seize, is it then that there's no falsehood and one is opining the things

which are? And is it precisely in this way that there is true and false opinion, and nothing at which we were distressed before proves to be a stumbling-block? Perhaps you'll agree with me. Or what will you do? C

THEAETETUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: That's because we've got rid of "They don't know what they know." For it turns out that it's no longer the case anywhere that we do not possess what we possess either when we're deceived about something or not. It's my impression, however, that a different, more dreadful experience is coming to light alongside this one.

THEAETETUS: What sort is it?

SOCRATES: It's whether the interchange of knowledges will ever prove to be false opinion.

THEAETETUS: How's that exactly?

SOCRATES: First, the fact that in having a knowledge of something, one is ignorant of this very thing, not by ignorance but by one's own knowledge. Second, to opine another as this and this as the other, how isn't it a lot of nonsense, if with the presence of knowledge the soul comes to know nothing and be ignorant of everything? On the basis of this speech, nothing stands in the way of the presence of ignorance making one know something and blindness making one see, if knowledge in fact will ever make someone ignorant. D

THEAETETUS: The reason is perhaps, Socrates, that we were not putting the birds in beautifully when we put in only knowledges, but we should also have put in nonknowledges and have them fly about together with them in the soul. And the hunter sometimes seizes knowledge and sometimes seizes nonknowledge, and by nonknowledge he opines what is false and by knowledge what is true about the same thing. E

SOCRATES: It's really not easy, Theaetetus, not to praise you. Do, however, examine once more what you said. Let it be as you say. Whoever then seizes the nonknowledge will opine, you say, what is false. Isn't that so? 200

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: He surely won't be convinced at any rate that he's opining what is false.

THEAETETUS: How could he?

SOCRATES: But rather what is true, and his state will be as if he knew those things about what he has been deceived.

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: So he'll believe he has hunted and has knowledge and not nonknowledge.

THEAETETUS: Plainly.

SOCRATES: Then we went a long way around and are back once more with the first perplexity. For that skilled refuter will laugh and say, "Is it the case, your excellencies, that someone who knows
B both, knowledge and nonknowledge, believes that the one he knows is some other of what he knows? Or is it that in knowing neither of the pair, he opines that the one he does not know is another of what he does not know? Or one he knows and one he doesn't, and he opines the one he knows to be the one he doesn't know? Or the one he doesn't know, he's convinced it's the one he does know? Or will you tell me once more that there are in turn knowledges of the knowledges and nonknowledges, which their possessor confined in some other ridiculous dovecotes or wax molds
C and knows as long as he possesses them even if he does not have them ready at hand in his soul? If it's in this way, won't you all be compelled to run around to the same point thousands of times and get nowhere?" What answer shall we give in reply to this, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: But, by Zeus, I for one don't know what we should say.

SOCRATES: Doesn't the speech really then, my boy, rebuke us beautifully and point out that we do not correctly seek for false opinion
D prior to knowledge and let knowledge go? The fact is that it's impossible to come to know it before one grasps knowledge adequately as to whatever it is.

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity, Socrates, at the moment to believe it to be as you say it is.

SOCRATES: What then will one say once more from the beginning knowledge is? We'll surely not give up yet in weariness?

THEAETETUS: Not in the least, unless, that is, you are giving the order.

SOCRATES: Speak then. What could we most of all say it was and least contradict ourselves?

E THEAETETUS: Just what we were trying to say before Socrates, for I at any rate don't have anything else.

SOCRATES: What sort of thing?

THEAETETUS: That true opinion is knowledge. To opine what is true surely is at any rate infallible, and everything that comes to be as a result of it becomes beautiful and good.

201 SOCRATES: The river-guide, Theaetetus, said, "It will show up by itself."⁷⁷ So if we go and look for it, perhaps it too might turn up at our feet and show what is sought. But if we stay here, nothing will be plain.

THEAETETUS: You're right to say so. Well, let's go and consider it.

SOCRATES: This does in fact require a brief inquiry. A whole art indicates to you that it is not knowledge.

THEAETETUS: How exactly? And what's this art?

SOCRATES: It's the art of the greatest people in point of wisdom. It's those they call public speakers and advocates.⁷⁸ They surely persuade and don't teach by their own art, but they make one opine whatever they want. Or do you believe there are any teachers so uncanny that, in cases where people were robbed of money or experienced some different act of violence, they're capable of teaching adequately, with the clock running, any who were not present on these occasions the truth of what happened?

B

THEAETETUS: No, I don't believe it, in no way, but persuade, yes.

SOCRATES: And by "persuade," don't you mean to make opine?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Then whenever jurors are justly persuaded about whatever it's only possible to know if one sees it, but not in a different way, in deciding on these things at that time by hearsay, and in their acceptance of a true opinion, don't they decide without knowledge, though they've been persuaded rightly if they judged well?

C

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: A tip-top juror, then, my dear, if in the courts true opinion and knowledge were the same, would never opine rightly without knowledge. But as it is, it seems that each of the two is something different.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, it's what I heard someone say it was but forgot, but now I have it in mind. He said that true opinion with speech was knowledge, but true opinion without speech was outside of knowledge, and of whatever there is not a speech, these things are not knowable—that's just the word he used⁷⁹—and whatever admit of speech are knowable.⁸⁰

D

SOCRATES: You're really speaking beautifully. But tell at just what point he was dividing these knowable and not knowable things. Maybe you and I have heard it along the same lines.

THEAETETUS: Well, I don't know whether I'll find it out myself; should another speak, however, I suspect I would follow.

SOCRATES: Hear, then, a dream in exchange for a dream. I dreamt that I heard some people say that the first things were just like elements (letters), out of which we and everything else are composed, and they do not admit of speech; that it's only possible to give a name to each thing alone by itself, but it's impossible to address it any differently, either that (how) it is or that (how) it is not. For in that case one would be applying being or nonbeing

E

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- to it, and one should apply nothing to it if one will speak of it as that thing alone, since none of those must be applied at all—"it," "that," "each," "alone"⁸¹—and 'this' and many different ones of the same sort neither. For these expressions in running around get applied to everything, being other than the things to which they're applied. But it should be the case, if it were possible for it to be spoken of and have its own proper speech, for it to be spoken of without all these different things, but as it is, it's impossible for any one of the first things to get stated in speech. For there is nothing else for it except only to get named—for it only has a name—but just as the things that are then composed out of these things are composed by their plaiting, so too their names, once they're plaited together, become a speech. For the plaiting of names is the being of speech—that it's in exactly this way that the elements, though they are without speech and unknowable, are still perceptible, but the syllables are knowable, speakable, and opinable by true opinion. And that, in short, whenever anyone gets the true opinion of anything without speech, his soul tells the truth about it but does not know, for whoever is incapable of giving and receiving an account (speech) is without knowledge of this very fact. But if he gets in addition a speech, he becomes capable in all these respects and is in a perfect condition relative to knowledge. Is it in this way that you've heard the dream or in a different way?
- B* THEAETETUS: No, it's altogether in this way.
 SOCRATES: Are you then satisfied and do you set it down for yourself in this way—true opinion with speech is knowledge?
 THEAETETUS: Yes, utterly.
- D* SOCRATES: Is it really so, Theaetetus, that on this day and in this way we now have grasped what many of the wise sought for a long time and grew old before finding?
 THEAETETUS: I, at any rate, Socrates, am of the opinion that the present statement is said beautifully.
 SOCRATES: Yes, and it's likely that so far this is just the way it is, for what would knowledge still in fact be, apart from (the) speech and correct opinion? There is, however, one of the things stated which displeases me.
 THEAETETUS: What sort exactly?
 SOCRATES: It's the point that seems to be most cleverly said, that the elements (are) unknowable, but the genus of the syllables (is)
- E* knowable.
 THEAETETUS: Isn't that right?

SOCRATES: One has to know. There are paradigms of the speech that we hold like hostages and that he was using when he said all this.

THEAETETUS: What sort exactly?

SOCRATES: The elements and syllables of letters. Or do you believe that he gave a glance anywhere else when the one who spoke said those things which we're saying?

THEAETETUS: No, but at these.

SOCRATES: Let's take them up and put them to the torture—but, rather, 203
let's do it to ourselves—was it in this way or not that we learned letters? Come. First: The syllables admit of (have) speech, but the elements are without speech?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: Yes, of course, rather, and it appears so to me too. Should anyone, at any rate, ask for the first syllable of Socrates in just this way—"Theaetetus, speak what is SO?"—what will you answer?

THEAETETUS: That it's sigma and omega.⁸²

SOCRATES: Don't you then have this as a speech of the syllable?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Then come, speak in this way too the speech of the sigma. B

THEAETETUS: But how will one say the elements of the element? The reason is, Socrates, that the sigma belongs to the voiceless. It's only a sound; it's like when the tongue hisses. And of the beta in turn and most of the elements as well there's neither voice nor sound. The saying therefore holds good that they're without speech, since the most vivid of them are the very seven that only have voice and no speech whatever.⁸³

SOCRATES: Then it's this, comrade, that we've put right in the case of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: It appears that we have.

SOCRATES: But what of this? That the element is not knowable, but C
the syllable is—have we accepted that correctly?

THEAETETUS: It's likely at least.

SOCRATES: Come then. Do we mean by the syllable both elements, or if there are more than two, all of them, or some single look (*idea*) that has come to be when they are put together?

THEAETETUS: It's my impression that we mean all of them.

SOCRATES: Look then at the pair, sigma and omega. The first syllable of my name is both. Whoever knows it, does he know them both?

THEAETETUS: Why certainly. D

SOCRATES: So he knows the sigma and the omega.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Is he ignorant of each of the two, and in knowing neither knows both?

THEAETETUS: But that's dreadful, Socrates, and makes no sense (without speech).

SOCRATES: But yet it's the case that if there's a necessity to know each of the two if one will know both, there's every necessity for whoever's going to know a syllable to know first its elements. And in this way the beautiful speech of ours will have run away and be gone.

E THEAETETUS: Yes, and very suddenly too.

SOCRATES: That's because we're not guarding it beautifully. We should not have, perhaps, set down the syllable as the elements, but some single species that has come to be out of them, with its own single look (*idea*) and other than the elements.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course. And perhaps it might rather be in this way than in that.

SOCRATES: We ought to consider it and not betray in so unmanly a fashion a great and august speech.

THEAETETUS: No, indeed we ought not.

204 SOCRATES: Let it be then as we now claim it is: the syllable comes to be one look (*idea*) out of those several elements that fit together, and it similarly holds no less in letters than in everything else.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Then there must be no parts of it.

THEAETETUS: Why's that exactly?

SOCRATES: Because of whatever there are parts, it's a necessity that all the parts be the whole. Or are you saying that the whole too that has come to be out of its parts is some single species other than all its parts?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I am.

B SOCRATES: Are you then calling the all and the whole the same or each of the two other?

THEAETETUS: I don't have anything with clarity, but because you urge me to answer eagerly, I risk it and say, other.

SOCRATES: Well, your eagerness, Theaetetus, is right, and we must examine whether your answer is too.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we certainly must.

SOCRATES: The whole, then, would differ from the all, as is the present speech?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what of this then? Is it possible that all the things and the all differ? For example, whenever we say one, two, three, four, five, six, and we say twice three or thrice two, or four and

C two, or three and two and one—in all these cases are we saying the same or other?

THEAETETUS: The same.

SOCRATES: Is it anything else than six?

THEAETETUS: None else.

SOCRATES: Haven't we then said in each of these kinds of speaking all six?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But is there no one all that we're saying in saying them all?

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Is it anything else than the six?

THEAETETUS: None else.

SOCRATES: So it's the same, then, that we address as the all and all of them in at least all those things that are out of number? *D*

THEAETETUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: Let's then speak as follows about them. The number of the plethron (100 feet) and the plethron are the same. Aren't they?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the number of the stade (600 feet) likewise?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And further, the number of the army and the army, and similarly for all things of the sort? For all the number is all that each of them is?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the number of several things isn't anything else, is it, than parts? *E*

THEAETETUS: None else.

SOCRATES: So however many parts it has, it would be out of parts?

THEAETETUS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: Yes, and it's been agreed upon that also all the parts are the all, provided that all the number will be the all.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: So the whole, then, is not out of parts, for otherwise it would be an all in being all the parts.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely that it's not.

SOCRATES: But is a part which is just what it is, of anything else whatever than of the whole?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all.

SOCRATES: You're fighting in a manly way at least, Theaetetus. But isn't the all, whenever nothing is absent, this very thing, all? *205*

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: But won't a whole be this same thing, from whatever nothing in any way stands apart? But from whatever there is a standing apart, it is neither a whole nor an all, and that is the same result for both of them at once out of the same?⁸⁴

THEAETETUS: I'm now of the opinion that an all and a whole do not differ.

SOCRATES: Weren't we saying, then, that of whatever there are parts, the whole and all will be all the parts?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

B SOCRATES: Once more then—it's just that which I was trying to get at—if the syllable is not the elements, isn't it a necessity for it not to have the elements as its own parts, or if it is the same as them, it's a necessity that it be as knowable as they are?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: Didn't we then set it down as other than them in order that this might not occur?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what of this? If the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you speak of some different things which, though they are parts of a syllable, are not, however, its elements?

THEAETETUS: In no way, for should I concede, Socrates, that there are some proper parts of it, it's surely laughable to dismiss the elements and go to different things.

C SOCRATES: Then according to the present speech, Theaetetus, a syllable must be some single look (*idea*) altogether indivisible into parts.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, my dear, that a little while ago we welcomed the assertion, in the conviction that it was a good point, that speech is not of the first things out of which everything else is composed—inasmuch as each of them, itself by itself, was noncomposite—and it wasn't right to speak about it by applying even 'to be' to it, or 'this' either, on the grounds that they are other and spoken of as not their own but alien to them, and it was this cause precisely that made it be without speech and unknowable?

THEAETETUS: I remember.

D SOCRATES: Is there really, then, anything else than this that's the cause of its being single-specied and not divisible into parts? I for one don't see anything else.

THEAETETUS: It really does appear that there isn't.

SOCRATES: Hasn't the syllable then fallen into the same species as that, if it does not have parts and is a single look (*idea*)?

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

SOCRATES: So if the syllable is many elements and some kind of whole, and these are its parts, then the syllables are as knowable and

sayable as the elements, since all the parts came to light as the same as the whole.

THEAETETUS: Yes indeed. E

SOCRATES: Yes, but if it's one and without parts, a syllable no less than an element is in the same way without speech and unknowable, for the same cause will make them be of the same sort.

THEAETETUS: I cannot speak differently.

SOCRATES: So let's not accept this, whoever says a syllable's knowable and speakable, but for an element it's the contrary.

THEAETETUS: Let's not, provided we're to obey the speech.

SOCRATES: And what of this in turn? Wouldn't you rather accept, on the basis of what you yourself know about your own learning of letters, someone's saying the contrary? 206

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing?

SOCRATES: That you continued to do nothing else in learning than to try to recognize the elements distinctly in sight and in hearing, each one itself by itself, in order that their placement when being spoken and written might not perturb you.

THEAETETUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: And in the lyre-player's studio, to have learned perfectly, was it anything else than the capacity to attend to each note, of what sort of chord it was? It's these that everyone would agree are spoken of as the elements of music? B

THEAETETUS: Nothing else.

SOCRATES: So, after all, in the case of the elements and syllables we ourselves have experience of, if one has to transfer the evidence from them to everything else, we'll say that, in point of grasping each lesson perfectly, the genus of the elements admits of a knowledge more vivid and authoritative than that of the syllable. And if anyone says a syllable is by nature knowable and an element unknowable, we'll be convinced that, willingly or unwillingly, he's being playful.

THEAETETUS: Yes, utterly.

SOCRATES: Well, my impression is that still different proofs of this would also come to light. But let them not make us forget to look at that which lies before us—whatever is meant exactly by saying that if a speech is added to true opinion, the most complete and perfect knowledge is the result. C

THEAETETUS: We must indeed look at it.

SOCRATES: Come then. Whatever does it want 'speech' to signify for us? It's my impression that it's saying some one of three things.

THEAETETUS: Which exactly?

SOCRATES: The first would be that speech is that which makes one's D

own thought evident through sound with words and phrases, just as if it were into a mirror or water one was striking off one's opinion into the stream through one's mouth. Or isn't it your impression that speech is of this sort?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it is. We say, at any rate, that whoever's doing it is speaking.

E
SOCRATES: Isn't it the case, then, that everyone, whoever's not dumb or mute at the start is capable of doing (making) this at least, regardless of whether it's more quickly or more slowly—the indication of what his opinion is about each thing? And in this way as many as opine something rightly, all will evidently have it with speech, and in no case will right opinion any longer prove to be apart from knowledge?

THEAETETUS: True.

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SOCRATES: Well, let's not too readily issue a condemnation, to the effect that whoever declared knowledge to be what we're now examining has made no sense at all. For perhaps the speaker was not saying this, but rather that it's the capacity, when asked what each thing (is), to give the answer back to the questioner through the elements.

THEAETETUS: What are you saying, Socrates? Give an example.

SOCRATES: It's just as Hesiod in fact speaks about a wagon, "But the timbers of a wagon are one hundred."⁸⁵ I for one would not have the capacity to tell them, and I suspect that you wouldn't either, but we would be content should we be asked what a wagon is, if we could say, "Wheels, axle, carriage-body, rails, yoke."

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

B
SOCRATES: Yes, but he would perhaps believe us to be ridiculous, just as if we were asked about your name and answered syllable by syllable. Because, though in this case we're opining and speaking rightly what we're speaking, we believe we're skilled in letters and know (have) and speak in a letter-skilled way the speech of Theaetetus' name. But the fact is, he'd believe, it is impossible to say anything scientifically (knowledgeably) before one goes through each through its elements from end to end with true opinion, and this surely was stated also in the previous remarks.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it was stated.

C
SOCRATES: Well, then, is it in this way too that he'd believe we have a right opinion about a wagon? But that whoever has the capacity to explicate its being through those hundred things of it, by his addition of this, has added speech to his true opinion, and has become, instead of an opiner, artfully competent and a knower of a wagon's being, because he has gone through the whole through its elements from end to end?

- THEAETETUS: Isn't it your impression that it's good, Socrates?
- SOCRATES: Tell me whether it's yours, comrade, and whether you accept the procedure through elements to be speech about each thing, while the procedure which is syllable by syllable or is in terms of something greater still is not-speech (*alogia*), in order that we may go on to examine it. D
- THEAETETUS: Well, I very much accept it.
- SOCRATES: Are you, in accepting it, convinced that anyone whatever is a knower of anything whatever, when he's of the opinion that the same thing belongs at times to the same thing and at times to another, or whenever he opines that another belongs at times to the same thing and at times an other?
- THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.
- SOCRATES: Is it, then, that you don't remember that you and everyone else does this when you start to learn the letters?
- THEAETETUS: Are you saying that in the case of the same syllable, we believe another letter belongs at times to it and at times an other, and we put the same letter at times into the appropriate syllable and at times into a different syllable? E
- SOCRATES: That's what I'm saying.
- THEAETETUS: Well, by Zeus, I'm not one to forget it, and I'm convinced as well that those whose condition is this do not know as yet.
- SOCRATES: What then? Whenever on an occasion of this sort, someone in writing "Theaetetus" believes he must write theta and epsilon and writes it, and then, in turn, in trying to write "Theodorus," believes he must write tau and epsilon and writes it, shall we claim that he knows the first syllable of your names? 208
- THEAETETUS: But we just now agreed that whoever's condition is this does not know as yet.
- SOCRATES: Does anything then stand in the way of the same person being in this condition also in regard to the second, third, and fourth syllable?
- THEAETETUS: No, nothing.
- SOCRATES: Won't he then, at that time, in keeping to the procedure through elements write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, whenever he writes it in succession?
- THEAETETUS: That's plainly so.
- SOCRATES: Though he's still without knowledge but opines what is right, as we claim? B
- THEAETETUS: Yes.
- SOCRATES: Even though he has speech with right opinion, for while he was writing, he was maintaining his way through the elements, and it's this which we agreed was speech.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: So there is after all, comrade, right opinion with speech, which one must not yet call knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Probably.

SOCRATES: Then, it seems, we grew rich just on a dream, in our belief
 C that we had the truest speech of knowledge. Or are we not yet to issue an accusation? For perhaps one will not define it as this, but as the remaining species of the three, just one of which, we said, he will set down as speech, whoever defines knowledge to be right opinion with speech.

THEAETETUS: You recalled it rightly, for there's still one left. One was the image, as it were, of thought in sound, and one was just stated, a going to the whole through elements. But what exactly are you saying is the third?

SOCRATES: It's just what the many would say, to have some sign to say by means of which that which is asked about differs from all things.

THEAETETUS: What speech of what do you have to tell me by way of an example?

D SOCRATES: For example, if you want, in the case of the sun, I suspect this would be enough for you to accept it: "It is the most brilliant of the things that go around the earth across the sky."

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Take it, then, for the sake of which it has been spoken. It is exactly what we were just now saying it is: "If you take the difference of each thing by which it differs from everything else, you'll take, as some say, a speech; but as long as you touch on anything in common, the speech will be for you about those things, whichever they are, of which the commonness is."

E THEAETETUS: I understand. And it's my impression that it's beautiful to call something of the sort a speech.

SOCRATES: But whoever with right opinion takes in addition the difference from all the rest of anything whatever of the things which are will have become a knower of that of which he was previously an opiner.

THEAETETUS: Yes indeed, we say that.

SOCRATES: Now all of a sudden, Theaetetus, I don't understand anything at all, not even a little, since I've got too near to what is being said, just as if it were a shadowpainting. For as long as I stood way off from it, it appeared to me that something was being said.

THEAETETUS: How and why is that?

209 SOCRATES: I'll point it out if I can. If I for one have a right opinion

about you and take in addition the speech about you, that's exactly when I know you, but if not, I only opine.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes, but the interpretation of your difference was agreed to be a speech.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: Then when I was only opining, whatever else I was doing, I was touching in my thought on not one of those things by which you differ from everything else.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely that you weren't.

SOCRATES: So I was thinking something of the common things, none of which you have any more than anyone else.

THEAETETUS: It's a necessity.

B

SOCRATES: Come then, by Zeus. However in a situation of this sort was I opining you rather than anyone else whatsoever? Set me down as thinking, "Here is Theaetetus, whoever is a human being and has a nose and eyes and mouth and so on for each of his limbs." Is it possible that this thought will make me think Theaetetus rather than Theodorus, or the most remote of the proverbial Mysians?⁸⁶

THEAETETUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: But if I think not only the one who has a nose and eyes, but also the snub-nosed and exophthalmic, shall I any the more opine you rather than myself or all who are of this sort?

C

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: But, I suspect, Theaetetus will not be opined in me before this snubness of yours lays down a memorial in me that stamps its difference from all the rest of the snubnesses I have seen, and in this way for all the rest of the things out of which you are—which will remind me—if in fact I meet you tomorrow and make me opine rightly about you.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: So right opinion too would be about the difference of each thing.

D

THEAETETUS: It appears so at least.

SOCRATES: Then the fact of taking a speech in addition to right opinion would still be what? For if, on the one hand, it tells one to opine in addition in what way something differs from everything else, the injunction proves to be very ridiculous.

THEAETETUS: How?

SOCRATES: Of those things of which we have right opinion, by which they differ from everything else, it urges us to take in addition a right opinion of these things by which they differ from everything

E else. And if this is the case, compared to this injunction, the proverbial twirling of a baton, a pestle, or whatever names it goes by,⁸⁷ would be as nothing in point of nonsense. And this injunction would more justly be called the exhortation of a blind man. For to command us to take in addition those things which we have, in order that we may understand (learn) what we're opining, does resemble in a very grand manner a man who is wholly in the dark.

THEAETETUS: Then say what you just now put as if it were a question.⁸⁸

SOCRATES: If to take a speech in addition, my boy, urges us to come to know but not just to opine the difference, what a pleasantry the most beautiful speech of all about knowledge would be! For to come to know is surely to take knowledge, isn't it?

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THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then, it seems, if the speech is asked what knowledge is, it will answer, "Right opinion with knowledge of difference," for according to it, this would be the supplementary taking of a speech.

THEAETETUS: It seems likely.

SOCRATES: And it's really altogether naive, when we are seeking knowledge, for the speech to state it to be right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or anything whatever. So knowledge, Theaetetus, would not, after all, be perception, true opinion, or a speech that's getting added to true opinion.

B

THEAETETUS: It seems unlikely.

SOCRATES: Are we then still pregnant with something, and still suffering labor-pains, my dear, about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

THEAETETUS: Yes, by Zeus, and I for one have said even more on account of you than all I used to have in myself.

SOCRATES: Doesn't our maieutic art then declare all these to have been born as wind-eggs and unworthy of nurture?

THEAETETUS: That's altogether so.

C SOCRATES: Well, then, if you try to become pregnant, Theaetetus, with different things after this, and you do become so, you'll be full of better things on account of the present review. And if you're empty, you'll be less hard on your associates and tamer, believing in a moderate way that you don't know what you don't know. My art is only capable of so much and no more, and I don't know anything at all which everyone else does, all those who are and have been great and amazing men. But my mother and I have obtained from a god as our lot this midwifery, she of women, and *D* I of the young and noble and all the beautiful. Now, however, I have to go to the porch of the king and meet the indictment of Meletus which he's drawn up against me. But at dawn, Theodorus, let's come back here to meet.